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Abstract
We consider tangible economic problems for agents assessing risk by virtue
of dynamic coherent and convex risk measures or, equivalently, utility in
terms of dynamic multiple priors and variational preferences in an uncertain
environment.
Solutions to the Best-Choice problem for a risky number of applicants are
well-known. In Chapter 2, we set up a model with an ambiguous number
of applicants when the agent assess utility with multiple prior preferences.
We achieve a solution by virtue of multiple prior Snell envelopes for a model
based on so called assessments. The main result enhances us with conditions
for the ambiguous problem to possess finitely many stopping islands.
In Chapter 3 we consider general optimal stopping problems for an agent
assessing utility by virtue of dynamic variational preferences. Introducing
variational supermartingales and an accompanying theory, we obtain optimal
solutions for the stopping problem and a minimax result. To illustrate, we
consider prominent examples: dynamic entropic risk measures and a dynamic
version of generalized average value at risk.
In Chapter 4, we tackle the problem how anticipation of risk in an uncer-
tain environment changes when information is gathered in course of time. A
constructive approach by virtue of the minimal penalty function for dynamic
convex risk measures reveals time-consistency problems. Taking the robust
representation of dynamic convex risk measures as given, we show that all
uncertainty is revealed in the limit, i.e. agents behave as expected utility
maximizers given the true underlying distribution. This result is a gener-
alization of the fundamental Blackwell-Dubins theorem showing coherent as
well as convex risk measures to merge in the long run.
Keywords: Uncertainty, Dynamic Variational Preferences, Dynamic Multi-
ple Prior Preferences, Dynamic Convex Risk Measures, Dynamic Coherent
Risk Measures, Dynamic Penalty, Robust Representation, Time-Consistency,
Best-Choice Problem, Optimal Stopping, Blackwell-Dubins Theorem

If we begin with certainties,
we shall end in doubts;
if we begin with doubts,
and are patient,
we shall end in certainties.
Marcus Aurelius
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Chapter 1
General Introduction
In light of the current financial crisis accompanied by an unprecedented
amount of uncertainty in markets, financial industry as well as market su-
pervisors are in need of sophisticated yet applicable instruments to quantify
and manage risk. Therefore, the general question how agents anticipate risk
in uncertain environments is not just one of theoretical interest in economists
but necessitates a wholehearted and understandably framed answer procur-
able to be adopted by professionals in real world practice.
1.1 An Axiomatic Approach to Risk Mea-
surement
For the financial industry, value at risk (VaR) still seems to be the standard
approach in quantification of risk despite its several well known shortcomings
elaborately discussed e.g. in [McNeil et al., 05]: A danger in applying VaR
is the possibility of accumulating a highly risky portfolio and the fact that
diversification effects might not be accounted for. The prominence of VaR as
industry standard is mainly owed to its simplicity and intuitiveness. In over-
coming these shortcomings, alternative approaches to risk assessment have
to be introduced which result in risk measures that are easily communicated,
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intuitive and straightforward to implement for solving tangible problems. As
an example, alternative risk measures have to be readably applicable to min-
imal capital requirement models in line with the Basel II accord to ensure
financial stability for banking institutions while being easily manageable.
A sensible axiomatic approach to quantify risk was first mentioned in
[Artzner et al., 99] for a static setting: The authors introduced the notion
of coherent risk measures assessing risk of projects considered as real valued
random variables. Several other references as [Delbaen, 02] advanced upon
this approach for more general probability spaces. The approach to coherent
risk measures is based on four quite intuitive axioms and leads to a simple
and hence applicable robust representation that we encounter later. We will
rigorously introduce the underlying notion of risk measures in the respective
chapters of this thesis. However, for the sake of completeness and an intuitive
understanding at this stage, the four axioms for a risk measure to be coherent
are given by monotonicity, cash invariance, sub-additivity and positive homo-
geneity of degree one. The major advantage of coherent risk measures is their
simple and intuitive robust representation in terms of maximized expected
loss as elaborated below. Furthermore, coherent risk measures do not ne-
cessitate a specific probabilistic model and hence help to significantly reduce
model risk in applications. However, coherent risk measures have two ma-
jor shortcomings: First, they overestimate risk as they lead to a worst-case
approach by virtue of robust representation: An issue that has to be scoped
with from point of view of financial institutions having an intrinsic interest
in assessing risk not too conservatively when calculating minimal capital re-
quirements. Secondly, due to the assumption of homogeneity, coherent risk
measures do not take into account liquidity risk as one of the major problems
in the current financial crisis.
As an advancement, convex risk measures are introduced inter alia in
[Fo¨llmer & Schied, 04] for a static setting: The assumptions of sub-additivity
and homogeneity are replaced by convexity, intuitively stating that diversifi-
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cation reduces risk. It is immediately seen that coherent risk measures are a
special class of convex ones.
The prominent VaR is neither coherent nor convex. However, average
value at risk (AVaR), also called expected shortfall or conditional value at
risk in respective literature, is coherent as it, intuitively speaking, considers
not just quantiles but has a closer look in the respective tails of a distribu-
tion. The most prominent example for a convex risk measure is entropic risk
conveying an elegant intuition discussed below.
Of course, financial markets are intrinsically dynamic and agents are sup-
posed to use information they gain in course of time. Hence, dynamic convex
risk measures are considered in many of the cited references. Dynamic coher-
ent risk measures can inter alia be found in [Riedel, 04] or [Artzner et al., 07].
Wholehearted elaborations of dynamic convex risk measures are given in
[Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06] or [Fo¨llmer et al., 09] for risky projects seen as pay-
offs in the last period and in [Cheridito et al, 06] for risky projects seen as
stochastic processes.
To give some flesh to the bone without being mathematically precise at
this stage, consider a risky project X and an information process given by
filtration (Ft)t. We then call a family (ρt)t of (Ft)t-adapted random variables
a dynamic convex risk measure if each ρt is a conditional convex risk measure
and hence possesses the robust representation
ρt(X) = ess sup
Q
{
EQ [−X| Ft]− αt(Q)
}
for some dynamic (minimal) penalty function (αt)t. Intuitively, at time t the
agent evaluates risk of a position X as the maximal conditional expected
loss with respect to all possible distributions but has to be compensated
by nature for choosing a specific distribution in terms of the non-negative
penalty. In this sense, robust representation of convex risk is a maximized
penalized expected loss. Intuitively, the smaller the penalty the more likely
the agent considers the respective distribution to be the correct probabilistic
3
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model ruling the world. As coherent risk measures are just a special case
of convex ones, they also satisfy this robust representation but in terms of
a much simpler penalty that can only take the values zero or infinity and
is, hence, called trivial penalty further on. Throughout we consider robust
representation in terms of minimal penalty.
By virtue of the robust representation above, a convex risk measure is
uniquely characterized by its minimal penalty function. Given a coherent
and a convex risk measure for which the sets of distributions with infinite
penalty coincide, we see that the convex risk measure assesses risk more
liberally than the coherent one: A conservative over estimation of risk when
using coherent risk measures is the price we have to pay for substantially
reducing model risk. In other terms, if two agents assess risk in a convex
manner, the first one with penalty (α1t )t, the second one with penalty (α
2
t )t,
then, given (α1t )t ≥ (α2t )t, the first agent is less uncertainty averse. In this
sense, the penalty is a measure for uncertainty aversion. In other terms, (ρ1t )t
assesses risk more liberal than (ρ2t )t.
When considering dynamic problems under convex risk, the integral ques-
tion is how conditional convex risk measures at distinct time-periods are
connected. To scope with this issue, the notion of time-consistency was in-
troduced. It is inter alia elaborately discussed in [Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06] and
[Cheridito et al, 06]. Formally, time-consistency is defined as ρt = ρt(−ρt+1),
a Bellman equation for nature, the intuition of which is given in the respec-
tive chapters of this thesis. By virtue of the robust representation, time-
consistency of a dynamic convex risk measure can equivalently be stated as
a property of the minimal penalty function, called the no-gain condition. In
the coherent case, time-consistency reduces to a stability condition on the
set of distributions for which penalty vanishes, the set of multiple priors.
This stability condition and equivalent notions are inter alia discussed in
[Riedel, 09].
4
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1.2 A Preference Based Alternative
So far, we have focused on risk measures as underlying objects. Equivalently,
we can build our results on a preference based point of view of the problem.
Multiple prior preferences were introduced in [Gilboa & Schmeidler, 89] and
applied to a dynamic framework in [Epstein & Schneider, 03]. These types
of preferences are, assuming ambiguity aversion but risk neutrality as well
as a discount factor of unity and no intermediate payoffs, equivalent to co-
herent risk measures: Robust representation of multiple prior preferences is
the same as the one for coherent risk measures up to a minus sign. In that
sense, an agent evaluating utility of a risky project in an uncertain environ-
ment in terms of multiple priors, considers the minimal expected payoff with
respect to all distributions she deems likely to rule the world, i.e. have a
vanishing penalty. [Riedel, 09] approaches optimal stopping problems with
respect to multiple priors and thereto generalizes the Snell envelope approach
appropriately.
The preference based equivalent to convex risk measures is given by varia-
tional preferences, introduced in a static set up in [Maccheroni et al., 06a] and
generalized to a dynamic framework in [Maccheroni et al., 06b]. For the sake
of intuitive convenience, [Cheridito et al, 06] actually state their theory of
time-consistent dynamic convex risk measures in terms of utility functionals
instead of risk measures. As for the equivalence of coherent risk measures and
multiple priors, the robust representation of variational preferences coincides
with that of convex risk measures up to a minus sign: Robust representation
of variational preferences might hence be seen as a minimal penalized expec-
tation. In the dynamic setting, time-consistency considerations are the same
for the preference based approach as for the one in terms of risk measures
and result in the no-gain condition on the minimal penalty function.
Given these considerations, we note that it does not matter for our in-
sights whether we apply the preference based approach or the ansatz by
5
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virtue of risk measures: Each chapter may be reformulated in terms of the
other approach. However, in chapters 3 and 4, we consider a theory in terms
of dynamic variational preferences. Chapter 5 is based on dynamic convex
risk measures.
1.3 Particular Considerations
The main chapters of this thesis, each of which self contained in notation,
are based on three articles. The first two consider optimal behavior of agents
assessing risk in terms of coherent and convex risk measures or, equivalently,
assessing utility in terms of multiple prior preferences and variational pref-
erences. The third one is concerned with merging of dynamic convex risk
measures as information is gained in course of time. The latter chapter is
coauthored by Monika Bier.
As we have already mentioned, there are basically three distinct but equiv-
alent ways to introduce convex and hence coherent risk measures. First, by
virtue of an axiomatic system. Secondly, through a robust representation as
given above. Lastly, in terms of acceptance sets. The latter approach makes
explicit that, intuitively, a risk measure might be seen as the smallest amount
of numeraire that is necessary to make the agent accept a risky project. This
intuitively shows the tight connection of risk measures to preferences. The
starting point for our discussions in the subsequent chapters, however, will be
the robust representation of convex risk measures or variational preferences,
respectively. In this sense, we build our models on fundamental results con-
cerning the representation of time-consistent dynamic convex risk measures
as inter alia stated in [Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06].
In Chapter 2 we generalize the so called Best-Choice problem to multiple
priors. Extensions of the “simple” Best-Choice or Secretary problem are in-
ter alia introduced in [Gilbert & Mosteller, 66] or [Freeman, 83]. Solutions to
the problem for a risky number of applicants, i.e. when the number of appli-
6
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cants is given by a random variable with a known distribution, can be found
in [Presman & Sonin, 72], [Stewart, 81], [Petrucelli, 83] and [Irle, 80]. Here,
we set up a model with an ambiguous number of applicants, i.e. a distinct
distribution on the random number of applicants is not known. An impossi-
bility result shows the natural ambiguous generalization of the risky model
not to be solvable in terms of a time-consistent approach. We achieve a solu-
tion by virtue of the multiple prior Snell envelope introduced in [Riedel, 09]
for the ambiguous model based on so called assessments. The main result
enhances us with conditions for the ambiguous problem to possess finitely
many stopping islands and constitutes a generalization of the main result
in [Presman & Sonin, 72]. A major practical contribution of our ambiguous
model is elimination of model risk that is highly apparent in the risky setup
of the problem. However, before building our own model for the Best-Choice
problem under ambiguity, we take some time to review extensions of the
problem with a fixed number of applicants and discuss distinct approaches
to the problem with a risky number of applicants.
In Chapter 3 we consider general optimal stopping problems of pay-
off processes for an agent assessing risk in a convex manner as set out in
[Cheridito et al, 06] or, equivalently, assessing utility by virtue of dynamic
variational preferences as in [Maccheroni et al., 06b]. By generalizing the
approach in [Riedel, 09] from the coherent to the convex case introducing
variational supermartingales and an accompanying theory, we obtain optimal
solutions for the stopping problem and a minimax result. As a byproduct, we
generalize the model in [Maccheroni et al., 06b] to the case of infinite proba-
bility spaces. To illustrate the main results, we consider prominent examples:
dynamic entropic risk measures and a dynamic version of generalized average
value at risk (gAVaR); for our theory to be applicable, we have to introduce
a time-consistent dynamic version of gAVaR.
Having discussed risk optimal behavior of agents in the foregoing two
chapters, in Chapter 4, coauthored by Monika Bier, we answer the follow-
7
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ing question: How does anticipation of risk and, hence, optimal behavior in
an uncertain environment change when information is gathered in course of
time? We answer this question in terms of dynamic convex risk measures or,
equivalently, dynamic variational preferences. Therefore, we first introduce
a constructive approach by virtue of the minimal penalty function conceived
as likelihood of priors showing that time-consistency turns out to be a ma-
jor problem when explicitly constructing a dynamic penalty. Hence, in the
second part of that chapter we take the robust representation of dynamic
convex risk measures as given and show that all uncertainty is revealed in
the limit, i.e. distinct agents behave as expected utility maximizers given
the true underlying distribution. In other terms, distinct dynamic convex
risk measures merge to conditional expectation with respect to the under-
lying distribution as information increases. Note, it is just uncertainty that
is revealed: There is still risk going on by virtue of the underlying distri-
bution. This result is a generalization of the fundamental Blackwell-Dubins
theorem, cp. [Blackwell & Dubins, 62], to convex risk measures. A particular
achievement is the extension of the Blackwell-Dubins theorem to not neces-
sarily time-consistent convex risk measures. We thus obtain a more general
existence result for limiting risk measures than [Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06]. As
an application we consider dynamic entropic risk measures.
So far, we have just quite briefly discussed related literature. As the sub-
ject matters of the underlying articles are quite different, a scientific place-
ment of our results within the literature seems cumbersome in this general
introduction. Hence, elaborate discussions on literature and relevance of our
results are stated in the respective chapters.
As the intuition of our results can mostly be inferred from the respective
mathematical proofs, we have decided to state them within the chapters and
not in separate appendices.
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Chapter 2
The Best-Choice Problem with
an Ambiguous Number of
Applicants
2.1 Introduction
The Best-Choice or Secretary problem is not just a popular anecdote you
can tell at dinner parties but constitutes a whole field in stochastic optimiza-
tion theory. The origin of this problem is not quite clear today but traces
back to the 1950s. Historical abridgments may be found in [Freeman, 83] or
[Ferguson, 89]. The latter article summarizes the “simple” Secretary problem
as follows:
• You are ought to assign a position as a secretary to exactly one of n ∈ N
applicants; n is known.
• Applicants are interviewed sequentially in random order and ranked
relative to the ones already interviewed. The decision to accept an
applicant, i.e. to stop the process of job interviews, is based on relative
ranks only.
2. AMBIGUOUS BEST-CHOICE PROBLEM
• Once rejected, a job candidate cannot be recalled upon.
• You want to have the best secretary: You obtain payoff 1 if choosing
the best applicant among all n and zero else. Put equivalently, you
want to find a stopping time for the interview process maximizing the
probability of accepting the best applicant.
The solution to this formulation, i.e. the stopping rule that maximizes the
probability of choosing the best applicant, is well known:
• Given s ∈ N. Reject the first s− 1 applicants and then accept the first
relatively best thereafter.
• Choose s to maximize the probability of choosing the best applicant
among all n within the last n− s. For n 0, s ≈ 1
e
n ≈ 1
3
n.
Due to the variety of distinct formulations of the Secretary problems, it seems
worthwile to consider a generic definition:
Definition 2.1.1 ([Ferguson, 89], p.284). A Secretary Problem is a sequen-
tial observation and selection problem in which the payoff [and the decision
to stop] depends on the observations only through their relative ranks and not
otherwise on their actual values.1
Though we use the above definition, three types of Secretary Problems
are customarily distinguished:
• The no-information problem: only the rank of an upcoming applicant
is observable. All orderings are equally probable.2
1In this very definition, we already see the problem of talking about ambiguity: By
definition, a Secretary problem is considered under ambiguity as there is no distribution
of actual values known. However, when we talk of ambiguity in context of this problem,
we mean an ambiguous number of applicants.
2[Chudjakow & Riedel, 09] introduce ambiguity about the orderings.
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• The full-information problem: To each applicant, an actual value can
be attached. These values are distributed with a known probability
distribution.
• The partial-information problem: Actual values of applicants are ob-
served but the distribution is only partially known, i.e. belongs to some
family (Fθ)θ∈Θ with unknown parameter θ.
As mentioned in [Ferguson, 89], a first rigorous approach to the Secretary
problem is elaborated in [Lindley, 61]: A solution to the finite horizon prob-
lem as well as an approximation for the infinite horizon problem is discussed.
In advance, a more general utility function than above is considered. Sur-
prisingly, the partial-information and the no-information problem are quite
similar: [Stewart, 78] shows that a non-informative prior leads to the same
solution as the no-information problem, i.e. bayesian learning does not con-
tribute to maximizing the probability of choosing the best applicant.
The concern of this article is to extend the Secretary problem to ambigu-
ity. Introducing ambiguity may be done in two distinct ways: First, in the no-
information case, ambiguity is introduced about the number n of applicants.
In the simple problem above, n is fixed and known to the observer. Several
extensions relax this assumption by introducing risk : [Presman & Sonin, 72]
assume a random number N of applicants being distributed by a known
prior distribution on N. Another approach, makes use of applicants arriving
at poisson random times with known parameter and choice to be accom-
plished before a fixed time horizon, e.g. [Stewart, 81]. In our approach, we
assume applicants arriving at fixed times 1, 2, . . . and introducing ambiguity
over the number of applicants N in terms of multiple priors. A second ap-
proach would be introducing ambiguity over arrival times, e.g. ambiguous
poisson arrival times, up to a fixed time horizon T .
Secondly, ambiguity could be introduced over the actual qualification of
applicants in the partial information setting, usually considered to be risky
11
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but not uncertain. In this sense, the no-information problem considered here
is a case of maximal ambiguity on qualifications.
To be precise, here we tackle the no-information problem with an ambigu-
ous number of applicants. Our approach to ambiguity is based on (recursive)
multiple priors as in [Gilboa & Schmeidler, 89] and [Epstein & Schneider, 03]
on the number of applicants, applied to optimal stopping as in [Riedel, 09].
An alternative approach to ambiguity makes use of non-additive measures, so
called capacities, and corresponding Choquet integrals with respect to those
(cp. [Fo¨llmer & Schied, 04]). These allow for uncertainty averse as well as
uncertainty loving agents (cp. [Skulj, 01]) and the degree of convexity of the
capacity is a measure for uncertainty averseness. However, for optimal stop-
ping problems the multiple priors framework seems more adequate. Under
the assumption of uncertainty averseness both approaches are equivalent, as
stated in [Chateauneuf, 1991].
[Riedel, 09] shows that an uncertainty averse but risk neutral agent in a
time-consistent dynamic ambiguous setup behave as expected utility max-
imizer with respect to some worst-case distribution as she plays against a
malevolent nature, underpinning [Gilbert & Mosteller, 66], where the prob-
lem is modeled as a two person game: one player chooses the applicant,
the other the order in which applicants are presented in order to minimize
the observers probability of choosing the best. Such a two person game
in a risky and in an ambiguous context is also discussed in [Bruss, 84] and
[Hill & Krengel, 91], respectively.
In course of modeling and solving the ambiguous Best-Choice problem,
we have also to tackle the following problem: As usual, a stopping time only
depends on the information gathered so far. Hence, in the no-information
case, the decision to stop at time t only hinges on the relative rank of the tth
applicant. In case of a fixed or a risky number of applicants, if t is a candidate,
the optimal solution is measurable with respect to the σ-algebra generated by
the relative rankings up to time t, i.e. the stopping rule is a random variable
12
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but at the realization at time t it is known whether to stop or not for sure.
Hence, we call these deterministic stopping rules. In [Presman & Sonin, 72]
it is shown that randomization at time t does not increase expected payoff,
a result extended in [Abdel-Hamid et al., 82]. Thus, it is enough to con-
sider deterministic stopping rules. However, [Hill & Krengel, 91] consider
randomized stopping rules. Such a rule τ is not measurable with respect
to the sigma algebra generated by the relative ranks up to time t but sat-
isfies {τ = t} ∈ σ(R1, U1, . . . , Rt, Ut), where the Ri’s denote relative ranks
and the Ui’s independent random experiments. Intuitively: At time t, the
stopping rule specifies a random experiment, e.g. tossing a coin, whose out-
come determines stopping or not. In other words, at time t, we stop with a
probability that is fixed upon realization at t. Randomized stopping times
are discussed in [Siegmund, 67]. As we will see, in our model it suffices to
consider deterministic rules.
We will encounter that a straightforward ambiguous generalization of the
risky setup in [Presman & Sonin, 72] is not only doubtful from an economic
perspective but also does not satisfy the crucial time-consistency condition
needed for solving the problem: We show an intuitive impossibility result
stating that time-consistency cannot be achieved by virtue of a set of priors
on N and come up with a distinct approach based on so called assessments
µ := (µi)i, i.e. families of distributions on the number of applicants, where µi
may be thought of as the distribution on the number of applicants the agent
considers being correct upon observing the ith applicant. Multiple priors in
this framework then correspond to the distributions of the candidate process
induced by multiple assessments.
Having obtained an adequate model in terms of assessments inducing
time-consistent multiple priors, we solve the problem by virtue of minimax
Snell envelopes as introduced in [Riedel, 09] and obtain our main result: The
ambiguous version of Theorem 3.1 in [Presman & Sonin, 72] giving neces-
sary and sufficient conditions for the solution to the ambiguous Best-Choice
13
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problem to consist of finitely many stopping islands. A stopping island is,
intuitively speaking, a set of applicants, which, if observed to be better than
all applicants interviewed before, are optimal to be chosen. The theorem fur-
thermore characterizes these stopping islands. To understand the importance
of such a theorem it has to be noted, that the “simple” Best-Choice problem
is monotone and hence there is just one stopping island up to infinity. This
monotonicity property does not hold any longer in the risky as well as in the
ambiguous case.
Before turning to a mathematical formulation and solution to the issue,
we should ask if the Best-Choice problem is worthwhile for applications or if
it is just for theoretical considerations. [Stewart, 78] gives two examples, a
third is given in [Gilbert & Mosteller, 66]; the fourth is the usual application
thought of today:
• Selling a single item: You have your old car for sale but no information
on the market price. Prospective buyers arrive in random order telling
the amount willing to pay. Either you stop and sell your car to some
buyer or you send him away.3
• Exploration of resources: You are exploring oil deposits in the Middle
East. When you have found a deposit you either stop and exploit it or
you go on exploring. If not exploiting a deposit, someone else will do
so.
• Atomic bomb inspection programs: You try to maximize the probabil-
ity of finding a repository where illegal weapons-usable plutonium is
stored.4
3[Stewart, 78] argues that the first example should be considered in the context of
poisson arrival times.
4This particular example is more intuitive when modeled as a two person game as e.g. in
[Gilbert & Mosteller, 66]: You want to maximize the probability of finding the repository
by choosing an appropriate stopping rule whereas your opponent tries to minimize this
probability by choosing the appropriate random order of examined repositories.
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• Optimal exercise of an option or other financial derivatives.
As we see, the application changes over time but the integral problem, and
in particular the mathematical methods, remain the same.
Having discussed the importance of the problem in economics, the last
question to answer is: What value is added when considering this problem in
an ambiguous set-up? First, we substantially decrease model risk apparent in
the risky setup of the problem as a probabilistic model regarding the number
of applicants has to be chosen and this respective model might just be wrong.
Secondly, having a look at financial markets nowadays, a lot of uncertainty
is “going on” there. No clear cut probability distributions can be attached to
derivatives as not enough information is available or volatility is hitting in
too strongly. In this case, an ambiguous or, equivalently, coherent approach
seems a valuable ansatz for solving problems as e.g. pricing derivatives. In
particular, with no information available, expert judgement tends to favor
worst case solutions being theoretically underpinned within our framework.
The article is structured as follows: The next section discusses the “sim-
ple” Best-Choice problem and related extensions. The third section intro-
duces the Secretary problem with a risky number of applicants, first by
showing distinct approaches to model the problem and then discussing a
concrete model. The fourth section is the main part of this article: We first
recall the approach to optimal stopping as set out in [Riedel, 09]. Then,
we introduce a direct generalization of the risky Best-Choice Problem to an
ambiguous one and show why this is not feasible. Thereafter, we model the
ambiguous problem in terms of so called assessments and solve it by virtue
of the multiple prior Snell envelope. The main result of this article gener-
alizes the main result in [Presman & Sonin, 72] to the ambiguous case and
gives necessary and sufficient conditions for the solution to the ambiguous
Best-Choice problem to consist of finitely many stopping islands. The last
section concludes.
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2.2 The Fundamental Problem
Before turning to the ambiguous model, we briefly set out the “simple” Best-
Choice problem with a fixed number of applicants n ∈ N, known to the
agent. This section is divided into two parts: the no-information and the
full-information problem. We achieve optimal strategies and respective choice
probabilities as well as asymptotic results.
2.2.1 The No-Information Best Choice Problem
[Gilbert & Mosteller, 66] restate the problem in the following fashion: Given
an urn with n balls, each with a different number but the range of numbers
not known to the agent. The balls are drawn sequentially without replace-
ment. The agent is reported the number on the ball but does not know which
numbers are left in the urn, in particular has no information on the distribu-
tion of draws or even its range. Hence, the decision can only depend on rel-
ative ranks of draws. Equivalently, we could, as in [Gilbert & Mosteller, 66],
just report the current rank to the agent. When reported the current rank,
the agent must choose between keeping the current ball or continuing draw-
ing. The problem is to maximize the probability of choosing the ball with
the largest number among all n balls, or in other words to stop at the true
maximum of the sequence. Equivalently, we endow the agent with a utility
function only accounting for the best and the agent has to maximize expected
utility. We will now make the problem rigorous.
Definition 2.2.1. (a) Let Yi denote the relative rank of the i
th applicant
among the first i, i ≤ n. Let Y¯i denote its absolute rank among all n appli-
cants.
(b) We call applicant i a candidate (or current maximum), if Yi = 1. We
call i the true maximum (or the best) if Y¯i = 1.
More formally: Let (Ω,F ,P) be some arbitrary underlying probability
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space, Y¯i : Ω → {1, . . . , n}, i = 1, . . . , n, the absolute rank and Yi : Ω →
{1, . . . , i}, i = 1, . . . , n, the relative rank. Define the filtration (Fi)i≤n by
Fi := σ(Y1, . . . , Yi) and F0 = {∅,Ω}. Having in mind the intuition of a
filtration as information process, (Fi)i≤n states: Upon arrival of applicant
i, the agent can only observe her relative rank. In particular Y¯i is not Fi-
measurable for i < n.
Define a (random) utility function u : {1, . . . , n} ×Ω→ R from stopping
at applicant i for the agent as follows:
ui =
{
1 if Y¯i = 1,
0 else.
As we see, ui 6∈ Fi, i.e. (ui)i≤n is not adapted and hence not an admissible
payoff process for our problem.5 The natural way to introduce an adapted
payoff process built on this utility function is to consider its projection on
(Fi)i≤n, i.e. its conditional expectation. Hence, we define the adapted payoff
process (Xi)i≤n from stopping at applicant i upon observing by
Xi := EP [ui| Fi] = P(Y¯i = 1|Y1, . . . Yi, i) = P(Y¯i = 1|Yi, i),
where the last equation reflects the Marcovian nature of the problem. In
words, Xi is the expected payoff from stopping at applicant i or, in other
terms, the probability of applicant i being the best given her current rank.
Let T denote the set of all stopping times, i.e. all mappings τ : Ω →
{1, . . . , n} such that {τ ≤ i} ∈ Fi, then the no-information Best Choice
problem is defined by its value function (Vi)i≤n:
Remark 2.2.2 (Agent’s Problem). For n ≥ i ≥ 0 the value function V :=
5Intuitively, to evaluate u(i, ·) we need all information up to the last applicant n.
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(Vi)i≤n of the problem is given by
Vi := max
τ∈T,τ≥i
EP[Xτ |Fi] = max
τ∈T,τ≥i
EP
[
EP[uτ |Fτ ]
∣∣Fi]
= max
τ∈T,τ≥i
EP[uτ |Fi]
= max
τ∈T,τ≥i
P(Y¯τ = 1|Fi) (2.1)
= max
τ∈T,τ≥i
P(Y¯τ = 1|Yi, i).
Note that Vi is an Fi-measurable random variable.
Proposition 2.2.3. Equation (2.1), the Best-Choice problem, is solved by
the smallest optimal stopping time:
τ ∗ := min
i
{i ≥ s∗|Yi = 1} ∧ n,
where s∗ solves
n−1∑
k=s∗
1
k
≤ 1 <
n−1∑
k=s∗−1
1
k
.
Proof. As stated in [Neveu, 75], Section VI.1, the value function (Vs)s≤n of
an optimal stopping problem satisfies the Bellman equation and hence
Vs = max
P(Y¯s = 1|Fs)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=Xs
;EP[Vs+1|Fs]
 .
for s < n and Vn := un = Xn. Let’s assume interviewing the s
th applicant,
s ≤ n. If s = n, we always stop as there is no better to come even if she is
not ranked first. If she is not a candidate, i.e. Ys > 1, and s < n, the value
is given by
Vs = max{P(Y¯s = 1|Ys > 1, s ≤ n);EP[Vs+1|Ys > 1, s ≤ n]}
= EP[Vs+1|Ys > 1, s ≤ n] = max
τ>s
P[Y¯τ = 1|Ys > 1, s ≤ n],
since Ys > 1 implies Y¯s > 1 P-a.s. Hence, an applicant not being a candidate
is never accepted and stopping does not occur at s.
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Now assume s to be a candidate. In this case P(Y¯s = 1|Ys) > 0 and hence,
if s < n,
Vs = max{P(Y¯s = 1|Ys = 1);EP[Vs+1|Ys = 1]}
is non-trivial. By the principle of backwards induction, we stop at s, if the
probability of applicant s being best exceeds that of choosing the best appli-
cant from applicant s+ 1 onwards, i.e.
P(Y¯s = 1|Ys = 1) ≥ EP[Vs+1|Ys = 1]. (2.2)
In other words, the payoff at s exceeds the conditional expected payoff from
going on with optimal stopping strategy. We have
P(Y¯s = 1|Ys = 1) = s
n
.
This term is increasing in s, i.e. the later we observe a candidate, the higher
the probability that she is best. The second part of the value function above,
i.e. the probability of winning with the best strategy from s+ 1 onwards, is,
by monotonicity of probability measures, decreasing in s. Hence, the optimal
strategy is of the form: pass the first s∗ draws and take the first candidate
thereafter.6
Given this form of an optimal strategy, we now compute EP[Vs∗+1|Fs∗ ]
as the probability of winning with the optimal strategy when rejecting s
applicants. By combinatoric considerations, we have for all k, and s∗ ≤ k
P(Y¯k = 1) =
1
n
, P(Ys∗+1 > 1, . . . , Yk−1 > 1) =
s∗
k − 1 ,
meaning that the relatively best applicant in 1, . . . , k − 1 is in 1, . . . , s∗ − 1.
Hence, by independence,
P(Ys∗+1 > 1, . . . , Yk−1 > 1 ∧ Y¯k = 1) = s
∗
n(k − 1) .
6In the process of modeling the problem in the risky and the ambiguous setup, we see
that this monotonicity property does not necessarily hold when n is not deterministic.
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Summing up, we achieve the probability of accepting the best applicant
when accepting the first candidate after applicant s∗, i.e. the probability of
winning with a strategy of the optimal type:
EP[Vs∗+1|Fs∗ ]
= P
(
n⋃
k=s∗+1
{Y ∗s + 1 > 1, . . . , Yk−1 > 1 ∧ Y¯k = 1}
)
=
n∑
k=s∗+1
s∗
n(k − 1) .
By equation (2.2), we have the optimal s, say s∗, to satisfy
s
n
≥ s
n
n∑
k=s+1
1
k − 1 ∧
s− 1
n
<
s− 1
n
n∑
k=s
1
k − 1 ,
or, equivalently, s∗ solves
n−1∑
k=s∗
1
k
≤ 1 <
n−1∑
k=s∗−1
1
k
.
Remark 2.2.4. The intuition of the last inequality is immediate: The ex-
pected number of candidates following s∗ − 1 has to be at least 1, whereas
the expected number of candidates following the one at s∗ has to be less than
one, having in mind that the last candidate is the best applicant. Intuitively,
a strategy that passes the first s∗ observations may fail if the best applicant
already appears among the first s∗ ones or if between the (s∗ + 1)st and the
best applicant there is candidate who is then mistakenly chosen.
Approximate results for s∗ are available: For large n, we can use the Euler
approximation and obtain
P(
n⋃
k=s
{Ys > 1, . . . , Yk−1 > 1 ∧ Y¯k = 1}) ≈ s
n
ln
n
s
.
Maximizing the last term yields s∗ = n
e
and a corresponding probability of
choosing the best of 1
e
, where e denotes the Euler constant.
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Remark 2.2.5 (On Snell envelopes). The foregoing proof was explicitly
achieved in terms of backward induction via the Bellman equation. This is,
however, just an explicit way of solving optimal stopping problems in terms of
Snell envelopes (Ui)i≤n.7 For the sake of completeness, we briefly reconsider
the foregoing proof: For an adapted processes (Xi)i≤n, the minimal optimal
stopping time is given by τ ∗ = inf{i ≥ 0|Xi ≥ Ui}, where the Snell envelope
(Ui)i≤n for the no-information Best-Choice problem is recursively defined by
Un := Xn = P(Y¯n = 1|Fn) = 1{Yn=1}(Yn)
Ui := max
{
Xi;EP[Ui+1|Fi]
}
= max
{
P(Y¯i = 1|Fi);EP[Ui+1|Fi]
}
for i < n. We see that this is just the Bellman equation.8 Having in mind
– as already extensively used – that the payoff only depends on the observed
rank of the applicant, we evaluate the distinct parts of the Snell envelope:
P(Y¯i = 1|Yi > 1) = 0,
P(Y¯i = 1|Yi = 1) = i
n
,
EP[Ui+1|Fi] = i
n
n−1∑
k=i
1
k
,
where the last equation is shown in the foregoing proof. Hence,
Ui = max
{
i
n
I{Y1=1} + 0I{Y1>1};
i
n
n−1∑
k=i
1
k
}
and we obtain as smallest optimal stopping rule
τ ∗ = min
{
i ≥ 1
∣∣∣∣∣ in ≥ in
n−1∑
k=i
1
k
∧ Yi = 1
}
= min
{
i ≥ s
∣∣∣∣∣ s = arg mint≤n
{
t
n
≥ t
n
n−1∑
k=t
1
k
}
∧ Yi = 1
}
7The theory of Snell envelopes will be discussed in more detail in course of this article.
8In particular, we have (Ui)i≤n = (Vi)i≤n.
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= min
{
i ≥ s
∣∣∣∣∣
n−1∑
k=s
1
k
≤ 1 <
n−1∑
k=s−1
1
k
∧ Yi = 1
}
n→∞≈ min
{
i ≥ 1
e
∣∣∣∣ Yi = 1} ,
a solution, which of course equals our result in Proposition 2.2.3.
2.2.2 The Full-Information Best-Choice Problem
For the sake of completeness we briefly consider the Best Choice problem
without any ambiguity: We have full knowledge about the distribution of
applicants’ qualifications as well as the number of applicants is fixed.
Let therefore (Wi)i≤n be a family of random variables, iid with distribu-
tion F each. The agent wants to maximize the probability of choosing the
largest draw. Since only the largest counts and nothing else, we may without
loss of generality set F = U [0, 1], the uniform distribution on the interval
[0, 1]. Now, we call the ith draw a candidate if Wi = maxk≤i{Wk}.
In the no-information problem, s∗ observations were needed to gain infor-
mation. This is not the case here: If we, for example, observe the first draw
very close to unity, the probability of larger observations is relatively small
and hence, it might even be optimal, to accept the first draw. Thus, in the
current problem, the decision is not only contingent on an applicant being a
candidate or not and its time of observation but also on her current value.
As we will see, the general rule turns out to be: Accept the first candidate
exceeding some decision number corresponding to the qualification of that
applicant.
The sequence of optimal decision numbers may be obtained by backward
induction and only depends on the number of remaining draws: The last draw
Wn is always accepted. Hence, the decision number is b1 = 0. Assume that
we have not accepted an applicant up to the second to last, Wn−1 = w, and
that Wn−1 = maxi≤n−1Wi. Recall, that we will never accept non-candidates.
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Then
P(Wn ≥ w) = 1− w.
Hence, if w ≥ 1
2
, we choose it; otherwise, we go on, maximizing the probability
of winning in the second to last step. Hence, we have b2 =
1
2
. In this sense,
the decision numbers are just those values for candidates’ qualifications that
make the agent indifferent between stopping an going on just in the same
fashion as in the proof of Proposition 2.2.3.
In general: Let bi denote the decision number at the (n − i + 1)st draw.
Suppose we are faced with the (n−i)th draw Wn−i = w. In order to obtain the
optimal indifference value, we have to equate both parts of the Snell envelope
reducing to the following consideration: Expected payoff from accepting draw
n− i, the left hand side of the Snell envelope, is given by
P(Wn−i = max
t≤n
Wt|Wn−i = x = max
t≤n−i
Wt) = w
i,
whereas expected payoff from going on, the right hand side of the Snell
envelope, is calculated by the following considerations: First, we observe
that the optimal decision numbers are increasing, i.e. decrease as we go on
with drawing since the probability of drawing a larger number decreases.
Hence, in later draws, we would choose any draw exceeding bi+1. Assume
Wn−i = w = bi+1:
• If there is only one such draw exceeding w, following our strategy, we
choose it.
• If two those occur, say y ≥ z ≥ w, we have P(y) = 1
2
.
• If three occur, say y ≥ z ≥ x ≥ w, we have P(y) = 1
3
.
• etc.
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Hence,
EP[Ui+1|Fi] =
i∑
k=1
1
k
(
i
k
)
wi−k(1− w)k.
Equating these probabilities, we obtain ∀i bi+1 = w as solution to
i∑
k=1
1
k
(
i
k
)
wi−1(1− w)k = wi
⇔ 1 =
i∑
k=1
1
k
(
i
k
)(
1− w
w
)k
,
leading to the following proposition on optimal stopping numbers:
Proposition 2.2.6. The problem is solved by the following optimal stopping
rule:
τ ∗ := min{i ≥ 1 | Wi ≥ bn−i+1 ∧ Wi = max
k≤i
Wk},
where the sequence (bi)i=1,...,n is achieved as above.
Proof. Again, in terms of the Snell envelope approach:
Un = P(Wn = max
i≤n
Wi|Fn) = 1{Wn=maxi≤nWi}(Wn),
Ui = max{P(Wi = max
k≤n
Wk|Fi);E[Ui+1|Fi]}
τ ∗ = min{i ≥ 1 | P(Wi = max
k≤n
Wk|Fi) ≥ Ui}
= min{i ≥ 1 | Wi ≥ bn−i+1 ∧ Wi = max
k≤i
Wk}.
The last equality is seen as follows: At Wi(ω) = x, i < n, the Snell envelope
is given by
Ui := max
{
P(Wi = max
k≤n
Wk|Wi = max
k≤i
Wk);
E[Ui+1|Wi = max
k≤i
Wk)]
}
I{Wi=maxk≤iWk}
+ max
0;E[Ui+1|Wi < maxk≤i Wk) ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
 I{Wi<maxk≤iWk}
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and the first term
max
{
P(Wi = max
k≤n
Wk|Wi = max
k≤i
Wk);E[Ui+1|Wi = max
k≤i
Wk)]
}
= max
{
wn−i ;
n−i∑
k=1
1
k
(
n− i
k
)
wn−i−k(1− w)k
}
.
Hence,
τ ∗ = min
{
t ≥ 1
∣∣∣∣∣W n−tt ≥
n−t∑
k=1
1
k
(
n− t
k
)
W n−t−kt (1−Wt)k
∧ Wt = max
i≤t
Wi)
}
= min
{
t ≥ 1|Wt ≥ bn−t+1 ∧ Wt = max
i≤t
Wi)
}
.
2.2.3 A Further Refinement
One objection to the Secretary problem is that only the best choice counts.
Let us briefly consider the case when utility is given by the actual value of
the draw. Due to the fact that the agent obtains strictly positive utility even
from draws that are not candidates, the optimal stopping rule does not hinge
on an applicant being a candidate and hence it might be even optimal to
accept a non-candidate.
Let (Wi)i≤n be sequentially and independently drawn from a distribution
with density f . Define the Snell envelope U recursively by
Un := Wn,
Ui := max{Wi;E[Ui+1|Fi]}, 1 ≤ i < n.
Then, it is optimal to stop at τ ∗ := min{i ≥ 1|Ui = Wi}. We have
E[Un|Fn−1] = E[Wn|Fn−1] = E[Wn] =
∫
wf(w)dw := b1.
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Hence, the value of the problem at draw n− 1 is given by
Vn−1 = Un−1 = max{Wn−1; b1}.
At draw n − 1, accept Wn−1 if and only if Wn−1 ≥ b1. Let b2 denote the
value of the problem of length 2 when going on, i.e. b2 = E[Un−1|Fn−2].
Then, we accept Wn−2 at draw n − 2 if and only if Wn−2 ≥ b2: The family
(bi)i is a family of decision numbers as well as the value of not accepting the
current draw. Having a look at draw Wn−2, we have to decide whether to
go on or to accept that draw. We accept, if the draw exceeds the expected
value b2 of going on. How do we obtain this value? When going on, i.e.
after rejecting Wn−2, we accept Wn−1 if exceeding b1, i.e. with probability
P (Wn−1 ≥ b1) =
∫∞
b1
f(w)dw. In that case we obtain the expected value of
Wn−1 conditional on exceeding b1. We reject Wn−1 if smaller than b1, i.e.
with probability P (Wn−1 ≤ b1) =
∫ b1
−∞ f(w)dw, in which case we obtain the
expected value of the last draw, b1. Formally,
b2 = E[Un−1|Fn−2]
= P(Wn−1 ≥ b1)E[Wn−1|Wn−1 ≥ b1] + P(Wn−1 < b1)E[Wn|Wn−1 < b1]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=E[Wn]=b1
=
(∫ ∞
b1
f(w)dw
)
E[Wn−1|Wn−1 ≥ b1] + b1
∫ b1
−∞
f(w)dw
=
∫ ∞
b1
f(w)dw
∫∞
b1
wf(w)dw∫∞
b1
f(w)dw
+ b1
∫ b1
−∞
f(w)dw
=
∫ ∞
b1
wf(w)dw + b1F (b1).
Now, going on recursively, we set bi := E[Un−i+1|Fn−i] or equivalently
bn−j+1 = E[Uj|Fj−1]. Then, we accept Wn−i−1 if and only if Wn−i−1 ≥ bi+1.
We obtain the following recursive relation:
bi+1 = E[Un−i|Fn−i−1]
= P(Wn−i ≥ bi)E[Wn−i|Wn−i ≥ bi]
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+P(Wn−i ≤ bi)E[Un−i+1|Fn−i ∧ {Wn−i ≤ bi}]︸ ︷︷ ︸
E[Un−i+1|Fn−i]=bi
=
∫ ∞
bi
wf(w)dx+ biF (bi).
Since bn−j+1 is the expected value of rejecting the draw at j − 1, the value
function (equalling the Snell envelope) becomes Ui = max{Wi, bn−i}. For the
optimal stopping time, we have
τ ∗ = min{i ≥ 1|Ui = Wi} = min{i ≥ 1|Wi ≥ bn−i}
with (bi)i achieved recursively as above.
2.3 The No-Information Problem with a Risky
Number of Objects
The major contribution of this article is the extension of the Best-Choice
problem to an ambiguous number of applicants taking care of model risk. As
a first step, we relax the assumption of a known number of applicants and
consider the case of a risky number, i.e. with a given probability distribution
on the number of applicants. Now, in addition to the risk of missing out
on the best applicant in the setup with a fixed number, the agent is faced
with the danger of waiting too long and being surprised by having no further
choices.
2.3.1 A Review
There are several approaches to introduce risk about the number of appli-
cants. We briefly summarize two and elaborately discuss the model that
underlies this article. From a mathematical point of view, these approaches
are just alternative ways to pose the problem. However, from an economic
standpoint, they are quite different: which ansatz to prefer is a decision based
on faith in which parameters can possibly be known.
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[Stewart, 81] discusses both approaches: First, one might just assume the
number of applicants being a random variable N with known distribution
µ ∈ M(N). All other assumptions in the simple model preserve. In par-
ticular, applicants arrive at deterministic times. This approach is followed
in many articles: [Presman & Sonin, 72] apply a Snell envelope approach
to the Marcov chain of candidates. They show, that the optimal solution
of the problem is qualitatively different from the fixed-horizon setting: Dis-
tinct stopping islands may emerge, i.e. choosing a candidate may be optimal
within some interval of applicants followed by an interval, where accepting is
not optimal, again followed by an interval, where stopping is optimal, and so
on. Intuitively, in course of the application process, data is gathered about the
actual number of applicants that makes stopping at a candidate not optimal
even though it would have been optimal at an earlier stage with less informa-
tion. The reason for multiple stopping islands is owed to the fact that the
problem is not monotone any longer in case of risk. [Presman & Sonin, 72]
show that we still may use non-randomized stopping rules9 and, moreover,
give sufficient conditions to ensure single island rules.
[Gianini-Pettitt, 79] use the same approach to treat the problem of min-
imizing the expected rank. [Rasmussen & Robbins, 75] and [Rasmussen, 75]
also follow this approach for a bounded random variable N with known dis-
tribution and obtain results for increasing bound. However, they mistakenly
obtain a single island rule to be optimal for all distributions, contradicting
[Presman & Sonin, 72]. [Irle, 80] explicitly states a counterexample to this
single-island-statement and shows an algorithm to compute stopping islands.
Furthermore, a monotonicity condition is achieved as a sufficient condition
for optimality of a single island stopping rule. [Petrucelli, 83] gives sufficient
9Here, we distinguish between non-randomized and randomized stopping times: The
former ones are just adapted integer valued random variables, the latter ones are distri-
bution valued random variables, i.e. at some point in time, they do not specify whether
to stop or not but which distribution on stopping or not to choose.
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and necessary conditions on the distribution of N to obtain optimality of
single island rules. Moreover, [Petrucelli, 83] shows that virtually any family
of sets in N can be achieved as stopping islands of an optimal stopping rule
by appropriately selecting a distribution. [Petrucelli, 83] shows for bounded
distributions that only finitely many stopping islands are possible, i.e. there
exists an integer such that stopping will occur at the next candidate.
In [Samuel-Cahn, 96] and [Samuel-Cahn, 95], the author goes a slightly
different route: The problem is assumed with a fixed number n of applicants
but with a random freeze M . Hence, we have a problem with random number
of applicants N := n ∧M . For both settings, the full-information as well
as the no-information model, a sufficient and necessary condition on the
distribution of M implying optimality of a single island rule is derived. It
is shown that the setup with random horizon is equivalent to the simple
problem with horizon equalling the upper bound of the distribution and a
discount on payoffs induced by the distribution of M . In case of an optimal
single island rule, stopping occurs earlier than in the fixed horizon case du
to the discounting. [DeGroot, 68] considers a partial-information model with
random horizon.
A second approach doubts arrival times being deterministic: An appli-
cant is selected within a fixed time horizon but arrival times are randomly
distributed. [Gnedin, 96] applies a planar poisson process on [0, 1]×]−∞, 0]
to the full-information problem. [Bruss, 84] and [Bruss & Samuels, 87] use
the following model: Let arrival times be independently and identically dis-
tributed on the fixed interval [0, t], e.g. by a poisson process. Let the overall
random number N of applicants be independent of the arrival times but with
an unknown distribution. Then, knowledge of the arrival time distribution
fully compensates for ignorance of the number of applicants: The probability
of choosing the best is the same as for the simple problem, i.e. e−1. Whereas
in case of fixed arrival times and a known distribution of N , the probability of
choosing the best is significantly decreased. Of course, we may again achieve
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multiplicity of stopping islands. [Stewart, 81] uses an intermediate route in
assuming N being distributed via some prior and arrival times being i.i.d.
exponential random variables with known parameter. Then, upon arrival of
an applicant the belief about N is updated in a Bayesian manner. Given
this posterior distribution of N , optimization takes place as in the very first
approach. The idea underlying [Stewart, 81] is the incapability of achieving
a correct prior distribution for N as also assumed in [Bruss & Rogers, 91].
Hence, [Stewart, 81] introduces the non-informative prior of N basically as
some kind of “uniform distribution” on N. Of course, this is not a proper dis-
tribution but the posterior is. The posterior has to be taken as an additional
state variable in the value function V , whereas in [Rasmussen, 75] it is suf-
ficient to just truncate the prior distribution. However, the idea to compare
the value from stopping and the value from going on optimally is the same.
[Stewart, 81] shows that the optimal rule is of single island type and if large
values of N are likely, the optimal selection probability approaches that in
the fixed horizon problem, e−1. This observation is of particular importance:
In the deterministic case, misspecification of the number of applicants leads
to severe consequences as model risk is a serious issue. Within Stewart’s
model an exact estimation of N is not needed but results are quite stable.
Hence, model risk is considerably smaller in this setup: [Stewart, 81] achieves
robustness results showing that even for a relatively small number of appli-
cants as well as for an erroneous specification of the parameter of exponential
arrival rate (up to factor 2), the selection probability following the specified
rule is still quite close to the optimal case.
The “formal Bayes rule” obtained in [Stewart, 78] coincides with the op-
timal rule in the infinite horizon problem. [Bruss & Samuels, 87] extend this
insight and achieve that, for any loss function with finite risk in the infinite
secretary problem, the rule that is optimal in the infinite secretary problem
is formal Bayes in the sense of [Stewart, 78].
In the present article, we follow the first approach with fixed arrival times
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but unknown horizon, i.e. number of applicants. Based on this, we build
a model for an ambiguous number of applicants. There are as many good
reasons for the first as for the second approach. The main point for the latter
is that reliability theory indicates arrival times of uncertain events being
exponentially distributed. On the other hand, when considering financial
markets or atomic bomb inspection programs, we know at which times we
have a look at the market or at a potential repository but are not sure about
the time horizon.
2.3.2 A Specific Model
Let us now extend the simple no-information Best-Choice problem to the case
of a random number N of applicants with known distribution µ ∈ M(N),
µ(n) := µ(N = n), where M(N) denotes the set of distributions on N. As
we want to maximize the probability of choosing the best applicant, being
a candidate is a necessary condition to be accepted. Hence, the idea is to
only consider the candidate process instead of the applicant process. This
approach is found in [Presman & Sonin, 72].
Recall that Yk denotes the relative rank of applicant k among the first k
applicants, whereas Y¯k denotes the absolute rank of applicant k among all.
For k > N , we set Yk = Y¯k = ∞. First, we intuitively obtain the relevant
probabilities, then we rigorously introduce the probabilistic model at hand.
Given µ ∈M(N), k ∈ N, we have
Pµ(Yk = 1) = µ(N ≥ k)Pµ(Yk = 1|N ≥ k)
+µ(N < k)Pµ(Yk = 1|N < k)
= µ(N ≥ k)Pµ(Yk = 1|N ≥ k)
= µ(N ≥ k)Pµ(Yk = 1 ∧ N ≥ k) 1
µ(N ≥ k)
= Pµ(∪∞s=k{Yk = 1 ∧ N = s})
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=
∞∑
s=k
Pµ(Yk = 1 ∧ N = s)
=
∞∑
s=k
Pµ(Yk = 1|N = s)µ(s)
=
1
k
∞∑
s=k
µ(s) =
1
k
µ(N ≥ k).
Pµ(Y¯k = 1) =
∞∑
s=k
1
s
µ(s).
Pµ(Y¯k = 1|Yk = 1) = P
µ(Y¯k = 1 ∧ Yk = 1)
Pµ(Yk = 1)
=
Pµ(Y¯k = 1)
Pµ(Yk = 1)
=
∑∞
s=k
1
s
µ(s)
1
k
µ(N ≥ k) =
k
µ(N ≥ k)
∞∑
s=k
µ(s)
s
.
The last term is the value from stopping at applicant k being a candidate.
Note that this is just the µ-expectation of the value from stopping at appli-
cant k being a candidate in the “simple” problem:
Eµ
[
k
N
]
= Eµ
[
k
N
∣∣∣∣N ≥ k] 1µ(N ≥ k) = kµ(N ≥ k)
∞∑
s=k
µ(s)
s
.
Following [Presman & Sonin, 72], we now separate the the payoff and
the applicant process. The latter is then refined to the candidate process
(ξi)i, where ξi = k means that the i
th candidate is the kth applicant. We
now compute the distribution of this process. From the problem with fixed
number n ≥ k > l of applicants, i.e. µ(N = n) = 1, we have
Pµ(Yk = 1 ∩ Yk−1 > 1 ∩ · · · ∩ Yl+1 > 1|Yl = 1)
=
Pµ(Yk = 1 ∩ Yl = 1 ∩ {Yj > 1|j ∈ {l + 1, · · · , k − 1}})
Pµ(Yl = 1)
=
l
k
· 1
l
· l
l + 1
· . . . · k − 2
k − 1 =
l
k(k − 1)
This is the transition probability Pµ(ξi = k|ξi−1 = l) of the homogenous
Markov chain (ξi)i with state space {1, . . . , n} in case of a fixed N = n. For
a random number N of applicants with distribution µ, the distribution Pµ of
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(ξi)i is fully characterized by the initial distribution
Pµ ◦ ξ−11 = I{ξ1=1}
and the transition kernel pµ given by
pµ(l, k) := Pµ(ξi = k|ξi−1 = l)
= Pµ(Yk = 1 ∩ {Yj > 1|j ∈ {l + 1, · · · , k − 1}}|Yl = 1)
=
Pµ (Yk = 1 ∩ Yl = 1 ∩ {Yj > 1|j ∈ {l + 1, · · · , k − 1}} ∩N ≥ k)) + 0
Pµ(Yl = 1 ∩N ≥ l) + 0
=
Pµ
(
Yk = 1 ∩ Yl = 1
∩{Yj > 1|j ∈ {l + 1, · · · , k − 1}}
∣∣∣∣N ≥ k)µ(N ≥ k)
Pµ({Yl = 1|N ≥ l)µ(N ≥ l)
=
{
lµ(N≥k)
k(k−1)µ(N≥l) l < k <∞,
0 l ≥ k, ∀k ≥ 2,
pµ(∞,∞) = 1, pµ(l,∞) = Pµ(Y¯l = 1|Yl = 1) = l
µ(N ≥ l)
∞∑
s=l
µ(s)
s
.
Having entirely characterized the candidate process (ξi)i by its distribution,
we turn to the appropriate payoff function given by the probability of a candi-
date being the best: given ξi = k, set g
µ(k) := pµ(k,∞) = k
µ(N≥k)
∑∞
s=k
µ(s)
s
.
Theorem 2.1 in [Presman & Sonin, 72] shows that it suffices to only consider
the Markov chain of candidates to solve the Best-Choice problem and ne-
glect all elements with zero payoff, the “non-candidates”, as those will never
be chosen.
Definition 2.3.1 (Best-Choice problem under risk). Following the approach
in [Presman & Sonin, 72], the Best-Choice problem with a risky number of
applicants for a distribution µ ∈M(N) is given by the candidate process (ξi)i
with transition kernel pµ(·, ·) and payoff function gµ(·) as above.
The Snell envelope for optimally stopping the process (gµ(ξi))i is, at ξi =
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k, given by
Uµξi := max
{
gµ(ξi) ; Eµ[Uµξi+1|Fk]
}
= max

k
µ(N ≥ k)
∞∑
s=k
µ(s)
s
;
∞∑
s=k+1
k
s(s− 1)
µ(N ≥ s)
µ(N ≥ k)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:p(k,s)
Uµs
 ,
where the first term is the probability of choosing the best when stopping at
the current candidate and the second term the probability of choosing the
best by going on and optimally decide whether to stop at the next candidate.
Due to homogeneity, only the value k of the variable ξi is of interest. This is
also the reason for our modest change of notation: We now write Uµξi instead
of Uµi for the Snell envelope and thereby make explicit that the problem we
consider now is not stated in terms of the applicant process any longer but
in terms of the sub-process of candidates.
E.g. in [Riedel, 09] it is mentioned that Uµξi is the smallest supermartingale
exceeding the payoff process gµ(ξi) :=
ξi
µ(N≥ξi)
∑∞
s=ξi
µ(s)
s
and hence, it is
optimal to accept candidate i being applicant ξi = k, whenever U
µ
k ≤ gµ(k).
In other terms, the optimal stopping set Γµ is given by
Γµ = {k|Uµk ≤ gµ(k)}
and the smallest optimal stopping time is
τ ∗ := min{i|ξi ∈ Γµ} = min{i|Uµξi ≤ gµ(ξi)},
where stopping at τ = i means stopping at the ith candidate, not at the ith
applicant. However, k ∈ Γµ means to stop at applicant k being a candidate.
For more intuition on Γµ consider Section 2.4.2.
The main virtue of this article is to generalize the above model to the case
of an ambiguous number of applicants and to find conditions for finitely many
stopping islands, i.e. to generalize the results in [Presman & Sonin, 72].
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2.4 The No-Information Problem with an Am-
biguous Number of Objects
There are basically two approaches to model ambiguity: On one side, multi-
ple priors or equivalently coherent risk measures, on the other side Choquet
integrals. It is not just a matter of taste which ansatz to apply but what
shall be modeled. The first route to model behavior under uncertainty is
by virtue of non-additive probabilities or capacities applying Choquet inte-
gration for evaluation of “expected utility”. As not followed here, we just
have brief a look at the intuition of this approach. A valuable introduction
to capacities and the related Choquet integral can be found in [Skulj, 01].
[Chateauneuf, 1991] gives economic content to the theory by presenting an
“expected utility theorem” for capacities by virtue of Choquet integrals serv-
ing as expected utility. Furthermore, a connection to multiple priors expected
utility on convex sets of additive probabilities is drawn and hence an equiv-
alence to the multiple priors framework: An agent is ambiguity averse in
the sense of [Gilboa & Schmeidler, 89] if and only if the ruling non-additive
probability is convex. The gap of the total capacity to unity is a measure
for ambiguity ; measures for convexity of the capacity are in this sense mea-
sures for ambiguity aversion. A concave capacity is connected to an agent
who is ambiguity loving. In case of an additive probability, there is no am-
biguity or, more precisely, ambiguity does not matter to the agent. This is
equivalent to the case of a unique prior in the multiple priors theory. Then
the worst-case measure as obtained in [Chateauneuf, 1991] or in [Riedel, 09]
for the distinct theories coincides with this unique prior additive probabil-
ity. For a convex capacity, [Marinacci, 99] gives an explicit description of
a worst-case measure, i.e. a probability distribution such that the integral
with respect to that distribution and the Choquet integral coincide or, equiv-
alently, the expected utilities coincide. [Gilboa, 87] generalizes the expected
utility theorem for additive probabilities step by step to capacities and ex-
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plicitly compares additive and non-additive theory. Further representations
as well as equivalence results of convex capacities and multiple priors may
be found in [Schmeidler, 86], [Schmeidler, 89] or [Yaari, 87]. In the latter
reference, capacities are generated by monotone increasing distortions of ad-
ditive probabilities. An introduction to Choquet integration and its relation
to coherent risk measures can also be found in [Fo¨llmer & Schied, 04].
The second approach is the multiple priors framework as introduced in
[Gilboa & Schmeidler, 89]. They obtain a representation result for uncer-
tainty averse agents’ preferences in terms of minimal expected payoff, i.e.
expected reward is calculated as the minimized expected value with respect
to some set of prior distributions. [Epstein & Schneider, 03] extend this ap-
proach to a dynamic context where dynamic consistency leads to a recursive
representation of utility: Assuming conditional preferences at each time-event
pair to satisfy the axioms in [Gilboa & Schmeidler, 89] and the process of
conditional preferences being dynamically consistent, the value function is
obtained recursively. The notion of time-consistency, intuitively stating that
the set of prior distributions is closed under pasting, is rigorously introduced
in the next section.
The advantage of the approach in terms of capacities is to explicitly deliver
a measure of ambiguity aversion. In our model below we make use of multiple
priors. Therein an agent is assumed to be ambiguity averse and the expansion
of the set of priors might possibly measure ambiguity averseness. [Riedel, 09]
shows that this framework is adjuvant for optimal stopping problems. A
further reason for the multiple priors framework is merely a question of belief:
under the assumption of ambiguity aversion, is it easier to specify a unique
capacity or to give a full range of additive probabilities that seem possible for
the agent to rule the world? As we have seen above in the discussion of the
literature on capacities, the Choquet approach and multiple priors framework
are equivalent under mild conditions.
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2.4.1 General Theory of Optimal Stopping with Mul-
tiple Priors
For multiple prior preferences, [Riedel, 09] derives a general theory of optimal
stopping when the set of multiple priors is time-consistent. A recursive repre-
sentation of the value function allows for a generalization of the Snell envelope
approach in [Neveu, 75] and, hence, of the backward induction principle to
ambiguous settings. As the Snell envelope is the smallest supermartingale
dominating payoff in the risky case, we see that an appropriately generalized
Snell envelope is the smallest multiple prior supermartingale with this prop-
erty in the ambiguous case. As in the classical case, it is optimal to stop when
the value of the multiple prior Snell envelope equals the payoff from stop-
ping. Thereunto, [Riedel, 09] introduces a general theory of multiple prior
(sub-/super-)martingales.
Intuition
We briefly recap the framework in [Riedel, 09]. Given an arbitrary underlying
probability space (Ω,F ,P0) with filtration (Ft)t, a multiple prior martingale
is a process (Mt)t that satisfies Mt = ess infP∈Q EP[Mt+1|Ft] for some set Q
of prior distributions all being assumed locally equivalent to P0. Hence, a
minimax martingale is a submartingale for all distributions in Q and, in case
of time-consistency, a martingale with respect to some worst-case distribution
in Q. In this sense, it is a fair game for an ambiguity averse agent who always
expects nature to choose the worst distribution. Given time-consistency, the
minimax Snell envelope is the lower envelope of the Snell envelopes with
respect to priors in Q and it is the classical Snell envelope with respect to
the worst case distribution in Q. This amounts to the following main insight:
Remark 2.4.1. Assuming time-consistency, the ambiguity averse agent be-
haves as the Bayesian expected utility maximizer given the worst case distri-
bution in the set of priors Q.
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This formalizes the precious intuition that ambiguity averse agents expect
nature to be malevolent. Put another way: solving an optimal stopping
problem reduces to finding the worst case distribution and then solving the
problem as in the Bayesian setup.10
This insight simplifies the solution to the Best-Choice problem in the
multiple priors framework: Whereas [Hill & Krengel, 91] need randomized
stopping times in the uncertain case, [Abdel-Hamid et al., 82] as well as
[Presman & Sonin, 72] have shown that it suffices to consider non-randomized
rules in the Bayesian setup. Hence, we have:
Remark 2.4.2 (On randomized stopping rules). The optimal stopping time
for the ambiguous Best Choice problem in case of time-consistent multiple
priors is non-randomized.11
Rigorous Set-up and Results
We now formally introduce the results in [Riedel, 09]. let (Ω,F ,P0) be a
probability space with filtration (Ft)t. P0 serves a s a reference distribution.
The time horizon might be finite or infinite. Given a bounded adapted payoff
process (Xt)t, the agent tries to maximize payoff by appropriately choosing a
stopping time τ with respect to (Ft)t. The main assumption is that the distri-
bution of (Xt)t is not entirely known but belongs to a convex, weakly compact
set Q of measures that are (locally) equivalent to P012 or, equivalently, that
the agent is an ambiguity averter in the sense of [Gilboa & Schmeidler, 89].
10This is actually not precisely the case for the ambiguous Best-Choice problem as we
will see later: Given the worst case distribution the agent solves a problem that is just
related to the Best-Choice problem under risk.
11Please recall the distinction between randomized and non-randomized stopping times:
a non-randomized stopping time or just stopping time is a random variable τ such that
{τ ≤ t} ∈ Ft, whereas a randomized stopping time specifies a probability distribution
whether to stop or not upon arrival at t.
12Note that Q consists of distributions of the payoff process (Xt)t. The assumptions
made so far ensure suprema and infima to be maxima and minima, respectively.
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Hence, the agent has to solve
max
τ
min
P∈Q
EP[Xτ ].
The following assumption is crucially needed for this approach to be feasible.
Assumption 2.4.3. Let Q be time-consistent.
The following definition is taken from [Riedel, 09]. Therein, equivalent
definitions are discussed.
Definition 2.4.4 ([Riedel, 09], Assumption 4). A set of priors Q is said to
be time-consistent if for all P and Q in Q and stopping times τ the “pasted”
distribution R defined by virtue of
dR
dP0
∣∣∣∣
Ft
:=
{
pt if t ≤ τ ,
pτ qt
qτ
else
also belongs to Q, where dQ
dP0 denotes the Radon-Nikodym derivative with re-
spect to P0 and pi (resp. qi) denotes the density process of P with respect to
P0, i.e. ∀ i ∈ N
pi :=
dP
dP0
∣∣∣∣
Fi
.
Intuitively, Q is assumed to be closed under pasting: at any time-event
pair, combining marginals of P ∈ Q with conditionals of other priors in Q
has to be in Q again. This implies that Q is uniquely determined by the
process of conditional one-step-ahead distributions. In the above definition,
R is obtained as a distribution given by P up to time τ and Q thereafter
We now recall the mathematical concept crucial for our model:
Definition 2.4.5 ([Riedel, 09], Definition 1). Let Q be a time-consistent set
of priors. Let (Mt)t be an adapted process with EP[Mt] < ∞ ∀P ∈ Q and
∀t ∈ N. (Mt)t is called a multiple prior (sub-, super-) martingale with respect
to Q if ∀t ∈ N, it holds
ess inf
P∈Q
EP[Mt+1|Ft] = (≥,≤)Mt a.s.
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[Riedel, 09] shows that (Mt)t is a multiple prior submartingale if and
only if (Mt)t is a submartingale for all P ∈ Q. (Mt)t is a multiple prior
supermartingale if and only if there exists a P∗ ∈ Q such that (Mt)t is a
P∗-supermartingale. (Mt)t is a multiple prior martingale if and only if (Mt)t
is a submartingale for all P ∈ Q and there exists a P∗ ∈ Q such that (Mt)t
is a P∗-martingale. Hence, an ambiguity averse agent considers a game fair,
if it is non-disadvantageous for all priors and fair for the worst case prior P∗.
For existence of this worst case distribution P∗, time-consistency is crucially
needed as it is achieved by pasting instantaneous worst case distributions
recursively. It is shown in [Riedel, 09] that the Doob decomposition and
the optional sampling theorem are still valid for minimax martingales given
time-consistency. In a forthcoming article, we extend this notion and the
respective results to the case of dynamic variational preferences or, equiva-
lently, dynamic convex risk measures. The next theorem is the main result
in [Riedel, 09]: Let first T be finite.
Definition 2.4.6 ([Riedel, 09], Theorem 1). The multiple prior Snell enve-
lope U := (Ut)t of X := (Xt)t with respect to Q is defined recursively by
virtue of UT = XT and for all t < T
Ut := max
{
Xt, ess infP∈Q
EP[Ut+1|Ft]
}
.
Theorem 2.4.7 ([Riedel, 09], Theorem 1). Let Q be time-consistent, then
U is the smallest multiple prior supermartingale exceeding X. U is the value
process of the optimal stopping problem under ambiguity, i.e.
Ut = ess sup
τ≥t
ess inf
P∈Q
EP[Xτ |Ft].
The smallest optimal stopping time is τ ∗ := inf{i ≥ 0|Ui = Xi}.
The proof follows an insightful idea: At each time-event pair, we cal-
culate a one-step-ahead worst case distribution and then paste it with the
worst case distribution already obtained from the following time period on.
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Following this procedure recursively, we obtain a worst case distribution P∗
of the payoff process (Xt)t. As already stated, we have that the multiple
prior Snell envelope U with respect to Q equals the Snell envelope UP∗ of
the payoff process (Xt)t under P∗. In this sense, the ambiguity averse agent
behaves as the expected utility maximizer under a worst case distribution.
We hence have a minimax theorem:
Proposition 2.4.8 ([Riedel, 09], Theorem 2). (Ut)t is the lower envelope
of the Snell envelopes (UPt )t w.r.t. the priors P ∈ Q, and this envelope is
attained by the worst case prior P∗, i.e. Ut = ess infP∈Q UPt = UP
∗
t . More
precisely, we have
Ut = ess sup
τ≥t
ess inf
P∈Q
EP[Xτ |Ft] = ess infP∈Q ess supτ≥t E
P[Xτ |Ft]
= ess inf
P∈Q
UPt = U
P∗
t .
For sake of completeness, we state the results in [Riedel, 09] for the infinite
horizon case, i.e. T =∞.
Definition 2.4.9 ([Riedel, 09], Equation (6)). The value function V := (Vt)t
of the optimal stopping problem on (Xt)t is defined as
Vt := ess sup
τ≥t
ess inf
P∈Q
EP[Xτ |Ft].
Theorem 2.4.10 ([Riedel, 09], Theorem 3). V is the smallest multiple prior
supermartingale with respect to Q exceeding X. V satisfies the Bellman equa-
tion
Vt = max
{
Xt, ess infP∈Q
EP[Vt+1|Ft]
}
for all t ≥ 0. The smallest optimal stopping time is given by τ ∗ := inf{i ≥
0|Vi = Xi} provided that τ ∗ <∞ a.s.
We can approximate infinite by finite horizon problems:
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Proposition 2.4.11 ([Riedel, 09], Theorem 4). Denote by UT the multiple
prior Snell envelope of the optimal stopping problem of X with horizon T .
Then limT→∞ UTt = Vt for all t ≥ 0, where (Vt)t denotes the infinite horizon
value function.
These results particularly show that the value function and the multiple
prior Snell envelope coincide for an ambiguous problem. Moreover, the value
function and the Snell envelope in the risky set-up are equal.
2.4.2 The Model
We introduce ambiguity on the number of applicants in the Best-Choice prob-
lem. In [Chudjakow & Riedel, 09], ambiguity comes into account by virtue
of ambiguous orderings of the applicant process but with a fixed number of
applicants, i.e. [Chudjakow & Riedel, 09] assume distinct sets of ordering
distributions.
In [Hill & Krengel, 91], we see an extreme case of ambiguity: Basically
nothing is known about the distribution of N , the number of applicants.
However, we have to notice the formal difference between ambiguity therein
and in the sense of [Riedel, 09]: In the former, ambiguity is introduced by
non-uniqueness of priors µ ∈ M(N) on the number of applicants. In the
approach in [Riedel, 09], a prior is a distribution of the payoff process (Xi)i.
Thus, ambiguity in our ansatz comes into account by assuming a whole set
Q of possible prior distributions of the payoff process.
In a first approach, the problem seems to be transforming a distribution
µ ∈ M(N) on the number N of applicants to a distribution of the payoff
process (Xµi )i: Therefore, we first would have to appropriately define the
payoff process (Xµi )i given µ. Thereafter, it would suffice to give an ini-
tial distribution and a stochastic kernel to obtain a distribution of the pay-
off process as done in Section 2.3.2 mimicking [Presman & Sonin, 72]. We
hence obtain a one-to-one mapping from the set of priors on the number
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of applicants to the set of priors on the payoff process and may solve the
problem as in [Riedel, 09]. This approach directly generalizes the model in
[Presman & Sonin, 72]. However, we will see that time-consistency turns out
to be an integral problem. In a second approach, we find a remedy for the
time-consistency issue when modeling ambiguity in terms of assessments.
Although the first approach does not immediately lead to a solution, we
briefly consider it here as the calculations are the cornerstone for the second
approach and we explicitly note impossibility of time-consistency in the first
ansatz.
The Payoff Process and its Distribution for given µ ∈M(N)
We briefly recall the setup leading to the appropriate payoff process in several
steps. Let Yk be the relative rank of applicant k within the first k applicants
and Y¯k its absolute rank among all. Set Yk = ∞ for k > N . We again
fix an underlying space (Ω,F ,P0) and define a filtration by virtue of Fk :=
σ(Y1, . . . , Yk), k ∈ N. Intuitively, Fk states whether applicant k is a candidate
or not and in particular if k ≤ N . Payoff is unity if we have successfully
chosen the best applicant and zero else. However, the process
Xk :=
{
1 if Y¯k = 1,
0 else
}
= IY¯k=1
is not Fk-measurable since Y¯k 6∈ Fk. Hence, the above definition does not
yield an admissible payoff process. The intuitive reasoning is just that upon
interviewing applicant k, we do not know if she is best among all. Otherwise,
the problem would be equivalent to the parking problem, where the agent,
upon observing an open lot, knows the utility that he gains from parking
there. Hence, as in the classical case, the best the agent can do is to cal-
culate the conditional expected payoff from accepting an applicant given the
information available and use this as payoff process to be maximized. This
payoff is equivalent to calculating the probability of an applicant being best
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among all. If the number of applicants is fixed at N = n, the payoff process
(Xδnk )k is
Xδnk := E[IY¯k=1|Fk] = P(Y¯k = 1|Fk)
=
{
k
n
if Yk = 1,
0 if Yk > 1.
By definition Xδnk ∈ Fk. Hence, (Xδnk )k is an admissible payoff process.
In case that the number of applicants N is a random variable with dis-
tribution µ ∈ M(N), µ(N = s) =: µ(s), the conditional probability that
applicant k is best, and hence the payoff process, is given by
Xµk := E
µ[IY¯k=1|Fk] =
{
k
µ(N≥k)
∑∞
s=k
µ(s)
s
if Yk = 1,
0 if Yk > 1.
The respective calculations are stated in Section 2.3.2.
As in [Presman & Sonin, 72] we separate the applicant process from the
payoff process and w.l.o.g. reduce the former to the corresponding candidate
process since non-candidates generate payoff zero and, hence, will never be
chosen.
More formally: Consider the Markov chain zk := (Yk, k) with payoff
gµ(zk) = g
µ(Yk, k) := X
µ
k . Theorem 2.1 in [Presman & Sonin, 72] now al-
lows for the following: Define the process (ξi)i by virtue of ξ1 = 1, ξk :=
min{n > ξk−1|gµ(zn) > 0}, i.e. ξi is the arrival time of the ith candidate.
We then set Zi := zξi . It is shown that the stopping problems are equiv-
alent, i.e. the maximal expected values from stopping (zk)k equals that of
(Zi)i. Hence, we may reduce our analysis to the candidate process Zi. Since
Zi = zξi = (1, ξi), we identify Zi ≡ ξi and gµ(ξi) ≡ gµ(1, ξi). Hence, we have:
Remark 2.4.12. The Best-Choice problem under risk is reduced to optimally
stop the candidate process (ξi)i with corresponding payoff function g
µ(ξi) =
Xµξi =
ξi
µ(N≥ξi)
∑∞
s=ξi
µ(s)
s
.
In order to solve the problem, we need to characterize the distribution
Pµ of (ξi)i, which then of course also yields the distribution of Xµξi = g
µ(ξi).
44
2.4. THE NO-INFORMATION PROBLEM UNDER AMGIGUITY
Given µ, this is entirely achieved by the initial distribution
Pµ ◦ ξ−11 = I{ξ1=1},
as the first applicant is obviously a candidate, and the homogenous proba-
bility kernel (cf. Section 2.3.2)
pµi−1(l, k) := p
µ(l, k) := Pµ(ξi = k|ξi−1 = l)
=
{
lµ(N≥k)
k(k−1)µ(N≥l) , l < k <∞,
0 l ≥ k, ∀i ≥ 2 (2.3)
pµ(∞,∞) = 1,
pµ(l,∞) = Pµ(Y¯l = 1|Yl = 1) = l
µ(N ≥ l)
∞∑
s=l
µ(s)
s
.
pµ(l, k) is the probability that the kth applicant is a candidate given the
foregoing candidate is applicant l. Note that this is the transition kernel of
a homogenous Markov chain: intuitively, not the time of appearance of the
candidate matters but the time of appearance of the applicant being that
candidate.
The Payoff Process in an Ambiguous Setting – A First Approach
Let µ ∈ Q˜ ⊂ M(N), the set of priors on N. The aim in this section is to
define an appropriate payoff process as well as the set Q of priors on that
process corresponding to the set Q˜ of priors on applicants.
Assumption 2.4.13. Let Q˜ be closed and convex. If µ1, µ2 ∈ Q˜, then
sup{n|n ∈ supp(µ1)} = sup{n|n ∈ supp(µ2)}.
The last assumption ensures the corresponding set Q of distributions Pµ
of the candidate process (ξi)i via equation (2.3) being equivalent as imposed
in [Riedel, 09].13 Observing applicant ξi = k, the ambiguity averse agent
13This immediately follows from equation (2.3): if µ1(N ≥ k) = 0 for some k, then
the same has to hold for µ2, otherwise, the candidate process corresponding to µ2 puts
positive probability on events that are null sets under the process corresponding to µ1.
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evaluates her minimax expected value from choosing her as
XQ˜k := min
µ∈Q˜
Eµ[IY¯k=1|Fk]
=
{
minµ∈Q˜
{
k
µ(N≥k)
∑∞
s=k
µ(s)
s
}
if Yk = 1,
0 else.
This payoff is an immediate consequence of [Gilboa & Schmeidler, 89] in a
static set up. By definition, XQ˜k ∈ Fk and hence an admissible payoff process.
We have seen, that every µ ∈ Q˜ ⊂ M(N) corresponds to a distribution
Pµ of the candidate process (ξi)i by virtue of equation (2.3), but with payoff
function
gQ˜(ξi) := XQ˜ξi = min
µ∈Q˜
{
ξi
µ(N ≥ ξi)
∞∑
s=ξi
µ(s)
s
}
. (2.4)
Hence, Q˜ corresponds to some set
Q := {Pµ := I{ξi=1} ⊗ (pµ)N | µ ∈ Q˜} (2.5)
of priors Pµ of (ξi)i, where pµ is defined in equation (2.3). Note, that µ is
fixed in Pµ, i.e. does not switch to another prior on the number of applicants
in course of time; this eventually will cause the time-consistency issues.
Remark 2.4.14 (Model I). Given Q˜, we may now solve the optimal stopping
problem of the candidate process (ξi)i with payoff g
Q˜ as in equation (2.4) for
an ambiguity averse agent facing Q from equation (2.5). In other words, we
have the optimal stopping problem of the model (Ω,F ,P0, (Fξi)i, (XQ˜ξi )i,Q) as
in [Riedel, 09].
Remark 2.4.15. This model is an eligible generalization of the Best-Choice
problem under risk, as it holds for any stopping time τ
inf
Pµ∈Q
EPµ
[
min
µ∈Q˜
{
ξτ
µ(N ≥ ξτ )
∞∑
s=ξτ
µ(s)
s
}]
= inf
Pµ∈Q
EPµ
[
I{Yj>1 ∀j>ξτ}
]
.
This fact immediately follows from construction or, explicitly, from Lemma
1 in [Chudjakow & Riedel, 09].
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When choosing a stopping time τ , we may calculate the (minimax) ex-
pected reward infPµ∈Q EP
µ
[XQ˜ξτ ] and the agent’s problem is
sup
τ
inf
Pµ∈Q
EPµ [Xξτ ] = sup
τ
inf
Pµ∈Q
EPµ
[
min
µ∈Q˜
{
ξτ
µ(N ≥ ξτ )
∞∑
s=ξτ
µ(s)
s
}]
.
More formally, the (multiple prior) value (V Q˜ξi )i of the candidate process
at candidate i is
V Q˜ξi := ess sup
τ≥i
ess inf
P∈Q
EP[gQ˜(ξτ )︸ ︷︷ ︸
XQ˜ξτ
|Fξi ].
Again, we slightly misuse notation: We are now faced with optimally stopping
the payoff process (X¯i
Q˜
)i := (X
Q˜
ξi
)i adapted to the filtration (F¯i)i := (Fξi)i.
To be entirely in line with the notation from the general theory, the value
is actually given by V Q˜i = ess supτ≥i ess infP∈Q EP[X¯Q˜τ |F¯i]. However, we con-
sider the notation in terms of (V Q˜ξi )i more handy in our model. It furthermore
makes explicit the relation of the reduced problem to the“simple”Best-Choice
problem as we see that the value process of the candidate process is just a
sub-process of the value process of the applicant process; the same holds true
for the filtration. In this setup, a stopping time τ does not mean to stop at
applicant τ but at candidate τ , i.e. at applicant ξτ . Note, in case of a unique
µ, the above expression reduces to value function in [Presman & Sonin, 72].
Problems and their Removal
Before we go on, we have to answer two questions: Are all properties satisfied
in order to apply the theory in [Riedel, 09]? Does the set-up make sense from
an economic point of view?
Answering the first question is equivalent to posing the question whether
we can identify properties of Q˜ in order for Q to be time-consistent. As we
will see in Proposition 2.4.16, constructing Q as above, we cannot obtain
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Q to be time-consistent. Of course, from a mathematical point of view, we
could introduce something like a time-consistent hull of Q:
TC(Q) := {I{ξi=1} ⊗∞i=1 pµii ∣∣ pµii as in equation (2.3) for some µi ∈ Q˜} .
This approach has two major disadvantages: First, it only allows for simply
pasting kernels from distributions in Q. However, we have to change the
internal structure of kernels for a meaningful formalization of the notion
of time-consistency in this context, since kernels do not just incorporate
a marginal distribution of µ at the respective candidate but a probability
induced by that µ of all future applicants, in particular of applicants beyond
the time of pasting. More formally, if we paste at candidate t, then, being at
candidate k < t, the kernel used at k incorporates the respective measure µ1
also for times beyond t via the term µ1(N ≥ k), where µ2 is the generating
measure. Secondly, a pasted distribution in TC(Q) does not correspond to
a distribution in Q˜ in general, i.e. there are distributions in TC(Q) that
cannot be induced by a single distribution in Q˜. In particular, we might
achieve a worst case distribution that is not induced by a prior in Q˜.
Having obtained the set of priors Q on the candidate process (ξi)i from
the set of priors Q˜ on the number of applicants by virtue of equation (2.5),
recall that time-consistency in terms of Definition 2.4.3 assumes Q to be
closed under pasting.
Proposition 2.4.16. If µ1 6= µ2 ∈ Q˜ with corresponding priors P1 6= P2 ∈
Q, 1 ≤ t ≤ max{n|n ∈ supp(µi)}, and we define P3 by virtue of P3 :=
Iξ1=1 ⊗ p1 ⊗ . . . ⊗ p1 ⊗ p2 ⊗ . . ., where pi are the respective kernels, i.e. P3
is obtained by pasting kernels at candidate t. Then, there does not exist any
µ ∈M(N) generating P3 via equation (2.3). In particular, Q generated from
Q˜ by virtue of equation (2.5) cannot be time-consistent as P3 6∈ Q.
Proof. Assume, there exists µ˜ ∈ Q˜ s.t. pµ˜(l, k) is generated from µ˜ as in
equation (2.3), i.e.
pµ˜i−1(l, k) =
l
k(k − 1)
µ˜(N ≥ k)
µ˜(N ≥ l) ∀l < k <∞, i ≥ 2
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and
pµ˜i−1(l, k) =
l
k(k − 1)
µ1(N ≥ k)
µ1(N ≥ l) ∀l < k <∞, t > i ≥ 2,
pµ˜i−1(l, k) =
l
k(k − 1)
µ2(N ≥ k)
µ2(N ≥ l) ∀l < k <∞, i ≥ t.
Set l = 1 and obtain
1
k(k − 1)µ1(N ≥ k) = p
µ˜
1(1, k) =
1
k(k − 1) µ˜(N ≥ k) k > 1,
implying µ˜ = µ1. Likewise, we see µ˜ = µ2, Contradicting µ1 6= µ2. In
particular we would have P1 = P2 = P3.
In order to generate a time-consistent model, we now consider the follow-
ing definition motivated by the proof of Proposition 2.4.16:
Definition 2.4.17. For µ1, µ2 ∈ Q, t ∈ N, let µ˜ ∈ Q defined as
µ˜(i) :=
1
µ1(N < t) + µ2(N ≥ t)
{
µ1(i) if i < t,
µ2(i) if i ≥ t.
The corresponding kernel is given by
pµ˜(l, k) =
l
k(k − 1)
µ˜(N ≥ k)
µ˜(N ≥ l)
=
l
k(k − 1)

µ2(N≥k)
µ2(N≥l) k > l ≥ t,
µ2(N≥k)
µ1(t>N≥l)+µ2(N≥t) k ≥ t > l,
µ1(t>N≥k)+µ2(N≥t)
µ1(t>N≥l)+µ2(N≥t) t > k > l,
0 else.
However, having a look at this kernel, we immediately observe the following
problem: Given a stopping time τ , i.e. stop at candidate τ , i.e. stop at
applicant ξτ = t. Consider the case ξτ = t > l = ξi−1, in particular τ > i− 1.
Hence, we have that P(ξi = k|ξi−1 = l) is not Fξi−1-measurable but Fξτ -
measurable by the above formula, contradicting the general properties that
conditional probabilities have to satisfy. Hence, this is not an admissible
density process since we need future information.
In the next section, we come up with an appropriate notion taking care
of time-consistency as well as measurability problems.
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Ambiguity in terms of Assessments
As seen, a straightforward generalization of [Presman & Sonin, 72]’s model
leads to time-inconsistency, non-measurability as well as to properties that
are hard to justify in economic terms. We now tackle these issues. The
problem of time-consistency arises because Q˜ does not incorporate any notion
of time, whereas Q does. Hence, we consider the following definition:
Definition 2.4.18. A sequence µ := (µ1, µ2, . . .) ∈ M(N)N is called an
assessment.
Notation 2.4.19. In order to keep notation simple, we stick to our old
notation though the content has changed: Now, µ denotes an assessment
and not an element in M(N), whereas µi is the generic notation for these
distributions. Q˜ now denotes a set of assessments, not of simple distributions
any longer and Q defined below is the set of priors corresponding to the set
Q˜ of assessments.
Intuitively, given an assessment (µi)i, µk denotes the distribution on the
number of applicants, the agent thinks to be correct upon observing applicant
k. We do not assume µk(i) = 0 for i < k; in particular, µk is in general not
the distribution conditional on N ≥ k. Recall that the aim is to find a
time-consistent set Q of distributions of (ξi)i. Hence, let us now assume that
the agent has a set Q˜ consisting of assessments. Assume that an assessment
induces a distribution of (ξi)i via the kernels
P∗(ξi = k|ξi−1 = l) :=
{
l
k(k−1)
µi(k)+µi+1(k+1)+...
µi−1(l)+µi(l+1)+...
if k > l,
0 else,
or alternatively
P∗∗(ξi = k|ξi−1 = l) :=
{
l
k(k−1)
µk(k)+µk+1(k+1)+...
µl(l)+µl+1(l+1)+...
if k > l,
0 else.
Note, that the first kernel does not only depend on k and l but also on i.
Now, pasted kernels correspond to some assessment and in order to achieve
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time-consistency, this is assumed to be in Q˜. Note, that the second kernel
is the one induced by µ˜ ∈M(N) defined by µ˜(i) := 1P
j≥1 µj(j)
∑
j≥1 Ij=iµi(i),
µi(k) := µi(N = k). However, having a look at this approach we immediately
observe two aspects: Pasting assessments, we may easily run into the same
measurability problems as before. Furthermore, both kernels do not have to
be probability kernels. Even more severe, the first approach does not make
sense, because we evaluate the probability of a kth applicant existing in terms
of the measure at the ith candidate. As for the second alternative, does it
really make sense to evaluate the probability that N = j by µj(j) for j ≥ l
being at applicant l, where we have assesment µl? We don’t think so and
hence, we define the transistion probability in another way:
Definition 2.4.20. Given assessment µ := (µi)i, define the kernel
Pµ(ξi = k|ξi−1 = l) = pµ(l, k) :=
{
l
k(k−1)
µl(N≥k)
µl(N≥l) if l < k <∞,
0 l ≥ k,
(2.6)
pµ(∞,∞) := 1,
pµ(l,∞) := l
µl(N ≥ l)
∞∑
s=l
µl(s)
s
.
Note that Pµ(ξi = k|ξi−1 = l) ∈ Fξi−1 .
Assumption 2.4.21. Given a set Q˜ of assessments, set Q˜k := {µk|(µi)i ∈
Q˜}. For every k, let Q˜k be convex and closed. Moreover, if µ1, µ2 ∈ Q˜, then
sup{i|µ1k(i) > 0} = sup{i|µ2k(i) > 0} ∀k.
Definition 2.4.22. For Q˜, the set of assessments, we define the set of priors
of (ξi)i as Q := {Pµ = Iξ1=1 ⊗ (pµ)N|µ = (µi)i ∈ Q˜},14 where pµ is obtained
as in equation (2.6).
Note that Q˜ now denotes a set of assessments and not of simple elements
in M(N). Q still denotes the set of priors on (ξi)i but now induced by
multiple assessments. Q˜k contains elements in M(N), the k-projections of
14Convex and compact by the foregoing assumption.
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the respective assessments. Again, the latter part of the assumption induces
Q consisting of equivalent distributions, the former allows for the following
payoff process: Given a set of assessments Q˜, upon observing applicant k,
we have the (multiple prior) payoff
XQ˜k := min
µk∈Q˜k
E[IY¯k=1|Fk]
=
{
minµk∈Q˜k
{
k
µk(N≥k)
∑∞
s=k
µk(s)
s
}
if Yk = 1,
0 else.
By definition, XQ˜k ∈ Fk and hence an admissible payoff process. Thus, we
consider the candidate process (ξi)i with payoff function
gQ˜(ξi) := XQ˜ξi = min
µξi∈Q˜ξi
{
ξi
µξi(N ≥ ξi)
∞∑
s=ξi
µξi(s)
s
}
. (2.7)
Remark 2.4.23 (The Correct Model (Ω,F ,P0, (Fξi)i, (XQ˜ξi )i,Q)). We are
now in the context of [Riedel, 09] and may solve the optimal stopping problem
of the candidate process (ξi)i with payoff function g
Q˜ as in equation (2.7),
i.e. stopping the payoff process (XQ˜ξi )i, for an ambiguity averse agent facing
priors in Q from Definition 2.4.22 with transition kernel in Definition 2.4.20.
Proposition 2.4.24. Q is time-consistent if and only if Q˜ satisfies the
following property: Given µ1, µ2 ∈ Q˜ and a stopping time τ , then µ3 :=
(µ11, . . . , µ
1
ξτ−1, µ
2
ξτ
, . . .) ∈ Q˜.
Proof. Let P1 be the distribution corresponding to assessment µ1 and P2 to
µ2. Then, we the have as density process of (ξi)i for the respective assess-
ments:
pji :=
dPj
dP0
∣∣∣∣
Fi
=
d(Iξ1=1 ⊗ (pj)i−1)
d(Iξ1=1 ⊗ (p0)i−1)
,
pji (ξ1 = l1, ξ2 = l2, . . . ξi = li) =
I{1}(l1)pj(l1, l2) . . . pj(li−1, li)
I{1}(l1)p0(l1, l2) . . . p0(li−1, li)
,
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∀l1 < l2 < . . . < li. Now consider a stopping time τ and set
ri :=
dR
dP0
∣∣∣∣
Fi
:=
{
p1i i ≤ τ,
p1τp
2
i
p2τ
i > τ.
ri(ξ1 = l1, . . . ξi = li) =

I{1}(l1)p1(l1,l2)...p1(li−1,li)
I{1}(l1)p0(l1,l2)...p0(li−1,li) i ≤ τ,
I{1}(l1)p1(l1,l2)...p1(lτ−1,lτ )p2(lτ ,lτ+1)...p2(li−1,li)
I{1}(l1)p0(l1,l2)...p0(li−1,li) i > τ,
∀l1 < l2 < . . . < li. We immediately see that R is induced by any assessment
of the form µ3 := (µ11, . . . , µ
1
lτ−1 , µ
a1
lτ−1 , . . . µ
alτ−lτ−1−1
lτ−1 , µ
2
lτ
, . . .) with aj ∈ {1, 2},
1 ≤ j ≤ lτ − lτ−1 − 1. However, since this has to hold for all τ and since
all µ are equivalent to µ0 in the sense that the induced distributions of the
candidate process have to be equivalent and hence ξi can take all values k ≥ i
with positive probability, we have that Q is time-consistent, if and only if
µ3 := (µ11, . . . , µ
1
lτ−1 , µ
1
lτ−1+1, . . . , µ
1
lτ−1, µ
2
lτ , µ
2
lτ+1 . . .) ∈ Q˜
for all stopping times τ .
Example 2.4.25. Q is time-consistent if Q˜ is the independent product of its
projections, i.e. Q˜ = Q˜1 ⊗ Q˜2 ⊗ . . .
Remark 2.4.26. If µ1 = µ2 = . . ., and |Q˜| = 1, we are back in the case
of [Presman & Sonin, 72]. Our first approach (the time-consistent hull) is
achieved by the assumption Q˜1 = Q˜2 = . . . and the independence assumption.
To keep the model simple, we pose the following assumption:
Assumption 2.4.27. We assume that Q˜ is of the form Q˜1 = Q˜2 = . . .
and that Q˜ satisfies the assumptions for Q being time-consistent as given in
Proposition 2.4.3,15 i.e. Q˜ being an independent product of its projections.
One may object that we might have µi(k) > 0 for k < i though it seems
counterintuitive given the intuition of an assessment. We might also have as-
sumed Q˜k to only enclose the respective distributions appropriately updated,
15Note, that time-consistency is not automatically satisfied in the indistinguishable case:
Indeed, set Qi = {µ1i , µ2i }, µj1 = µj2 := µj , (µ1, µ1), (µ2, µ2) ∈ Q˜ but (µ1, µ2), (µ2, µ1) 6∈ Q˜.
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i.e. contingent on observing k applicants. However, this does not change the
payoff process (gQ˜(ξi))i or the distribution of (ξi)i since these contingencies
are “averaged out” in the respective formulae.
2.4.3 Results
Considering our formulation of the ambiguous best choice problem, we are in
context of optimally stopping the stochastic process (ξi)i with payoff function
g(ξi) as in equation (2.7) and transition kernel from Definition 2.4.20, where
the agent faces the set of priors Q as in Definition 2.4.22, induced by a set
Q˜ of assessments satisfying Assumption 2.4.27. The value process (V Q˜ξi )i at
candidate i being applicant ξi is given by
V Q˜ξi = ess sup
τ≥i
ess inf
P∈Q
EP[gQ˜(ξτ )|Fξi ].
From Theorem 2.4.10, we know that the value function equals the multiple
prior Snell envelope
U Q˜ξi = max
{
gQ˜(ξi); ess infP∈Q
EP[U Q˜ξi+1 |Fξi ]
}
= max
{
gQ˜(ξi); ess inf
p(ξi,·)
∞∑
s=ξi+1
p(ξi, s)U
Q˜
s
}
= max
{
gQ˜(ξi); ess inf
µξi∈Q˜ξi
∞∑
s=ξi+1
ξi
s(s− 1)
µξi(N ≥ s)
µξi(N ≥ ξi)
U Q˜s
}
= max
{
min
µξi∈Q˜ξi
ξi
µξi(N ≥ ξi)
∞∑
s=ξi
µξi(s)
s
;
min
µξi∈Q˜ξi
∞∑
s=ξi+1
ξi
s(s− 1)
µξi(N ≥ s)
µξi(N ≥ ξi)
U Q˜s
}
.
We now set
τ ∗ := min{i ≥ 1|U Q˜ξi = gQ˜(ξi)}.
By Theorem 2.4.10, τ ∗ is the smallest optimal stopping time. Recall that
τ(ω) = m means to “stop at candidate m”. However, to comply with the
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classical problem, we want to have a stopping strategy telling us “stop at
applicant m, given she is a candidate”. Hence, we set
ΓQ˜ := {k|U Q˜k = gQ˜(k)}
and we see that
τ ∗ = min{i > 0|ξi ∈ ΓQ˜}.
ΓQ˜ is the set of all arrival times of applicants (not of candidates) that are
optimally chosen if being a candidate. τ ∗ is the first candidate in ΓQ˜.
Remark 2.4.28. The specific structure of ΓQ˜ is the solution to our problem
and the multiple prior Snell envelope entirely characterizes ΓQ˜.
Remark 2.4.29 (Instantaneous Worst-Case Assessment). Having a look at
the left hand side of the Snell envelope, gQ˜(k), at applicant k being a can-
didate, the agent has to calculate the instantaneous payoff from stopping by
minimizing expected payoff with respect to the set of k-projections of assess-
ments. As for a given distribution of the number of applicants, the instanta-
neous payoff is just the probability that no further candidate will follow, the
instantaneous payoff in the multiple priors set-up is just given by the mini-
mum of this probability with respect to all possible distributions of numbers
of applicants.
Recall that we assume all orderings of agents being equally likely. Hence,
the probability of the current candidate being the last is minimal for the
distribution that puts weight on large numbers of applicants. Hence, for
every applicant k, there corresponds a distribution µ˜k ∈ Q˜k such that
min
µk∈Q˜k
{
k
µk(N ≥ k)
∞∑
s=k
µk(s)
s
}
=
k
µ˜k(N ≥ k)
∞∑
s=k
µ˜k(s)
s
.
Hence we may define the instantaneous worst-case assessment µ˜ by virtue of
components (µ˜i)i minimizing the instantaneous payoff at applicant i. From
the structure of the minimization problem and assuming Q˜k = Q˜m, we see
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that µ˜k = µ˜m for every k,m, i.e. the instantaneously minimizing assess-
ment is constant. It is immediate, that there is no problem in calculating
the instantaneous worst case assessment (µ˜k)k for the instantaneous payoff
(gQ˜(k))k in advance as this is, irrespective of whatever might happen, the
distribution that puts on average most weight on higher values.
Notation 2.4.30. By the foregoing remark, we may hence write gQ˜(k) =
gµ˜k(k), where µ˜ = (µ˜i)i denotes the instantaneous worst-case assessment.
A first – unfruitful – Approach to a Solution
The first idea to the solution of the problem is to use the minimax theorem
in order to interchange the infimum and the supremum in the problem’s
value function. This would allow for solving the inner maximization problem
as in [Presman & Sonin, 72] for every assessment under consideration and
then obtain the worst case assessment in terms of that solution with minimal
payoff to the agent. However, as the instantaneous payoff also depends on the
distribution, we will show that this approach is not eligible for the ambiguous
Best-Choice problem. Formally, we have
V Q˜ξi = ess sup
τ≥i
ess inf
Pµ∈Q
EPµ [gQ˜(ξτ )|Fξi ]
= ess sup
τ≥i
ess inf
µ∈Q˜
EPµ [gQ˜(ξτ )|Fξi ]
= ess sup
τ≥i
ess inf
µ∈Q˜
EPµ
[
min
µξτ∈Q˜ξτ
ξτ
µξτ (N ≥ ξτ )
∞∑
s=ξτ
µξτ (s)
s
∣∣∣∣∣Fξi
]
in general
6= ess sup
τ≥i
ess inf
µ∈Q˜
EPµ
[
ξτ
µξτ (N ≥ ξτ )
∞∑
s=ξτ
µξτ (s)
s
∣∣∣∣∣Fξi
]
MiniMax
= ess inf
µ∈Q˜
ess sup
τ≥i
EPµ
[
ξτ
µξτ (N ≥ ξτ )
∞∑
s=ξτ
µξτ (s)
s
∣∣∣∣∣Fξi
]
,
The second to last inequality destroys our simple approach to the probelm:
We cannot just reduce the ambiguous problem to the risky one, i.e. solve the
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inner problem in the last line as in [Presman & Sonin, 72] for every assess-
ment on its own and then apply the worst of these risky solutions to solve
the ambiguous one. We will make this more concrete in Remark 2.4.32 below
as the upper inequality shows the multiple prior Snell envelope not to be the
lower envelope of the individual risky Best-Choice problems’ Snell envelopes.
We however argue that this does not contradict [Riedel, 09] as we consider a
family of induced risky problem, the Snell envelopes of which are enveloped
from below by the multiple prior Snell envelope.
Remark 2.4.31 (On the Schizophrenia of Agents). It is not just formally
obvious that the line of equations does not hold in general but also intuitively.
Before we apply the minimax theorem in the above line of equations, we
combine the minimal instantaneous distribution with the worst case dynamic
distribution. However, we have to distinguish these terms: the instantaneous
worst case distribution is just the minimizer in the instantaneous payoff g(k)
at applicant k being a candidate. Of course, due to homogeneity, we can at
time zero calculate the assessment minimizing the instantaneous payoff, i.e.
(µ˜k)k s.t. µ˜k ∈ arg min gQ˜(k) for every k. We call (µ˜k) the instantaneous
worst case assessment as each component gives the worst case distribution for
the instantaneous payoff at the respective candidate. On the other hand, we
calculate the worst case distribution of the candidate process. This is given
by some worst case assessment (µ¯k)k that induces the worst case distribution
for the payoff in terms of the kernels in equation (2.3).
Our approach above would now imply these worst case assessments (the
instantaneous and the dynamic one) to coincide. However, this is not true
as might immediately be seen in case of prior assessments consisting of dis-
tributions that induce the best choice problem to still be monotone, as e.g.
families of uniform distributions. Observing applicant k being a candidate,
the instantaneous worst case distribution µ˜k on the number of applicants
would prefer high values as this would minimize the probability of the respec-
tive candidate chosen being the best and hence minimize the instantaneous
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payoff.16 However, in the monotonic case, as the value function, and hence
the right hand side of the Snell envelope is increasing, the worst case assess-
ment puts most weight on lower values of the candidate process. Hence, in
general (µ˜k)k 6= (µ¯k)k.
This behavior seems quite schizophrenic on first sight: At applicant k being
a candidate, the agent beliefs that nature will choose a different distributions
contingent on her decision to stop or not. We, however, do not consider this
observation as unintuitive: Having decided on stopping or going further, the
agent’s view of what might happen in worst case changes drastically.
Solution to the Ambiguous Problem
We have seen the multiple prior Snell envelope to be given by
U Q˜ξi = max
{
min
µξi∈Q˜ξi
(
ξi
µξi(N ≥ ξi)
∞∑
s=ξi
µξi(s)
s
)
;
min
µξi∈Q˜ξi
( ∞∑
s=ξi+1
ξi
s(s− 1)
µξi(N ≥ s)
µξi(N ≥ ξi)
U Q˜s
)}
and the optimal stopping time as τ ∗ := min{i|ξi ∈ ΓQ˜}, where the stopping
set ΓQ˜ := {k|gQ˜(k) = U Q˜k }. Hence, we can write
τ ∗ = min{i|gQ˜(ξi) = U Q˜ξi }
= min
{
i
∣∣∣∣gQ˜(ξi) ≥ minµ∈Q EPµ [U Q˜ξi+1∣∣∣Fξi]
}
= min
{
i
∣∣∣∣∣gQ˜(ξi) ≥ minµξi∈Q˜ξi
( ∞∑
s=ξi+1
ξi
s(s− 1)
µξi(N ≥ s)
µξi(N ≥ ξi)
U Q˜s
)}
Remark 2.4.32 (Major Problem for the solution). In [Riedel, 09]’s theory
of optimal stopping under ambiguity, instantaneous payoff did not depend on
16Of course, this monotonic behavior of instantaneous payoff g always holds and, hence,
the instantaneous worst case assessment (µ˜k)k is calculated in any case. Of course, appro-
priate assumptions have to be required as, otherwise, nature would choose a distribution
favoring infinitely many applicants and hence set the payoff to zero.
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priors. Hence, in that case the multiple prior Snell envelope is the lower en-
velope of the individual Snell envelopes with respect to the single priors. In
the Snell envelope of the risky Best-Choice problem, however, the instanta-
neous payoff g, the left hand side of the Snell envelope, also depends on the
distribution. Hence, the multiple prior Snell envelope of the ambiguous Best-
Choice problem is not the lower envelope of the individual Snell envelopes of
the respective risky Best-Choice problems.
However the way we solve this apparent contradiction to [Riedel, 09] is
by artificially introducing an induced risky problem by virtue of the instan-
taneous payoff g already as the minimal instantaneous payoff with respect to
priors. In that respect, the multiple prior Snell envelope of the ambiguous
Best-Choice Problem is the lower envelope of the the Snell envelopes of the
optimal stopping problems with artificial payoff g given the respective priors.
But it is important to keep in mind that these optimal stopping problems are
not the risky Best-Choice problems as the payoff of the induced risky problems
is given by the minimized expectation and hence in general not equal to the
payoff of the risky Best-Choice problems.
More formally it holds:
ess sup
τ≥i
ess inf
µ∈Q˜
EPµ
[
min
µξτ∈Q˜ξτ
ξτ
µξτ (N ≥ ξτ )
∞∑
s=ξτ
µξτ (s)
s
∣∣∣∣∣Fξi
]
= ess inf
µ∈Q˜
ess sup
τ≥i
EPµ
[
min
µξτ∈Q˜ξτ
ξτ
µξτ (N ≥ ξτ )
∞∑
s=ξτ
µξτ (s)
s
∣∣∣∣∣Fξi
]
in general
6= ess inf
µ∈Q˜
ess sup
τ≥i
EPµ
[
ξτ
µξτ (N ≥ ξτ )
∞∑
s=ξτ
µξτ (s)
s
∣∣∣∣∣Fξi
]
.
The multiple prior Snell envelope of the optimal stopping problem with payoff
gQ˜ given by gQ˜(k) := minµk∈Q˜k
{
k
µk(N≥k)
∑∞
s=k
µk(s)
s
}
and set of assessments
Q˜, i.e. the ambiguous Best-Choice problem (first line above), is not the lower
envelope of the individual Snell envelopes of the risky problems with payoff gµ
defined by virtue of gµ(k) := k
µk(N≥k)
∑∞
s=k
µk(s)
s
for assessments µ ∈ Q˜, i.e.
the risky Best-Choice problems (third line). It is however the lower envelope
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of the individual Snell envelopes of the risky problems with payoff gQ˜ and
distributions given by µ ∈ Q˜ (second line).
The Finite Problem
In order to obtain a feeling for solving the problem, we first consider the
almost surely finite case. This will already make several aspects explicit.
Assumption 2.4.33. Given a fixed T ∈ N, we have for all µ ∈ Q˜ supp(µi) ⊂
[0, T ] for all i.
Given this assumption, we have max{supp(µi)} = T for all i. Recall that
ξi = ∞ if there does not exists an ith candidate and, hence, in particular if
there does not exist an ith applicant. Furthermore, g(∞) = 0.
Have in mind that for all i, ξi+1 > ξi a.s., in particular ξi ≥ i, and hence
the effective state spaces of (ξi)i are of the form
ξ1 = 1
ξ2 ∈ {2, 3, . . . , T,∞} µ2 − a.s.∀µ2 ∈ Q2
...
ξi+1 ∈ {ξi + 1, . . . , T,∞} ⊂ {i+ 1, . . . , T,∞} µi+1 − a.s.∀µi+1 ∈ Qi+1
...
ξT ∈ {T,∞} µT − a.s.∀µT ∈ QT
We can now compute:
U Q˜ξT = g
Q˜(ξT ) = 1{ξT=T}
and for U Q˜ξT−1
gQ˜(ξT−1) =

0 if ξT−1 =∞,
1 if ξT−1 = T ,
minµT−1
(
T−1
µT−1(N≥T−1)
(
µT−1(T−1)
T−1 +
µT−1(T )
T
))
if ξT−1 = T − 1
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and, as one-step ahead conditional expected minimax payoff
min
µ∈Q
EPµ
[
U Q˜ξT
∣∣∣FξT−1]
=

0 if ξT−1 =∞,
0 if ξT−1 = T ,
minµT−1
(
pµ(T − 1, T )U Q˜T + pµ(T − 1,∞)U Q˜∞
)
if ξT−1 = T − 1.
=

0 if ξT−1 =∞,
0 if ξT−1 = T ,
minµT−1
(
1
T
µT−1(N≥T )
µT−1(N≥T−1)
)
if ξT−1 = T − 1.
Hence, we stop at T − 1 if and only if either
ξT−1 = ∞,
ξT−1 = T,
or, in case ξT−1 = T − 1
min
µT−1
(
T − 1
µT−1(N ≥ T − 1)
(
µT−1(T − 1)
T − 1 +
µT−1(T )
T
))
≥ min
µT−1
µT−1(N ≥ T )
TµT−1(N ≥ T − 1) ,
where the left hand side of the inequality equals
min
µT−1
(
T − 1
µT−1(N ≥ T − 1)
(
µT−1(T − 1)
T − 1 +
µT−1(T )
T
))
= min
µT−1
(
1− µT−1(T )
T (µT−1(T − 1) + µT−1(T ))
)
= min
µT−1
(
1− µT−1(T )
TµT−1(N ≥ T − 1)
)
.
Hence, upon observing ξT−1 = T − 1, the agent stops the process if and only
if
min
µT−1
(
1− µT−1(T )
TµT−1(N ≥ T − 1)
)
≥ min
µT−1
µT−1(N ≥ T )
TµT−1(N ≥ T − 1) .
Two observations are worthwhile to note: First, µT−1(T )
TµT−1(N≥T−1) is the prob-
ability that ξT−1 is the second to last candidate, i.e. there will be the best
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applicant among all to follow at T given the candidate at T −1. In this sense
the left hand side is the probability that the candidate at T − 1 is the best
among all, the right hand side the probability that a better applicant is still
to follow and hence observed at T .
In terms of the intuition of coherent risk or multiple prior preferences, the
minimization problem that nature has to solve on both sides of the inequality
is immediate: on the left hand side, nature has to minimize the probability
of the chosen candidate to be the best, on the right hand side she has to
minimize the probability that, if candidate T − 1 is not chosen, there still
follows a candidate at T , i.e. nature wants that the candidate at T − 1 was
actually the best and the agent realizes that stopping is too late. Formally:
Pµ
[
Y¯T−1 = 1
∣∣YT−1 = 1] = 1− µT−1(T )
TµT−1(N ≥ T − 1) ,
Pµ [YT = 1|YT−1 = 1] = µT−1(T )
TµT−1(N ≥ T − 1) ,
where Y¯ denotes the absolute and Y the relative rank.
Secondly, it is immediate that, observing candidate T − 1, these mini-
mization problems are conflicting: As set out, on the right hand side, nature
minimizes the probability of a better candidate to be chosen, i.e. at T − 1
to minimize the probability that there is a candidate at T , whereas the left
hand side is equivalent to maximize this probability, as then the chosen can-
didate at T − 1 is not the best applicant. More formally, the left hand side
is equivalent to the problem
max
µT−1
µT−1(N ≥ T )
TµT−1(N ≥ T − 1) .
Hence, at T − 1, observing ξT−1 = T − 1, for the immediate payoff function
g, we obtain a minimizing assessment µ˜ s.t. µ˜T−1(T − 1) = µl(T − 1) and
µ˜T−1(T ) = µu(T ), where µu denotes the assessment putting most weight on
T and µl the one putting least weight. On the other hand, the worst case
measure from T − 1 onwards is abteined by µ¯ s.t. µ¯T−1(T − 1) = µu(T − 1)
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and µ¯T−1(T ) = µl(T ), i.e. exactly the opposite. Thus, the Snell envelope,
upon observing ξT−1 = T − 117 takes the form
U Q˜T−1 =
{
1− µ
u
T−1(T )
TµuT−1(N ≥ T − 1)
;
µlT−1(T )
TµuT−1(N ≥ T − 1)
}
.
At this stage, we observe the difference of our Snell envelope in the ambiguous
case and the one in [Presman & Sonin, 72] in the risky case: in the risky set
up, there is the same distribution on both sides, in our ambiguous approach,
there is an instantaneous worst case assessment on the left and a dynamic
worst case assessment on the right hand side and those do not coincide.
Explicit solutions can now be achieved by going on further with the backward
induction principle given explicit characteristics of the set of assessments
under consideration. We, however, do not want to achieve this here but have
a look in theoretical results on the set Γ of stopping islands.
The General Problem
Again, we note that the problem is entirely solved by characterizing Γ, the
stopping set. In general, i.e. when the support is not assumed bounded, the
Snell envelope of the problem is given by18
U Q˜ξi = max
{
gQ˜(ξi); min
µ∈Q
EPµ
[
U Q˜ξi+1
∣∣∣Fξi]} ,
which, for ξi = k takes the form
U Q˜k = max
{
min
µk∈Q˜k
∞∑
s=k
k
s
µk(s)
µk(N ≥ k) ; minµk∈Q˜k
∞∑
s=k+1
k
s(s− 1)
µk(N ≥ s)
µk(N ≥ k)U
Q˜
s
}
.
In [Chudjakow & Riedel, 09], the approach to ambiguity is again leading to
monotone problems but does not cover the case of an ambiguous number of
17Due to homogeneity of the process, this is the same value for any ξi = T − 1 as it
does not matter if it is the first or (T − 1)st candidate at applicant T − 1 or whatever in
between, i.e. be it ξ1, ξ2, . . . does not matter.
18More precisely, in the infinite case, it is the value function satisfying the Bellman
equation.
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applicants. As in the risky Best-Choice problem, the main problem here is
the lack of monotonicity leading to a multiplicity of stopping islands. Hence,
it is not possible in our case to find a worst case distribution for the payoff
process in terms of stochastic dominance as it is done in several examples
in [Riedel, 09]. We will now emphasis on a theoretical result: The question
is, whether we can find conditions to ensure finitely many stopping islands
in case of not necessarily bounded support of priors. The following theorem
shows that there exists a final stopping island up to infinity and, hence, there
can only be finitely many stopping islands. It generalizes the main result in
[Presman & Sonin, 72] to an ambiguous number of applicants.
We have already introduced the difference between the instantaneous
worst case assessment (µ˜k)k and the dynamic worst case assessment (µ¯k)k
in the foregoing paragraph:
µ˜k ∈ arg min
µk∈Q˜k
∞∑
s=k
k
s
µk(s)
µk(N ≥ k)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=gQ˜(k)
µ¯k ∈ arg min
µk∈Q˜k
∞∑
s=k+1
pµk(k, s)U Q˜(s).
Let us know pose two definitions as in [Presman & Sonin, 72]:
cµkk := g
Q˜(k)−
∞∑
s=k+1
pµk(k, s)gQ˜(s)
and define the operator
QµkgQ˜(k) := max
{
gQ˜(k);
∞∑
s=k+1
pµk(k, s)gQ˜(s)
}
In the proof of the following main theorem, generalizing Theorem 3.1 in
[Presman & Sonin, 72], we inevitably use the fact, that the multiple prior
Snell envelope is the lower envelope of the Snell envelopes of the induced
risky problems.
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Theorem 2.4.34. (a) If ΓQ˜ consists of finitely many stopping islands, then
there exists some k∗ such that cµ¯kk ≥ 0 for all k ≥ k∗.
(b) If there exists (µ∗k)k such that c
µ∗k
k ≥ 0 for all k ≥ k∗, then ΓQ˜ exists
of finitely many stopping islands; in particular, [k∗;∞] ⊂ ΓQ˜.
(c) Given k∗ from part (b), if for all µk∗−1 ∈ Q˜k∗−1 it holds cµk∗−1k∗−1 < 0,
then k∗ − 1 6∈ ΓQ˜.
Proof. ad (a): Note that ΓQ˜ possesses finitely many stopping islands if there
exists a “last” stopping island up to infinity. Let [k∗,∞] ⊂ ΓQ˜, then for all
k ≥ k∗ we have
U Q˜k = g
Q˜(k) by definition of ΓQ˜
≥ min
µk
∞∑
s=k+1
pµk(k, s)U Q˜s by definition of U
Q˜
=
∞∑
s=k+1
pµ¯k(k, s)U Q˜s by definition of µ¯k
≥
∞∑
s=k+1
pµ¯k(k, s)gQ˜(s).
ad (b): Let µ∗k be such that c
µ∗k
k ≥ 0 for all k ≥ k∗, then
gQ˜(k) ≥
∞∑
s=k+1
pµ
∗
k(k, s)gQ˜(s)
and hence
Qµ∗kgQ˜(k) = max
{
gQ˜(k);
∞∑
s=k+1
pµ
∗
k(k, s)gQ˜(s)
}
= gQ˜(k).
As (ξi)i is increasing we have that p
µ∗k(k, s) = 0 for all s ≤ k and it follows
inductively that the payoff process is idempotent with respect to Q, i.e.
(Qµ∗k)ngQ˜(k) = gQ˜(k) ∀n ∀k ≥ k∗.
Let Uµ
∗
k denote the Snell envelope of the induced risky problem under distri-
bution µ∗k but still with payoff g
Q˜. Then, we know from the general theory
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of optimal stopping of Markov chains:
U
µ∗k
k = limn→∞
(
Qµ∗k
)n
gQ˜(k) = gQ˜(k) ∀k ≥ k∗.
As the multiple prior Snell envelope of our ambiguous problem ist the lower
envelope of these Snell envelopes, we have
gQ˜(k) = Uµ
∗
k
k ≥ min
µk∈Q˜k
Uµkk = U
Q˜
k ∀k ≥ k∗.
and hence, as by definition of U Q˜ we have U Q˜k ≥ gQ˜(k) for all k,
U Q˜k = g
Q˜(k) ∀k ≥ k∗.
This implies k ∈ ΓQ˜ for all k ≥ k∗.
ad (c): If now c
µk∗−1
k∗−1 < 0 for all µk∗−1 ∈ Q˜k∗−1, then
Qµk∗−1gQ˜(k∗ − 1) > gQ˜(k∗ − 1)
⇒ Uµk∗−1k∗−1 > gQ˜(k∗ − 1) ∀µk∗−1 ∈ Q˜k∗−1
⇒ U Q˜k∗−1 = minµk∗−1 U
µk∗−1
k∗−1 > g
Q˜(k∗ − 1)
⇒ k∗ − 1 6∈ ΓQ˜.
Of course, part (a) of the foregoing theorem is quite difficult to check.
However, for applications, parts (b) and (c) are the interesting ones. Asser-
tion (b) particularly holds for (µ˜k)k, the instant worst-case assessment.
2.5 Conclusions
Having elaborated the “simple” and the risky Best-Choice problem, we came
up with an adequate generalization to an ambiguous number of applicants.
To solve this problem, we made use of the theory of optimal stopping with
respect to multiple priors as set out in [Riedel, 09]: Agents assess expected
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reward in terms of multiple prior preferences or, equivalently, coherent risk
measures.
When solving the problem, we have seen that a direct generalization of the
risky to the ambiguous set-up is not feasible as time-consistency is impossibly
achieved in that model. The problem, however, was seen to be solvable in
terms of multiple assessments with a time-consistency assumption. By virtue
of multiple prior Snell envelopes we have achieved conditions for the solution
to consist of finitely many stopping islands. Furthermore, these stopping
islands were entirely characterized by the multiple prior Snell envelope.
As we have seen, the major problem in solving the model is that the
multiple prior Snell envelope is not the lower envelope of the individual Snell
envelopes of the respective risky problems as the respective distribution is
also incorporated in the instantaneous payoff. It is, however, the lower enve-
lope of the Snell envelopes of the respective risky problems with artificially
introduced instantaneous payoff g.
So far, we have not considered learning in our model as introduced in
[Epstein & Schneider, 07]. On the contrary, an agent observing applicant,
say, 10 may still put positive probability on having only, say, 5 applicants.
However, updating assessments won’t change the results as updating is“aver-
aged out” in expected reward. Nevertheless, future research should introduce
learning to this model: One might think of state dependent projections of sets
of assessments, narrowing or widening contingent on available information.
In this sense, assessments would emerge from learning.
Furthermore, ambiguous arrival times with a fixed horizon, extending
[Stewart, 81] or [Bruss, 84] to the ambiguous case, should be considered;
e.g. in case of Poisson arrival times, one might introduce multiplicity of
parameters. Moreover, the case of ambiguity on the quality of applicants and
an updating approach of beliefs over this set of priors is to elaborate in case
of the partial information Best-Choice problem. After several observations,
the set of priors on agents’ quality is refined since several priors seem too
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unlikely; an approach as used in [Epstein & Schneider, 07].
A further extension is to consider the secretary problem when uncertainty
over the number of applicants is not given as here but in terms of dynamic
variational preferences or convex risk measures. A general theory for optimal
stopping problems in that context can be found in the next chapter.
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Chapter 3
Optimal Stopping with
Dynamic Variational
Preferences
3.1 Introduction
In our everyday life we face a broad variety of optimal stopping problems : We
accept bids for our used car to sell or stop the process of potential marriage
partners not knowing whether a more appropriate partner is still to come.
On financial markets, agents try to maximize profits from American options.
Hence, optimal stopping problems are not just of value for theoretical con-
siderations but of great virtue in applications. All examples have in common
that, on an abstract level, an agent has to find an optimal stopping time for
some stochastic payoff process. The classical solution to this problem, as in-
ter alia given in [Neveu, 75], assumes the agent to possess a unique subjective
prior ruling the payoff process and to maximize expected payoff. In an un-
certain environment however, there might not be a unique prior distribution:
On incomplete financial markets, we might be faced with multiple equivalent
martingale measures not being sure which one is ruling the world. Hence,
3. STOPPING WITH VARIATIONAL PREFERENCES
with multiple possible distributions, a solution to the problem by virtue of
simple expected utility maximization with respect to some subjective prior
cannot be eligible: An alternative notion of“expected reward”has to be used.
In this article, we hereto choose dynamic variational preferences.
[Riedel, 09] considers the problem to optimally stop an adapted payoff
process (Xt)t∈N on a filtered probability space (Ω,F ,P, (Ft)t∈N) when ex-
pected reward is induced by multiple prior preferences or, equivalently, by
coherent risk measures. By virtue of a robust representation theorem, ex-
pected reward for chosen stopping time τ is then given by a minimal ex-
pectation of the form infQ∈Q EQ[Xτ ] on a set of priors Q. Several reasons
for considering optimal stopping problems in terms of multiple prior prefer-
ences are stated therein: An ambiguity averse agent might not be able to
completely determine the distribution governing the payoff process (Xt)t and
hence apply this worst-case approach. Equivalently, when considering the
problem from point of view of risk assessment, the above minimized expec-
tation is, modulo a minus sign, the robust representation of coherent risk
measures as seen in [Riedel, 04] or [Fo¨llmer & Schied, 04]. We let the matter
of justification rest at this point but mention the following example: In case
(Xt)t is viewed as the payoff process of an American option in an incomplete
financial market, a unique real world measure may induce several risk neu-
tral martingale measures and, hence, a robust approach to expected payoff
maximization with Q as the set of risk neutral measures seems appropriate.
As mentioned, the approach in [Riedel, 09] is based on multiple prior pref-
erences introduced in [Gilboa & Schmeidler, 89], applied to a dynamic frame-
work in [Epstein & Schneider, 03]. It can equivalently be stated in context of
coherent risk measures introduced in [Artzner et al., 99] and applied to a dy-
namic setting in [Riedel, 04]. However, [Fo¨llmer & Schied, 04] point out the
limitations of the coherent approach: Due to homogeneity coherent risk mea-
sures do not account for liquidity risk. Secondly, the robust representation
shows coherent risk measures to assess risk quite conservatively. Hence, the
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coherent approach is generalized to convex risk measures relaxing the homo-
geneity and sub-additivity assumption to a convexity condition resulting in a
more liberal assessment of risk; in a dynamic context elaborately discussed in
[Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06] and [Cheridito et al, 06]. Furthermore, several fun-
damental risk measures are not coherent but convex as inter alia entropic risk.
Equivalently, [Maccheroni et al., 06a] generalize the multiple priors approach
to so called variational preferences and to dynamic variational preferences in
[Maccheroni et al., 06b]. In a more general setup dynamic risk adjusted val-
ues or (concave) utilities are introduced in [Cheridito et al, 06] for stochastic
processes. [Maccheroni et al., 06b] show dynamic multiple prior preferences
to be a special class of dynamic variational preferences; [Cheridito et al, 06]
show dynamic coherent risk measures to be a special class of dynamic convex
risk measures.
For both approaches, the one in terms of variational preferences as well
as the one in terms of convex risk measures, robust representations in terms
of minimal penalized expected payoff (or maximal penalized expected loss)
are achieved. These approaches are equivalent in the sense that the robust
representations coincide up to a factor of −1. Under the assumption of risk
neutrality but uncertainty aversion, a discount factor of unity and without
intermediate payoffs, expected reward pit for stopping the process (Xt)t with
stopping strategy τ induced by dynamic variational preferences at time t is
given by a robust representation of the form
pit(Xτ ) = ess infQ
(
EQ[Xτ |Ft] + αt(Q)
)
, (3.1)
for some dynamic penalty (αt)t. The equivalent dynamic convex risk mea-
sure is then given as ρt = −pit. Having in mind the robust representation
of dynamic multiple prior preferences, it is immediate that these are a spe-
cial case of dynamic variational preferences when the penalty is trivial, i.e.
only achieves values null and infinity. In the same token, this holds for
coherent risk measures as a special case of convex ones. It is beyond the
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scope of this article to discuss the axioms of variational preferences or con-
vex risk measures, respectively, leading to the robust representation. We
just take the representation as given and build our theory upon that. (αt)t,
formally derived by a Fenchel-Legendre transform, might be interpreted as
an ambiguity index ; this is inter alia done in [Maccheroni et al., 06a] and
[Maccheroni et al., 06b]. We might intuitively think of (αt)t as an inverse
likelihood of a distribution to be the ruling one: the larger the penalty, the
less likely the agent assumes the respective distribution to be the true under-
lying one. Stated differently: Given two agents, one characterized by (αt)
1
t ,
the other by (αt)
2
t . If (αt)
1
t ≥ (αt)2t , then the first agent is less ambigu-
ity averse. Equivalently, (rho1t )t assess risk more liberally. Throughout, we
assume robust representation in terms of minima penalty (αt)
min
t uniquely
characterizing the variational preference.
For dynamic models, the first question is how preferences or risk mea-
sures at distinct time periods are interrelated. An assumption that serves
as a link between time periods is time-consistency, defined by virtue of
pit = pit(pit+1). Robust representation results showing equivalence of time-
consistency and a condition on dynamic minimal penalty (αmint )t, called no-
gain condition, are obtained in [Cheridito et al, 06], [Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06],
and [Maccheroni et al., 06b]. The basic idea is to represent minimal penalty
as a sum of contingent penalties and a one-step-ahead penalty, thus con-
necting penalties in different time periods. Hence, the great advantage of
the approach via dynamic variational preferences is that time consistency
as a property of dynamic minimal penalty function (αmint )t leads to a re-
cursive robust representation in terms of minimal penalized expected utility.
This property will elaborately be discussed in the next section. As shown in
[Maccheroni et al., 06b], the no-gain condition on (αmint )t reduces to stability
of the set of priors in context of multiple prior preferences.
By virtue of the above expected reward in terms of minimal penalized
expectation, results in this article constitute a generalization of the results in
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[Riedel, 09] by applying optimal stopping to dynamic convex risk measures or
dynamic variational preferences under the assumption of time-consistenty. In
terms of a recursion formula we obtain a worst-case distribution for expected
reward induced by dynamic variational preferences. It is however important
that we do not obtain the elegant intuition in [Riedel, 09] that the agent
behaves as expected utility maximizer with respect to the worst-case distri-
bution since the penalty is not trivial and, hence, does not vanish. We make
use of a Snell envelope approach to solve the problem at hand by showing
equality of the value function and an appropriately generalized Snell envelope,
called variational Snell envelope, for a finite horizon. In the infinite horizon
case, we show the Bellman principle to hold for the value function. These re-
sults allow us to obtain an optimal stopping strategy recursively: We observe
that the smallest optimal stopping time obeys well-known characteristics. A
further result is a minimax theorem for optimal stopping under convex risk.
In order to achieve our results, we introduce the notion of variational (super-,
sub-) martingales and an accompanying variational martingale theory.
We then consider two prominent examples of dynamic convex risk mea-
sures. First, we have a look at dynamic entropic risk measures (or dynamic
multiplier preferences). We state a robust representation of these measures
and obtain quite intuitive results on the worst case measure for a specific kind
of payoff processes. Secondly, we consider dynamic convex generalizations of
average value at risk (AVaR) as introduced in [Cheridito & Li, 09]. As the
natural dynamic extension of these risk measures is not time-consistent, we
first achieve a dynamic version directly in terms of the definition of time-
consistency. Secondly, we achieve a time-consistent version of generalized
AVaR by virtue of a recursive construction in terms of the minimal penalty
from the static version of generalized AVaR assumed to satisfy the no-gain
condition when applied to a dynamic framework. As we see in the examples,
when considering non-trivial penalty functions applications become more
complex: in particular, independence, inevitably used in simple examples
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in [Riedel, 09], does not hold any longer. Nevertheless, the second example
constitutes a tangible alternative to widely used VaR taking into account
liquidity risk, satisfying time-consistency, and avoiding the problem of risk
accumulation caused by VaR.
To prevent confusion, the reader should have the following in mind: Even
though we stop a payoff process (Xt)t, we do not need dynamic risk measures
in all generality for stochastic processes (Xt)t as set out in [Cheridito et al, 06].
We only consider dynamic risk of a random variable Xτ . Hence, it suffices to
consider the results from the theory of dynamic risk measures for end-period
payoffs as in [Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06].
[Schied, 07] applies an approach to optimal behavior on financial markets
neglecting time-consistency. Agents maximize minimal penalized intertem-
poral utility as given above. Making use of convex conjugates, he achieves
a minimax theorem similar to ours without using time-consistency. Hence,
no constructive recursion for worst-case measures is achieved in that set-
up. However, we are convinced that time-consistency is not only a crucial
property from a theoretical point of view to obtain explicit results but also
intuitively justifiable.
Again, let us note the (mathematical) equivalence of dynamic convex
risk measures and dynamic variational preferences. Slovenly, both are the
same modulo a minus sign in terms of robust representation. The notion of
time-consistency as well as necessary and sufficient conditions for it to be
satisfied are in both approaches basically identical. Just the interpretation
differs: The risk measure of a (financial) position reflects the amount of the
numeraire needed to make the position acceptable or might be seen as penal-
ized worst expected loss, whereas variational preferences are used to assess
utilities. Hence, throughout the article we identify convex risk measures with
variational preferences and coherent risk measures with multiple priors pref-
erences. Particularly in the last section where we state examples, dynamic
variational preferences are directly given in terms of dynamic convex risk
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measures.
The article is structured as follows: The next section defines the model,
gathers the relevant assumptions and then states the optimal stopping prob-
lem in terms of a value function. This directly leads to the definition of vari-
ational supermartingales and an accompanying theory in Section 3. Section
4 contains the main results with proofs. Section 5 discusses some interesting
examples. Thereafter, we conclude.
3.2 The Model
We now come up with a model to optimally stop a payoff process (Xt)t≤T , T ∈
N ∪ {∞}, in discrete time. For this purpose let (Ω,F ,P0) be an underlying
probability space with filtration (Ft)t≤T , F0 := {∅,Ω} and F = σ
(⋃
t≤T Ft
)
,
modeling the information process for the agent. P0 serves as a reference
distribution. Consider an adapted process (Xt)t≤T assumed to be essentially
bounded.1 If not stated otherwise, equalities are meant to hold P0-a.s. Let
Me(P0) denote the set of all probability measures on (Ω,F) that are locally
equivalent to P0, i.e. for every t, Q ≈ P0 on Ft. In particular, if T < ∞,
this is just the set of all distributions equivalent on F = FT . As we see
in [Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06], the assumption of locally equivalent distributions
is justified from a mathematical point of view as the robust representation
allows for only considering these distributions under suitable assumptions on
convex risk measures. Intuitively, equivalence of distributions implies that
the agent, not sure which distribution is the correct one, at least agrees upon
which events are possible, i.e. have positive mass under all distributions, and
which are not, i.e. have mass zero. We will elaborate on local equivalence
being appropriate further in Chapter 4. Recall that a stopping time τ is
an integer valued random variable such that {τ ≤ t} ∈ Ft for all t ≤ T .
1This crucial assumption is mainly used for convenience. In the proofs it can be seen
that weaker notions of integrability might be sufficient.
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For ω ∈ Ω, we set Xτ (ω) := Xτ(ω)(ω). Let L∞ := L∞(Ω,F ,P0) be the
space of all essentially bounded F -measurable random variables. Analog, for
t ≤ T , let L∞(Ft) := L∞(Ω,Ft,P0) be the space of all essentially bounded
Ft-measurable random variables.
3.2.1 Robust Representation of Time-Consistent Vari-
ational Preferences
For the payoff process (Xt)t≤T an agent chooses a stopping time τ with respect
to filtration (Ft)t≤T in order to maximize expected reward.
How do Agents assess Utility?
Given a stopping time τ , we first have to answer the following question:
Remark 3.2.1 (Initial Question). Given the agent is not able to entirely
assess the ruling distribution of the payoff process and is uncertainty averse
but risk neutral, how does expected reward look like?
The assumption in expected utility theory would be that the agent has a
subjective probability distribution, say Q, of the payoff process and assesses
expected reward by EQ[Xτ ].2 [Riedel, 09] assumes the agent not being sure
about the appropriate distribution of (Xt)t but knowing that it belongs to
some convex set Q ⊂ Me(P0) with reference distribution P0. However, all
elements in Q are assumed being equally probable. Then, multiple prior
expected reward is given by infQ∈Q EQ[Xτ ].
In this article, we go a step further by assuming that an agent deter-
mines expected reward from stopping time τ in terms of dynamic variational
preferences as introduced in [Maccheroni et al., 06b] or, equivalently, by a
dynamic convex risk measure as in [Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06]. As shown in
2We have implicitly assumed the agent to be risk-neutral as we will do throughout the
article. Hence, we may choose the identity as Bernoulli state utility.
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[Maccheroni et al., 06b] as well as in [Cheridito et al, 06], the agent then as-
sesses variational expected reward at time t from stopping at τ by
pit(Xτ ) = ess infQ
(
EQ[Xτ |Ft] + αt(Q)
)
, (3.2)
where (αt)t≤T denotes the dynamic penalty, also called dynamic ambiguity
index in [Maccheroni et al., 06b]. This robust representations is obtained
from the axioms of dynamic variational preferences. The penalty is achieved
in terms of a Fenchel-Legendre transform. However, throughout this article,
we take the robust representation as given and build our theory upon that; we
do not consider the axiomatic approach to dynamic variational preferences.
Equivalently, the axioms of dynamic convex risk measures (ρt)t lead to a
robust representation satisfying ρt = −pit.
Before stating appropriate assumptions and rigorous definitions, let us
make a short note on the penalty’s intuition: As set out in the introduc-
tion, the approach of assessing expected reward in term of minimal penal-
ized expected utility emerges from the (dynamic) variational preferences ax-
ioms in [Maccheroni et al., 06b], as well as the convex risk measure axioms
in [Cheridito et al, 06]. Robust representation results therein justify rep-
resenting expected reward in the above manner. [Maccheroni et al., 06a]
and [Maccheroni et al., 06b], as well as [Rosazza Gianin, 06] in the time-
consistent case, incorporate a broad discussion of the penalty αt: The penalty
function is a measure for ambiguity aversion of an agent: If α1t ≥ α2t for all t
and all distributions, then agent 1 is less ambiguity averse than agent 2. In-
terpreted in another way, the penalty represents the subjective likelihood of
a distribution to be the ruling one: The higher the value of αt, the less likely
the agent considers the respective distribution. In terms of a game against
nature, αt is usually interpreted as a cost nature has to bear for choosing
a specific probability at time t. the penalty is – under the assumption of
risk neutrality but ambiguity aversion – the characterization of the agent’s
preferences; unique as long as it is the minimal penalty function. Distinct ex-
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amples of dynamic convex risk measures and dynamic variational preferences
will be given later. As an extreme case, consider a distribution Q ∈Me(P0)
such that, for all t, αt(Q) = 0 and ∞ for all P 6= Q: We achieve expected
utility theory with subjective prior Q. As shown in [Maccheroni et al., 06b],
multiple prior expected reward with Q ⊂ Me(P0) is a special case of vari-
ational expected reward where αt = 0 on Q and ∞ else. In this sense, the
present article constitutes a generalization of the approach in [Riedel, 09].
We now state a rigorous definition of the penalty (αt)t≤T and appropriate
assumptions for the above expected reward (pit)t≤T to be well defined as a
robust representation of dynamic (time-consistent) variational preferences.
There are several justifications for our definition of penalty: As seen in the
respective literature as e.g. [Cheridito et al, 06] or [Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06],
our assumptions yield a representation of convex risk measures or variational
preferences in terms of a penalty (αt)t satisfying the properties below.
Notation 3.2.2. Define the set M of distributions in Me(P0) by
M := {Q | Q|Ft ≈ P0|Ft∀t, α0(Q) <∞},
where “≈” means two probability distributions to be equivalent. Given the
distribution Q ∈ M, Q|Ft denotes the restriction of Q to Ft, i.e. the distri-
bution of the process up to time t. As usual Q(·|Ft) denotes the conditional
probability distribution of the process given history up to time t.
The following definitions are obtained from [Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06] and
[Maccheroni et al., 06b]:
Definition 3.2.3 (Dynamic Penalty & Time-Consistency). (a) We call a
family (αt)t a dynamic penalty if each αt satisfies:
• αt is a mapping αt : M → L1+(Ft): For each Q ∈ M, αt(Q) is an
Ft-measurable random variable with values in R+.34
3More elaborately, for all ω ∈ Ω, αt(·)(ω) is a function on the Ft-bayesian updated
distributions in M, i.e. the effective domain satisfies effdom(αt(·)(ω)) ⊂ {Q(·|Ft) : Q ∈
M, ω ∈ Ft ∈ Ft}. Hence, when writing αt(Q) we actually have in mind αt(Q(·|Ft)).
4It can be seen in [Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06], Lemma 3.5, that this domain of a penalty is
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• For all t ≥ 0, αt is grounded, i.e. ess infQ∈M αt(Q) = 0.
• αt is closed and convex,5 i.e. convex as a mapping on M and closed in
the sense that images of closed sets are again closed.
(b) At t, define the acceptance set by At := {X ∈ L∞|ρt(X) ≤ 0}. Then,
we define the minimal penalty (αmint )t by
αmint (Q) := ess sup
X∈At
EQ[−X|Ft].
for all Q ∈M.6
(c) Let pt (resp. qt) denote the density process of P (resp. Q) with respect to
P0, i.e. pt := dPdP0
∣∣∣
Ft
, where dP
dP0 denotes the Radon-Nikodym derivative with
respect to P0. For a stopping time θ define the “pasted distribution” P ⊗θ Q
by virtue of
d(P⊗θ Q)
dP0
∣∣∣∣
Ft
:=
{
pt if t ≤ θ,
pθqt
qθ
else.
(d) We call a dynamic penalty (αt)t time-consistent if it satisfies the following
no-gain condition: for all t ≥ 0 and Q we have
αt(Q) = EQ [αt+1(Q)|Ft] + ess infP∈M αt(Q⊗t+1 P). (3.3)
Notation 3.2.4. Taking into account that αt only depends on Bayesian up-
dates, we simplify notation when appropriate and write
αt(Q⊗t+1 P) = αt
(
q1 . . . qt+1pt+2 . . .
q1 . . . qt
)
= αt(qt+1pt+2 . . .).
well defined in case of relevant time-consistent dynamic convex risk measures as relevance
allows to only consider the set of locally equivalent distributions in the robust represen-
tation and time-consistency in conjunction with relevance implies αt(Q) < ∞ for all t.
We call a dynamic convex risk measure (ρt)t≤T relevant, if P0[ρt(−IA) > 0] > 0 for all t,
 > 0 and A ∈ F such that P0[A] > 0.
5This assumption is well defined by [Fo¨llmer & Schied, 04], Remark 4.16.
6(αmint )t≤T is a penalty function in terms of (a).
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Assumption 3.2.5. Throughout this article we assume the agent to as-
sess risk in terms of a relevant time-consistent dynamic convex risk measure
(ρt)t≤T on the set of essentially bounded F-measurable random variables as
in [Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06] or, equivalently, assess utility in terms of time-
consistent dynamic variational preferences (pit)t≤T for end-period payoffs as
in [Maccheroni et al., 06b]. Note that we identify dynamic variational pref-
erences with its robust representation of induced payoff. Furthermore, we
assume continuity from below for (ρt)t≤T , i.e. for all (Xn)n ⊂ L∞ such that
Xn ↗ X for some X ∈ L∞, we have ρt(Xn) ↘ ρt(X). Equivalently, we
assume continuity from below of (pit)t≤T , i.e. pit(Xn) ↗ pit(X) for the above
sequence.
Definition 3.2.6. (ρt)t is called time-consistent if it satisfies ρt = ρt(−ρt+1)
for all t < T . Equivalently, pit = pit(pit+1).
7
Remark 3.2.7. [Cheridito et al, 06] and [Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06] show that,
under Assumption 3.2.5, (ρt)t≤T and (pit)t≤T have a robust representation of
the form
ρt(Xτ ) = −pit(Xτ ) = ess sup
Q∈M
{
EQ[−Xτ |Ft]− αt(Q)
}
,
with some dynamic penalty (αt)t≤T . Furthermore, it is shown that this ro-
bust representation holds true in terms of, the minimal penalty (αmint )t≤T ,
satisfying the no-gain condition (3.3) by the time-consistency assumption.
Remark 3.2.8. By virtue of the Fenchel-Legendre Transform, the minimal
7In general, time-consistency is defined as: ρt = ρt(−ρt+s), t, s ≤ T , t + s ≤ T .
In this sense, our definition of time-consistency is a special case, called “one-step time-
consistency” in [Cheridito et al, 06]. However, for the proofs in this article, our definition
is sufficient and, of course, always satisfied in the general case of time-consistency. On
the other hand, one-step time-consistency implies general time-consistency under our con-
tinuity assumptions by Proposition 4.5 in [Cheridito et al, 06]. Hence, our definition of
time-consistency in terms of ”one-step time-consistency” is equivalent to the general notion
of time-consistency.
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penalty can be written as
αmint (Q) = ess sup
X∈L∞
(EQ[−X|Ft]− ρt(X))
for all Q ∈M. The term “minimal” is justified as the robust representation of
(ρt)t≤T or (pit)t≤T might allow for multiple penalties (αt)t≤T , but the minimal
one satisfies
αmint (Q) ≤ αt(Q)
for all Q ∈M and (αt)t≤T in the robust representation of (ρt)t≤T or (pit)t≤T .
The minimal penalty uniquely characterizes the agent’s preferences or,
equivalently, risk attitude by virtue of the robust representation.
Assumption 3.2.9. We assume robust representation in terms of the min-
imal penalty throughout this article.
Remark 3.2.10. (a) The no-gain condition on the minimal penalty (αmint )t
is equivalent to time-consistency of (pit)t≤T or (ρt)t≤T . Connecting distinct
periods via the penalty function, this property leads to a recursive structure
of penalty and hence of the value function of the optimal stopping problem.
We will make this explicit later on.
(b) As stated in [Fo¨llmer et al., 09], Remark 1.1, continuity from below of
pit or ρt implies continuity from above of either one. Continuity from above is
equivalent to the existence of a robust representation of pit (or ρt) in terms of
minimal penalized expected payoff; continuity from below of pit (or ρt) induces
the worst case distribution to be achieved. We hence could change the sup
into a max. pit is continuous from above (below) if and only if the convex
risk measure ρt is continuous from above (below).
The intuition of equation (3.3), the no-gain condition, is the following:
We might think that nature has to pay a penalty for choosing a specific dis-
tribution at time t: αmint . Nature may now accomplish the task of choosing
a probability in two ways: On the left hand side of equation (3.3), it uses
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the time-consistent way by just choosing a probability Q, pay the appropri-
ate amount and do nothing in the next period and go with the conditional
distribution Q(·|Ft). However, the right hand side describes the possibly
time-inconsistent way of choosing a probability: It chooses today a distri-
bution P that inuces the same distribution today as Q but may differ from
tomorrow on and pays the amount αmint (Q ⊗t+1 P). In the second step, i.e.
after realization of Ft+1, nature may deviate and, conditionally on Ft, choose
a distribution Q. If this time-inconsistent way of choosing a distribution is
not less costly, we call (αmint )t time-consistent. Equation (3.3) particularly
tells us that the cost of choosing Q at time t can be decomposed into the
sum of expected cost of choosing Q’s conditionals at time t+ 1 and the cost
of inducing Q|Ft+1 as a so-called one-period-ahead marginal distribution of
the payoff process at time t.
The no-gain condition on (αmint )t is the generalization of the time-consistency
condition in [Riedel, 09]: As shown in [Maccheroni et al., 06b], if (αt) is triv-
ial, i.e. only assumes values in {0,∞}, the no-gain condition is equivalent to
stability of the set of priors Q := {Q ∈ M : αmint (Q) = 0}. This also holds
true in the not necessarily finite case as shown in e.g. in [Cheridito et al, 06].
In course of this section, we explicitly show time-consistency results when
assuming a robust representation of dynamic convex risk measures or dy-
namic variational preferences in terms of minimal penalty.
Explicit Answer to the Initial Question
The following assumption answers the question how agents assess utility in
the present set-up.
Assumption 3.2.11 (Main Assumption on Preferences). To sum up, for
given τ we assume expected reward (pit)t≤T being continuous from below and
possessing the robust representation as in Remark 3.2.7: for all t
pit(Xτ ) = ess infQ∈M
(
EQ[Xτ |Ft] + αmint (Q)
)
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with dynamic minimal penalty (αmint )t≤T assumed to be time-consistent, i.e.
satisfying equation (3.3). This is equivalent to Assumption 3.2.5 but in terms
of robust representation.
Again, due to continuity from below, we can write the robust representa-
tion as ess min instead of ess inf.
In terms of dynamic variational preferences, time consistency is given by
the recursion formula pit(pit+1) = pit, which, as elaborately discussed below,
in our case becomes for τ ≥ t+ 1
ess inf
Q∈M
(
EQ[Xτ |Ft] + αmint (Q)
)
= ess inf
Q∈M
(
EQ
[
ess inf
P∈M
(
EP[Xτ |Ft+1] + αmint+1(P)
)∣∣∣∣Ft]+ αmint (Q)) .
Remark 3.2.12. The following assumption is equivalent to pit (or equiva-
lently ρt) being continuous from below:{
dP
dP0
∣∣∣∣
Ft
∣∣∣∣ αt(P) < c} ,
for each c ∈ R, t ∈ N, being relatively weakly compact in L1(Ω,F ,P0).8
Proof. Theorem 1.2 in [Fo¨llmer et al., 09] states the assertion in an uncondi-
tional setting. Due to the properties of conditional expectations, the assertion
also holds in our dynamic set-up.
Remark 3.2.13 (Robust Representation as in Remark 3.2.7). We have now
justified the representation in Remark 3.2.7. Relevance in conjunction with
time-consistency allows us to only consider locally equivalent distributions
in the robust representation and ensures M being non-empty as shown in
[Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06].
The second part, continuity from below, then induces the worst case dis-
tribution to be attained in the coherent case, cp. [Fo¨llmer & Schied, 04],
Corollary 4.35, and Lemma 9 and 10 in [Riedel, 09], and the minimal distri-
bution to be achieved in our approach as will be seen in Proposition 3.3.6.
8Or, assuming αmint to be lsc, then just weakly compact. Due to time-consistency, we
have αmint (Q) <∞ for all t whenever there exists one such t.
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Remark 3.2.14 (Conditional Cash Invariance). One of the axioms of dy-
namic variational preferences (and dynamic convex risk measures) is condi-
tional cash invariance. In conjunction with a normalization assumption, this
property becomes: for all t ≤ T and Ft-measurable X, we have pit(X) = X.
As we do not consider the axiomatic approach, we immediately derive this
property from the robust representation as αmint is assumed to be grounded:
pit(X) = ess infQ∈M
(
EQ[X|Ft] + αmint (Q)
)
= X + ess inf
Q∈M
αmint (Q) = X.
The next result justifies to define time-consistency in terms of the penalty
as it results in time-consistency of dynamic variational preferences (pit)t≤T .
Proposition 4.5 in [Cheridito et al, 06] shows in case of continuity from below
our definition of time consistency, pit = pit(pit+1), to be equivalent to the
general definition, pit = pit(pit+s). The proof of Proposition 3.2.15 is a special
case of the proof of Theorem 4.22 in [Cheridito et al, 06]. It is explicitly
stated here as it generates fruitful insights.
Proposition 3.2.15. The no-gain condition, equation (3.3), implies time-
consistency of dynamic variational preferences (pit)t≤T , i.e. pit = pit(pit+1) for
t < T . More precisely, we have for all (Xt)t≤T and τ ≤ T
pit(Xτ ) = Xτ I{τ≤t} + pit(pit+1(Xτ ))I{τ≥t+1}
= pit(Xτ I{τ≤t} + pit+1(Xτ )I{τ≥t+1})
= pit(pit+1(Xτ )).
Proof. (i) τ ≤ t: In this case, Xτ is Ft-measurable and in particular Ft+1-
measurable. Hence, by conditional cash invariance, we have
pit(Xτ ) = Xτ = pit+1(Xτ )
and hence pit(Xτ ) = pit(pit+1(Xτ )).
(ii) τ ≥ t+ 1: “≤”: If, for all Q ∈M, we have
αmint (Q) ≤ EQ
[
αmint+1(Q)|Ft
]
+ ess inf
P∈M
αmint (Q⊗t+1 P),
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then, as ess infR∈M αmint (Q⊗t+1 R) ≤ αmint (Q), also
αmint (Q⊗t+1 P) ≤ EQ⊗t+1P
[
αmint+1(Q⊗t+1 P)|Ft
]
+ αmint (Q).
Now, consider Q1,Q2 ∈ M and B ∈ F . Set dQ3dP0 := IB dQ1dP0 + IBc dQ1dP0 . Then
Q3 ∈M and by the local property of minimal penalty, [Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06],
Lemma 3.3, we have αmint (Q3) = IBαmint (Q1) + IBcαmint (Q2). Define B as
B := {EQ2 [Xτ |Ft+1] + αmint+1(Q2) ≥ EQ1 [Xτ |Ft+1] + αmint+1(Q1)}.
Then
EQ3 [Xτ |Ft+1] + αmint+1(Q3)
= min
{
EQ1 [Xτ |Ft+1] + αmint+1(Q1);EQ2 [Xτ |Ft+1] + αmint+1(Q2)
}
showing the set {
EP[Xτ |Ft+1] + αmint+1(P) : P ∈M
}
to be downward directed. Hence, there exists a sequence (Pn)n ⊂ M such
that
EPn [Xτ |Ft+1] + αmint+1(Pn)↘ pit+1(Xτ ).
As (αmint )t≤T is assumed to satisfy equation (3.3) and (pit)t≤T is assumed to be
relevant, pasted distributions again have finite penalty. Hence, M is closed
under pasting and we obtain for all Q ∈M and such Pn:
pit(Xτ ) = ess infP,Q
(
EQ⊗t+1P[Xτ |Ft] + αmint (Q⊗t+1 P)
)
≤ EQ⊗t+1Pn [Xτ |Ft] + αmint (Q⊗t+1 Pn)
≤ EQ⊗t+1Pn [Xτ |Ft]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=EQ [EPn [Xτ |Ft+1]|Ft]
+ EQ⊗t+1Pn [αt+1(Q⊗t+1 Pn)|Ft]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=EQ [αt+1(Pn)|Ft]
+αmint (Q)
= EQ
[
EPn [Xτ |Ft+1] + αmint+1(Pn)
∣∣Ft]+ αmint (Q),
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i.e. for all Q ∈M we have
pit(Xτ ) ≤ EQ
[
EPn [Xτ |Ft+1] + αmint+1(Pn)
∣∣Ft]+ αmint (Q).
Hence, letting n→∞, we achieve for all Q ∈M
pit(Xτ ) ≤ EQ [pit+1(Xτ )| Ft] + αmint (Q).
Applying the essential infimum to this expression yields
pit(Xτ ) ≤ pit(pit+1(Xτ )).
“≥”: Assuming
αmint (Q) ≥ EQ
[
αmint+1(Q)|Ft
]
+ ess inf
P∈M
αmint (Q⊗t+1 P)
for all Q ∈M, we obtain
EQ[Xτ |Ft] + αmint (Q)
≥ EQ[Xτ |Ft] + EQ
[
αmint+1(Q)|Ft
]
+ ess inf
P∈M
αmint (Q⊗t+1 P)
≥ ess inf
P∈M
(
EQ⊗t+1P
[
EQ [Xτ |Ft+1] + αmint+1(Q)
∣∣Ft] + αmint (Q⊗t+1 P))
≥ ess inf
P∈M
(
EQ⊗t+1P [pit+1(Xτ )| Ft] + αmint (Q⊗t+1 P)
)
≥ pit(pit+1(Xτ )).
Applying the essential infimum, we achieve
pit(Xτ ) ≥ pit(pit+1(Xτ )).
As in [Maccheroni et al., 06b] we have the following result on the recursive
structure of expected reward pit at time t. However, we achieve this result
for more general probability spaces but under the assumption of end-period
payoffs, risk neutrality and a discount factor of unity.
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Corollary 3.2.16. For time-consistent dynamic minimal penalty (αmint )t,
the time-t conditional expected reward from choosing stopping time τ ≤ T
satisfies
pit(Xτ ) = Xτ I{τ≤t} + ess inf
µ∈M|Ft+1
(∫
pit+1(Xτ )dµ+ γt(µ)
)
I{τ≥t+1},
where
γt(µ) := ess infQ∈M
αmint (µ⊗t+1 Q) ∀µ ∈M|Ft+1 ,
andM|Ft+1 denotes the set of all distributions inM restricted on Ft+1 condi-
tional on Ft. To have this expression well-defined, we set ess infP∈M αmint (µ⊗t+1
P) := ess infP∈M αmint (Q⊗t+1 P) with Q ∈M such that Q|Ft+1(·|Ft) = µ.
Proof. By conditional cash invariance, we have
pit(Xτ ) = pit(Xτ I{τ≤t} + pit+1(Xτ )I{τ≥t+1})
= Xτ I{τ≤t} + pit(pit+1(Xτ ))I{τ≥t+1}.
As pit+1 is Ft+1-measurable we have, whenever τ ≥ t+ 1,
pit(pit+1(Xτ )) = ess infQ∈M
(
EQ[pit+1(Xτ )|Ft] + αmint (Q)
)
= ess inf
R,P∈M
ER⊗t+1P[pit+1(Xτ )|Ft]︸ ︷︷ ︸
ER|Ft+1 [pit+1(Xτ )|Ft]
+αmint (R⊗t+1 P)

= ess inf
µ∈M|Ft+1 ,P∈M
(
Eµ[pit+1(Xτ )|Ft] + αmint (µ⊗t+1 P)
)
= ess inf
µ∈M|Ft+1
Eµ[pit+1(Xτ )|Ft] + ess infP∈M αmint (µ⊗t+1 P)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:γt(µ)
 .
γt might be viewed as nature’s penalty when choosing the one-period-
ahead marginal µ. Hence, it is called one-period-ahead penalty in analogy to
[Maccheroni et al., 06b]. In terms of γt, equation (3.3) becomes
αmint (Q) = EQ[αmint+1(Q)|Ft] + γt(Q|Ft+1(·|Ft)). (3.4)
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Remark 3.2.17 (Bellman Principle for Nature). Given τ ≤ T , Corollary
3.2.16 can be rephrased as
pit(Xτ ) = ess inf
Q|Ft+1∈M|Ft+1
(
EQ|Ft+1 [pit+1(Xτ )|Ft] + γt(Q|Ft+1)
)
:
Indeed, this is immediately seen as Xτ I{τ≤t} is Ft-measurable, γt is grounded,
and the conditional expectation is the unconditional one with respect to the
conditional distribution.
Intuitively, this constitutes a Bellman principle for nature’s choice of a
worst-case distribution:9 Given the optimal (worst-case) distribution from
time t+1 on, represented by its value pit+1, nature chooses a minimizing one-
period ahead conditional distribution Q|Ft+1. Note, that the above expression
is basically the same as the robust representation but in terms of a one-
step-ahead problem. This insight is particularly adjuvant when constructing
a worst-case distribution in Proposition 3.3.6 in terms of pasted one-period
ahead conditional distributions.
3.2.2 The Agent’s Problem
Let (Xt)t≤T , T ∈ N ∪ {∞}, be a payoff process adapted to the filtered “ref-
erence space” (Ω,F ,P0, (Ft)t≤T ) and expected reward (pit)t≤T with robust
representation by virtue of time-consistent minimal penalty (αt)t≤T . Recall
that M := {Q ∈Me(P0) : αmin0 (Q) <∞}.
The agent solves the following problem by finding an appropriate stopping
time τ with respect to (Ft)t≤T :
sup
0≤τ≤T
inf
Q∈M
(
EQ[Xτ |F0] + αmin0 (Q)
)
(3.5)
among all stopping times that are universally finite, i.e.
inf
Q∈M
Q[τ <∞] = 1.
9This should not be mixed up with the Bellman principle in the next chapter’s theorems
on optimal stopping: there, we achieve Bellman equations for the optimal stopping decision
of the agent, not for the worst-case distribution decision of nature.
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Definition 3.2.18 (Value Function, Snell Envelope). (a) For the problem at
hand, the value (function) (Vt)t≤T at time t ≤ T is given by
Vt := ess sup
T≥τ≥t
ess inf
Q∈M
(
EQ[Xτ |Ft] + αmint (Q)
)
. (3.6)
(b) For finite T , define the variational Snell envelope (Ut)t≤T of (Xt)t≤T with
respect to dynamic minimal penalty (αmint )t recursively by UT := XT and
Ut := max
{
Xt, ess infQ∈M
(
EQ[Ut+1|Ft] + αmint (Q)
)}
for t < T . (3.7)
(c) Define the stopping time
τ ∗ := inf{t ≥ 0|Ut = Xt}. (3.8)
Due to time-consistency of (pit)t≤T the variational Snell envelope can also
be written as:
Ut = max {Xt, pit(Ut+1)}
= max
{
Xt, ess infQ∈M
(
EQ[Ut+1|Ft] + αmint (Q)
)}
= max
{
Xt; ess inf
µ∈M|Ft+1
(∫
pit+1(Ut+1)dµ+ γt(µ)
)}
= max
{
Xt; ess inf
µ∈M|Ft+1
(∫
Ut+1dµ+ γt(µ)
)}
Subsequently, we show that the value function and the variational Snell
envelope coincide when T is finite. In the infinite time-horizon case, we show
the Bellman principle to hold for the value function allowing for recursive
solutions. Furthermore, it follows that τ ∗ is an optimal stopping time, i.e.
a solution to the initial problem. Note, that the variational Snell envelope
coincides with the multiple prior Snell envelope in case of multiple prior
preferences as introduced in [Riedel, 09]. It coincides with the “good old”
Snell envelope as e.g. set out in [Neveu, 75] in case of a unique subjective
prior.
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3.3 Variational Supermartingales
From the approach to optimal stopping in terms of Snell envelopes as e.g.
set out in [Neveu, 75] or more generally with multiple prior Snell envelopes
as in [Riedel, 09], we know that the value function satisfies some kind of
supermartingale property.10 The sleight of hand is always showing the value
function to be “some kind” of martingale until the optimal stopping time
and “some kind” of supermartingale thereafter. Hence, in order to solve the
agent’s problem, we have to come up with an appropriate notion of martingale
for dynamic variational preferences: the following definition generalizes the
notion of multiple prior (sub-, super-) martingales in [Riedel, 09]:
Definition 3.3.1. Given a time-consistent dynamic minimal penalty func-
tion (αmint )t∈N, let (Mt)t∈N be an (Ft)t∈N-adapted process with EQ[|Mt|] <∞
for all t ≤ T and all Q ∈ M. (Mt)t∈N is called a variational (sub-, super-)
martingale with respect to (αmint )t∈N if the following relation holds for t < T :
ess inf
Q∈M
(
EQ[Mt+1|Ft] + αmint (Q)
)
= (≥,≤)Mt.
In Lemma 6, [Riedel, 09] achieves a quite elegant way to characterize the
concepts of multiple prior (sub-, super-) martingales with respect to some
time-consistent set Q of distributions in terms of (sub-, super-) martingales
with respect to a worst-case distribution P∗ ∈ Q. However, this result is owed
to the simple structure of αt in the multiple priors case. Under variational
preferences, we do not achieve such an elegant lemma, but nevertheless can
state a similar result for variational supermartingales as being a supermartin-
gale “modulo penalty” with respect to some worst-case distribution Q∗ ∈M.
However, non-triviality of the minimal penalty in case of variational pref-
erences is the reason why the intuition of an agent behaving as expected
utility maximizer under the worst case distribution does not carry over from
10Having a look in the respective chapters in [Neveu, 75], it can be seen that the term
Snell envelope is not explicitly used therein; the solution procedure, however, is identical.
90
3.3. VARIATIONAL SUPERMARTINGALES
[Riedel, 09]. As in Riedel’s Lemma 6, the worst-case distribution is achieved
recursively: At each time t, the worst-case conditional one-step-ahead dis-
tribution is chosen. In [Riedel, 09], time-consistency is needed to ensure the
recursively pasted distribution to be again in the set of priors Q. By defi-
nition ofM and equation (3.3), we obviously have that pasted distributions
are again in M: αmint+1(Q) < ∞ implies αmint (Q) < ∞. However, the most
important part in our construction of a worst-case Q∗ is that, given equa-
tion (3.3), pasting of worst-case one-step-ahead distributions is consistent
with being of worst-case type given equation (3.3) Having achieved a worst-
case distribution from t + 1 onwards, we paste this with the one-step-ahead
worst-case conditional distribution from t to t+ 1 and achieve the worst-case
distribution from time t onwards.
For the next result analog to Lemma 6 in [Riedel, 09], we need several
lemmata directly generalizing the respective ones in [Riedel, 09] (Lemmata
9 and 10) to dynamic variational preferences applying interim results from
[Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06]. Throughout we assume the minimal penalty to sat-
isfy equation (3.3).
Lemma 3.3.2. For all µ ∈ M|Ft+1 there exists P∗ ∈ M(·|Ft+1) such that
αmint (µ⊗t+1 P∗) = ess infP∈M(·|Ft+1) αmint (µ⊗t+1 P).
Proof. By the weak compactness assumption on the set of density processes
(equivalent to continuity from below), it is sufficient to show that there exists
a sequence (Pn)n ⊂M(·|Ft+1) such that
αmint (µ⊗t+1 Pn)↘ ess infP∈M(·|Ft+1)α
min
t (µ⊗t+1 P).
Hence, it suffices to show that for all µ ∈M|Ft+1 , the set
{αmint (µ⊗t+1 Pn) : P ∈M(·|Ft+1)}
is downward directed, i.e. for every P1,P2 ∈ M(·|Ft+1), there exists a P3 ∈
M(·|Ft+1) sucht that
min
{
αmint (µ⊗t+1 P1), αmint (µ⊗t+1 P2)
}
= αmint (µ⊗t+1 P3).
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Indeed, set A := {αmint (µ⊗t+1P1) < αmint (µ⊗t+1P2)} and define P3 by virtue
of
dP3
dP0
:= IA
dP1
dP0
+ IAC
dP2
dP0
.
By Lemma 3.3 in [Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06], we have
αmint (µ⊗t+1 P3) = IAαmint (µ⊗t+1 P1) + IACαmint (µ⊗t+1 P2)
since µ⊗t+1 P3 = (µ⊗t+1 P1)IA + (µ⊗t+1 P2)IAC . Hence, we have
min
{
αmint (µ⊗t+1 P1), αmint (µ⊗t+1 P2)
}
= αmint (µ⊗t+1 P3),
which concludes the proof.
Lemma 3.3.3. Let Z ∈ L∞(Ω,FT ,P0). Then, for any stopping time τ , the
set {
EQ[Z|Fτ ] + αminτ (Q) : Q ∈M, Pτ |Fτ = P0|Fτ
}
is downward directed, i.e. for any Q1,Q2 ∈ M with Q1|Fτ = Q2|Fτ = P0|Fτ ,
there exists Q3 ∈M with Q3|Fτ = P0|Fτ such that
EQ3 [Z|Fτ ] + αminτ (Q3)
= min
{
EQ1 [Z|Fτ ] + αminτ (Q1);EQ2 [Z|Fτ ] + αminτ (Q2)
}
.
Proof. Let Q1 and Q2 be chosen as above. Consider some arbitrary set
B ∈ Fτ and define Q3 by virtue of
dQ3
dP0
:= IB
dQ1
dP0
+ IBC
dQ2
dP0
.
We have Q3 ∈ M, Q3|Fτ = P0|Fτ , and by [Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06], Lemma
3.3, we have the so called local propery for the minimal penalty
αminτ (Q3) = IBαminτ (Q1) + IBCαminτ (Q2) <∞.
Now, define B ∈ Fτ as
B := {ω ∈ Ω|EQ2 [Z|Fτ ](ω) + αminτ (Q2)(ω)
≥ EQ1 [Z|Fτ ](ω) + αminτ (Q1)(ω)
}
.
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Then, by definition of Q3 and the local property, we have
EQ3 [Z|Fτ ] + αminτ (Q3)
=
(
EQ1 [Z|Fτ ] + αminτ (Q1)
)
IB +
(
EQ2 [Z|Fτ ] + αminτ (Q2)
)
IBC
= min
{
EQ1 [Z|Fτ ] + αminτ (Q1);EQ2 [Z|Fτ ] + αminτ (Q2)
}
,
which completes the proof.
Lemma 3.3.4. Let Z ∈ L∞(Ω,Fs,P0), s ≤ T , and τ a stopping time.11
Then there exists Pτ ∈M sucht that Pτ |Fτ = P0|Fτ and
ess inf
Q∈M
(
EQ[Z|Fτ ] + αminτ (Q)
)
= EPτ [Z|Fτ ] + αminτ (Pτ )I{s>τ}.
Proof. In case τ ≥ s, the assertion obviously holds true by conditional cash
invariance: Both sides of the equation equal Z.12
Hence, we consider the case τ < s. To show: ∃ (Pm)m ⊂ M with
Pm|Fτ = P0|Fτ such that
ess inf
Q∈M
(
EQ[Z|Fτ ] + αminτ (Q)
)
= lim
m→∞
EPm [Z|Fτ ] + αminτ (Pm).
By the weak closedness assumption, such a sequence (Pm)m then weakly
converges to some P∞ ∈M that satisfies
ess inf
Q∈M
(
EQ[Z|Fτ ] + αminτ (Q)
)
= EP∞ [Z|Fτ ] + αminτ (P∞).
Setting P∞ =: Pτ then concludes the proof.
It leaves to prove existence of a sequence (Pm)m ⊂ M with the above
properties: As in the proof of Lemma 10 in [Riedel, 09], Bayes rule as well
as the dependence of ατ only on the Fτ -conditional distribution allows us to
restrict attention to Q ∈ M such that Q = P0 on Ft. This is made explicit
11We actually state the assertion in a more general fashion than needed: For our results
it suffices to have a fixed stopping period t ∈ N.
12Of course, the assertion in the lemma would still be correct without the indicator
function attached to the penalty. Then, in case τ ≥ s, the minimizing distribution Pτ is
just the one for which αminτ (Pτ ) = 0. However, our form makes more explicit that the
α-term vanishes in that case.
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in Corollary 2.4 in [Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06]. Hence, existence of the sequence
is assured if we can show the set{
EQ[Z|Fτ ] + αminτ (Q) : Q ∈M, Pτ |Fτ = P0|Fτ
}
.
to be downward directed as achieved in Lemma 3.3.3.
Corollary 3.3.5 (from Lemma 3.3.4). For all Z ∈ L∞(Ω,Ft+1,P0), ∃µ∗ ∈
M|Ft+1 such that
ess inf
µ∈M|Ft+1
(Eµ[Z|Ft] + γt(µ)) = Eµ∗ [Z|Ft] + γt(µ∗).
Proposition 3.3.6. Let (Mt)t∈N be an adapted process and (αmint )t∈N a time-
consistent minimal dynamic penalty function.
(a) If (Mt)t∈N is a Q-submartingale for all Q ∈M, then (Mt)t∈N is a varia-
tional submartingale with respect to (αmint )t.
(b) (Mt)t∈N is a variational supermartingale with respect to (αmint )t∈N if and
only if there exist a Q∗ ∈ M such that (Mt)t∈N is a Q∗-supermartingale
“modulo penalty”, i.e.
EQ∗ [Mt+1|Ft] + αmint (Q∗) ≤Mt.
In particular, (Mt)t∈N is a Q∗-supermartingale, i.e. EQ
∗
[Mt+1|Ft] ≤Mt.
Proof. ad (a): Let (Mt)t∈N be a submartingale for every Q ∈M, i.e.
EQ[Mt+1|Ft] ≥Mt ∀Q ∈M
⇒ ess inf
Q∈M
{
EQ[Mt+1|Ft] + αmint (Q)
}
≥ ess inf
Q∈M
EQ[Mt+1|Ft] + ess infQ∈M α
min
t (Q)
= ess inf
Q∈M
EQ[Mt+1|Ft] ≥Mt.
This shows (a).
ad (b): “⇐” Let Q∗ ∈ M be such that Mt ≥ EQ∗ [Mt+1|Ft] + αmint (Q∗).
Then obviously, Mt ≥ ess infQ∈M
{
EQ[Mt+1|Ft] + αmint (Q)
}
and hence (Mt)t
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is a variational supermartingale w.r.t. (αt)
min
t∈N as well a Q∗-supermartingale:
Mt ≥ EQ∗ [Mt+1|Ft] + αmint (Q∗) ≥ EQ∗ [Mt+1|Ft].
“⇒” By making use of Corollary 3.2.16, we will explicitly construct a
worst-case distribution Q∗ ∈M that satisfies
Mt ≥ ess infQ∈M
(
EQ[Mt+1|Ft] + αmint (Q)
)
= EQ∗ [Mt+1|Ft] + αmint (Q∗)
for t < T . Let M(·|Ft) denote the set of all distributions in M conditional
on Ft and M|Ft as defined in Corollary 3.2.16. We use that, due to conti-
nuity from below, the infima in the robust representation of preferences are
achieved and, hence, are actually minima. We nevertheless state the equa-
tions in terms of infima as this is common in the respective literature. We
have
Mt ≥ pit(Mt+1)
= ess inf
Q|Ft+1∈M|Ft+1
EQ|Ft+1 [pit+1(Mt+1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=Mt+1
|Ft] + γt(Q|Ft+1(·|Ft))

by Corollary 3.2.16
= ess inf
Q|Ft+1∈M|Ft+1
(
EQ|Ft+1 [Mt+1|Ft] + γt(Q|Ft+1(·|Ft))
)
= EQ
∗|Ft+1 [Mt+1|Ft] + γt(Q∗|Ft+1(·|Ft))
with Q∗|Ft+1 as achieved in Corollary 3.3.5
= EQ
∗|Ft+1 [Mt+1|Ft] + ess inf
P∈M(·|Ft+1)
αmint (Q∗|Ft+1(·|Ft)⊗t+1 P)
by definition of γt
= EQ
∗|Ft+1⊗t+1Q∗(·|Ft+1)[Mt+1|Ft] + αmint (Q∗|Ft+1(·|Ft)⊗t+1 Q∗(·|Ft+1))
by Lemma 3.3.2 and Bayes rule on the first summand
= EQ∗(·|Ft)[Mt+1|Ft] + αmint (Q∗(·|Ft))
by definition of ⊗t+1
= EQ∗ [Mt+1|Ft] + αmint (Q∗),
where Q∗(·|Ft) := Q∗|Ft+1(·|Ft)⊗t+1 Q∗(·|Ft+1) is the pasting of the Q∗|Fs ’s,
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s ≥ t, and Q∗ the respective recursive pasting down to time 0. The last
equality makes use of the fact that the penalty only depends on conditional
distributions13 and that the conditional expectation is the unconditional one
with respect to the conditional distribution.
In the foregoing proposition, we see that a variational submartingale with
respect to some minimal penalty (αmint )t∈N does not need to be a submartin-
gale with respect to some Q ∈ M. This insight limits the mathematical
theory obtained later. Luckily however, our economic results only rely on
the properties of variational supermartingales.
Remark 3.3.7. As seen in the lemmata, the foregoing assertion can be gen-
eralized to: ∃ Q∗ ∈M such that ∀t, s we have
EQ∗ [Ms|Ft] + αmint (Q∗)I{s>t} ≤Mt.
Indeed, if s ≤ t, due to projection property of conditional expectation, the left
hand side reduces to Ms as, in that case, Ms is Ft-measurable, and αmint is
assumed to be grounded.
In the same token as [Riedel, 09], we generalize standard results for su-
permartingales to our notion of variational supermartingales. First, we show
the fundamental Doob Decomposition in martingale theory to still be valid
in our framework. Thereafter, we show an Optional Sampling theorem for
variational supermartingales.
Proposition 3.3.8 (Doob Decomposition). Let (St)t∈N be a variational su-
permartingale with respect to time-consistent minimal penalty (αmint )t∈N. Then
there exists a variational martingale (Mt)t∈N with respect to (αmint )t∈N and a
predictable non-decreasing process (At)t∈N, A0 = 0, such that St = Mt − At
for all t and this decomposition is unique.
13I.e. the effective domain of the dynamic minimal penalty is the set of conditionals
and, hence, our intuitive notation here is justified.
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Proof. (a) Uniqueness: Let S = M − A as above. Then
ess inf
Q∈M
(
EQ[St+1 − St + At+1 − At|Ft] + αmint (Q)
)
= ess inf
Q∈M
(
EQ[Mt+1 −Mt|Ft] + αmint (Q)
)
= ess inf
Q∈M
(
EQ[Mt+1|Ft] + αmint (Q)
)−Mt = 0,
as M was assumed to be a variational martingale. Since αmint is uniquely
given (as ρt is assumed to be relevant) and A is assumed to be predictable,
we have
At+1 = At − ess infQ∈M
(
EQ[St+1 − St|Ft] + αmint (Q)
)
.
This shows uniqueness of A and thus also of M .
(b) Existence: Define (At)t∈N by virtue of A0 = 0 and
At+1 := At − ess infQ∈M
(
EQ[St+1 − St|Ft] + αmint (Q)
)
.
Then, At+1 ∈ Ft, i.e. (At)t∈N is predictable and, moreover, it is non-
decreasing. Set Mt := St +At. It is left to show that (Mt)t∈N is a variational
martingale with respect to (αmint )t∈N:
ess inf
Q∈M
(
EQ[Mt+1|Ft] + αmint (Q)
)−Mt
= ess inf
Q∈M
(
EQ[Mt+1 −Mt|Ft] + αmint (Q)
)
= ess inf
Q∈M
(
EQ[St+1 − St + At+1 − At|Ft] + αmint (Q)
)
= At+1 − At + ess infQ∈M
(
EQ[St+1 − St|Ft] + αmint (Q)
)
= 0,
where the last equality follows by definition of (At)t∈N and the second to last
because of its predictability.
Proposition 3.3.9 (Optional Sampling). Let (St)t∈N be a variational super-
martingale with respect to the time-consistent minimal penalty (αmint )t∈N and
σ ≤ τ be universally finite stopping times. Then
Sσ ≥ ess infQ∈M
(
EQ[Sτ |Fσ] + αminσ (Q)
)
.
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Proof. We know from Proposition 3.3.6 that there exists a “worst case” dis-
tribution P∗ ∈M such that
St ≥ EP∗ [St+1|Ft] + αmint (P∗).
Whereas the proof of optional sampling with multiple priors in [Riedel, 09]
is immediate as the minimal penalty vanishes for the worst case distribution,
we have to mimic the proof of the original optional sampling theorem and
carry with us the penalty. The proof is accomplished in two steps:
(i) First, we show that for fixed N ∈ N a stopped “supermartingale mod-
ulo penalty” (SN∧t)t∈N is again one such. I.e.14
SN∧t ≥ EP∗ [SN∧(t+1)|Ft] + αmint (P∗)I{N>t}. (3.9)
Indeed, we have
SN∧t = S0 +
t∑
k=1
I{N≥k}(Sk − Sk−1)
≥ S0 +
t∑
k=1
I{N≥k}(Sk − Sk−1)
+I{N≥t+1}(EP
∗
[St+1 − St|Ft] + αmint (P∗))
= EP∗
[
S0 +
t∑
k=1
I{N≥k}(Sk − Sk−1) + I{N≥t+1}(St+1 − St)|Ft
]
+αmint (P∗)I{N>t}
= EP∗ [SN∧(t+1)|Ft] + αmint (P∗)I{N>t},
where the inequality holds with equality for variational martingales.
(ii) Note: By (i), we have for a variational martingale (Mt)t∈N
EP∗ [MN∧t] = EP
∗
[MN∧(t+1) + αmint (P∗)I{N>t}]
14It might, at first sight, seem quite confusing that there is an indicator function adjacent
to the penalty in equation (3.9) as already stated in Remark 3.3.7. However, the intuition
is that a time t > N , i.e. when the process has already been stopped, its value is known
since SN is Ft-measurable and nature does not have to be penalized any more as it does
not choose any distribution.
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and in particular
EP∗ [M0] = EP
∗
[
MN∧t +
t−1∑
i=0
αmini (P∗)I{N>i}
]
∀N, t.
Moreover, it holds
lim
t→∞
EP∗ [MN∧t +
t−1∑
i=0
αmini (P∗)I{N>i}]
= EP∗ [MN ] + EP
∗
[
∞∑
i=0
αmini (P∗)I{N>i}].
Hence,
EP∗ [M0] = EP
∗
[MN ] + EP
∗
[ ∞∑
i=0
αmini (P∗)I{N>i}
]
.
We set
∑∞
i=0 α
min
i (P∗)I{N>i} =:
∑N−1
i=0 α
min
i (P∗). Now, let B ∈ Fσ and define
SB := σIB + κIBC ,
TB := τIB + κIBC ,
where κ := supN . Then SB and TB are stopping times and we have by
equation (3.3)
EP∗
[
MσIB +
σ−1∑
i=0
αmini (P∗)IB
]
+ EP∗
[
MκIBc +
κ−1∑
i=0
αmini (P∗)IBc
]
= EP∗
MSB + SB−1∑
i=0
αmini (P∗)

= EP∗ [M0]
= EP∗
MTB + TB−1∑
i=0
αmini (P∗)

= EP∗
[
Mτ IB +
τ−1∑
i=0
αmini (P∗)IB
]
+ EP∗
[
MκIBc +
κ−1∑
i=0
αmini (P∗)IBc
]
,
and hence
EP∗ [MσIB] = EP
∗
[
(Mτ +
τ−1∑
i=σ
αmini (P∗))IB
]
.
99
3. STOPPING WITH VARIATIONAL PREFERENCES
Since this holds true for all B ∈ Fσ, we have
EP∗ [Mσ|Fσ] = EP∗ [Mτ +
τ−1∑
i=σ
αmini (P∗)|Fσ],
i.e.
Mσ = EP
∗
[
Mτ +
τ−1∑
i=σ+1
αmini (P∗)
∣∣∣∣∣Fσ
]
+ αminσ (P∗)I{τ>σ}.
Summing up, we have shown for τ > σ15
Mσ ≥ EP∗ [Mτ |Fσ] + αminσ (P∗)
≥ ess inf
Q∈M
(
EQ[Mτ |Fσ] + αminσ (Q)
)
for a variational martingale M ; for τ = σ
Mσ = Mτ = EP
∗
[Mτ |Fσ]
= ess inf
Q∈M
(
EQ[Mτ |Fσ] + αminσ (Q)
)
as αminσ is grounded and Mτ ∈ Fσ. Hence, for τ ≥ σ
Mσ ≥ EP∗ [Mτ |Fσ] + αminσ (P∗)I{τ>σ}
≥ ess inf
Q∈M
(
EQ[Mτ |Fσ] + αminσ (Q)
)
.
For (St)t∈N being a variational supermartingale, the conjecture then follows
from the Doob decomposition, Proposition 3.3.8, and the above results for
variational martingales:
ess inf
Q∈M
(
EQ[Sτ − Sσ|Fσ] + αminσ (Q)
)
= ess inf
Q∈M
(
EQ[Mτ |Fσ] + αminσ (Q)
)−Mσ︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
+Aσ − Aτ︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
≤ 0.
Hence
Sσ ≥ ess infQ∈M
(
EQ[Sτ |Fσ] + αminσ (Q)
)
.
15As usual the empty sum is assumed to equal zero.
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For the proofs of our economic results, we just need:
Corollary 3.3.10 (from Propsition 3.3.9). Let (St)t∈N be a variational super-
martingale with respect to time-consistent minimal penalty (αmint )t∈N. Then
we have for every stopping time τ
Sτ∧t ≥ ess infQ∈M
(
EQ[Sτ∧(t+1)|Ft] + αmint (Q)
)
.
Proof. From the first part of the proof of Proposition 3.3.9, we have
Sτ∧t ≥ EP∗ [Sτ∧(t+1)|Ft] + αmint (P∗)I{τ>t}
≥ ess inf
Q∈M
(
EQ[Sτ∧(t+1)|Ft] + αmint (Q)I{τ>t}
)
= ess inf
Q∈M
(
EQ[Sτ∧(t+1)|Ft] + αmint (Q)
)
.
The last equation follows from (αmint )t∈N assumed to be grounded: In case
τ ≤ t we have
ess inf
Q∈M
(
EQ[Sτ |Ft] + αmint (Q)
)
= Sτ + ess infQ∈M
αmint (Q) = Sτ .
3.4 Main Results
We are now enabled to state and prove the main results of this article.
These directly generalize the results in [Riedel, 09] to dynamic variational
preferences. In the first subsection, we state the solution of the optimal
stopping problem for finite time-horizons and a minimax-theorem similar to
[Schied, 07] or [Riedel, 09]. The second subsection is devoted to the solution
of the infinite time-horizon problem and an approximation result. The proofs
directly follow the lines in [Riedel, 09]
3.4.1 Finite Horizon
Let T < ∞. The following result extends the fundamental Propositions
VI-1-2 and VI-1-3 in [Neveu, 75] to dynamic variational preferences.
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Recall the agent’s problem as given by the value function in equation
(3.6): At time t, find a stopping rule τ solving
Vt := ess sup
T≥τ≥t
ess inf
Q∈M
(
EQ[Xτ |Ft] + αmint (Q)
)
,
where (αmint )t≤T is a time-consistent dynamic minimal penalty function.
Theorem 3.4.1 (Solution to the Finite Problem). (a) The variational Snell
envelope (Ut)t≤T defined in equation (3.7) by
Ut := max
{
Xt, ess infQ∈M
(
EQ[Ut+1|Ft] + αmint (Q)
)}
for t < T
and UT = XT is the smallest variational supermartingale with respect to
(αmint )t≤T that dominates (Xt)t≤T .
(b) We have Ut = Vt for all t ≤ T , i.e. the variational Snell envelope,
equation (3.7), equals the problem’s value function, equation (3.6).
(c) τ ∗ := inf{t ≥ 0|Ut = Xt} from equation (3.8) is an optimal stopping
time, i.e. solves the optimal stopping problem under dynamic variational
preferences stated in Remark 3.5. Moreover, it is the smallest optimal stop-
ping time.
Proof. ad (a): By definition we have Ut ≥ Xt for all t ≤ T and
Ut ≥ ess infQ∈M
(
EQ[Ut+1|Ft] + αmint (Q)
)
for all t ≤ T−1. Hence, (Ut)t≤T is a variational supermartingale with respect
to (αmint )t≤T exceeding the payoff process (Xt)t≤T . Let (Zt)t≤T be another
such variational supermartingale with respect to (αmint )t≤T . We show by
(backward) induction that (Zt)t≤T ≥ (Ut)t≤T : By definition ZT ≥ XT = UT .
Assuming Zt+1 ≥ Ut+1, we achieve
Zt ≥ ess infQ∈M
EQ[Zt+1︸︷︷︸
≥Ut+1
|Ft] + αmint (Q)

≥ ess inf
Q∈M
(
EQ[Ut+1|Ft] + αmint (Q)
)
.
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Thus, as by assumption Zt ≥ Xt, we have hence shown (a):
Zt ≥ max
{
Xt, ess infQ∈M
(
EQ[Ut+1|Ft] + αmint (Q)
)}
= Ut.
ad (b): We first show “≥”: By Proposition 3.3.9, we have for the varia-
tional supermartingale (Ut)t≤T ≥ (Xt)t≤T and all t ≤ τ ≤ T
Ut ≥ ess infQ∈M
(
EQ[Uτ |Ft] + αmint (Q)
)
≥ ess inf
Q∈M
(
EQ[Xτ |Ft] + αmint (Q)
)
.
Hence, we have
Ut ≥ ess sup
t≤τ≤T
ess inf
Q∈M
(
EQ[Xτ |Ft] + αmint (Q)
)
= Vt.
To show “≤”, we define the stopping rule
τ ∗t := inf{s ≥ t : Us = Xs}.
Now, fix t ≤ T . If we can show the stopped variational supermartingale
(Us∧τ∗t )t≤s≤T to be a variational martingale with respect to (α
min
s )t≤s≤T , we
are done: Indeed, in that case, we have since τ ∗t ≥ t
Ut = ess infQ∈M
(
EQ[Uτ∗t |Ft] + αmint (Q)
)
= ess inf
Q∈M
(
EQ[Xτ∗t |Ft] + αmint (Q)
)
≤ ess sup
t≤τ≤T
ess inf
Q∈M
(
EQ[Xτ |Ft] + αmint (Q)
)
= Vt.
Summing up, we then have Ut = Vt for all t ≤ T .
Hence, it leaves to show the variational martingale property of the stopped
variational Snell envelope (Us∧τ∗t )t≤s≤T : Let t ≤ s ≤ T .
(i) Whenever τ ∗t ≤ s, we have U(s+1)∧τ∗t = Uτ∗t = Us∧τ∗t and hence
ess inf
Q∈M
(
EQ[U(s+1)∧τ∗t |Fs] + αmins (Q)
)
= ess inf
Q∈M
(
EQ[Us∧τ∗t |Fs] + αmins (Q)
)
= Us∧τ∗t + ess infQ∈M
αmins (Q) = Us∧τ∗t .
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(ii) For τ ∗t > s, we have (by (a) and the definition of τ
∗
t ) Us > Xs and hence
Us∧τ∗t = Us = max
{
Xs, ess infQ∈M
(
EQ[Us+1|Fs] + αmins (Q)
)}
= ess inf
Q∈M
EQ[ Us+1︸︷︷︸
=U(s+1)∧τ∗t
|Fs] + αmins (Q)
 .
(i) and (ii) show the stopped variational martingale property.
ad (c): Let t = 0. Then
τ ∗ := τ ∗0 := inf{s ≥ 0 : Us = Xs}
and (Us∧τ∗)s≤T is a variational martingale with respect to (αmins )s≤T as already
shown. We now obtain
ess sup
0≤τ≤T
ess inf
Q∈M
(
EQ[Xτ ] + αmin0 (Q)
)
= V0 = U0 by (b)
= ess inf
Q∈M
(
EQ[Uτ∗|F0] + αmin0 (Q)
)
by Proposition 3.3.9
= ess inf
Q∈M
(
EQ[Xτ∗ ] + αmin0 (Q)
)
by definition of τ ∗.
Hence, τ ∗ is optimal and the proof of (c) is completed. Morover, any stopping
time such that P0[τ ∗∗ < τ ∗] > 0 cannot be optimal since in that case by
definition of τ ∗ and part (b)
V0 > ess infQ∈M
(
EQ[Xτ∗∗ ] + αmin0 (Q)
)
.
Since coherent risk is just a special case of convex risk, the example in
[Riedel, 09], Appendix D, shows that time-consistency is a necessary condi-
tion for the above theorem to hold.
We now state a minimax-theorem. Technically, this allows us to inter-
change the “inf” and “sup” in the formulation of the problem, i.e., intuitively,
it does not matter if nature chooses a worst case distribution first and then
104
3.4. MAIN RESULTS
the agent maximizes, or vice versa. In the not necessarily time-consistent
case, this result is achieved in [Schied, 07]. The proof therein makes use of
convex conjugates. However, the result in [Schied, 07] does not constitute a
constructive device for the calculation of solutions. Here, the result takes the
form
ess sup
T≥τ≥t
ess inf
Q∈M
(
EQ[Xτ |Ft] + αmint (Q)
)
= ess inf
Q∈M
(
UQt + α
min
t (Q)
)
,
where UQt := ess supT≥τ≥t EQ[Xτ |Ft] is the value of the expected-utility opti-
mal stopping problem with subjective prior Q.
Remark 3.4.2. As we immediately see, this means that
Vt = Ut = ess infQ∈M
(
UQt + α
min
t (Q)
)
.
Hence, we do not have the elegant result as in [Riedel, 09] that the variational
Snell envelope (Ut)t is the lower envelope of the individual Snell envelopes
(UQt ) as the penalty is not necessarily zero.
Of course, upon revelation, payoffs are equal:
ess inf
Q∈M
(
EQ[Xτ |Fτ ] + αminτ (Q)
)
= Xτ + ess infQ∈M
αminτ (Q) = Xτ .
Remark 3.4.3. Again, we can show the set{
UQt + α
min
t (Q) : Q ∈M
}
to be downward directed.
Indeed: Making use of Lemma 3.3 in [Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06], the proof
works as Lemma 3.3.3 when setting A := {UQ1t +αmint (Q1) < UQ2t +αmint (Q2)} ∈
Ft.
Theorem 3.4.4 (Minimax-Theorem). For every t, we have the following
identity:
ess sup
T≥τ≥t
ess inf
Q∈M
(
EQ[Xτ |Ft] + αmint (Q)
)
= ess inf
Q∈M
(
ess sup
T≥τ≥t
EQ[Xτ |Ft] + αmint (Q)
)
.
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Proof. “≤”: This inequality is inter alia shown in [Rockafellar, 70] for general
minimax-problems.
“≥”: By virtue of Proposition 3.3.6 there exists a Q∗ such that we have
the following chain of inequalities:
ess sup
T≥τ≥t
ess inf
Q∈M
(
EQ[Xτ |Ft] + αmint (Q)
)
= ess sup
T≥τ≥t
(
EQ∗ [Xτ |Ft] + αmint (Q∗)I{τ>t}
)
≥ ess inf
Q∈M
ess sup
T≥τ≥t
(
EQ[Xτ |Ft] + αmint (Q)I{τ>t}
)
= ess inf
Q∈M
ess sup
T≥τ≥t
(
EQ[Xτ |Ft] + αmint (Q)
)
since αmint is grounded, i.e. on {τ = t}, we have
ess inf
Q∈M
(
EQ[Xt|Ft] + αmint (Q)
)
= Xt + ess infQ∈M
αmint (Q) = Xt.
Remark 3.4.5. Set Q∗ the worst-case distribution in case of time-consistent
dynamic variational preferences and Q∗∗ the worst-case distribution for time-
consistent multiple priors in Q assuming M = Q, i.e. the sets of distribu-
tions with finite penalty coincide. Let (Vt)t denote the value function of the
optimal stopping problem under dynamic variational preferences and (V Qt )t
the value of the optimal stopping problem with subjective prior Q for an ex-
pected utility maximizer. We then have
Vt = ess sup
T≥τ≥t
EQ∗ [Xτ |Ft] + αmint (Q∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥EQ∗ [Xτ |Ft]
≥ V Q∗t .
Hence, in addition to Remark 3.4.2, this inequality makes explicit that the
uncertainty averse agent under variational preferences does not behave as
an expected utility maximizer with respect to the worst case measure as it is
the case in [Riedel, 09] under multiple priors. This fact is also elaborated in
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Proposition 3.5.16 below. In particular, the optimal stopping time τ ∗ from
the ambiguous problem, does not coincide with the smallest optimal stopping
time from the expected utility optimal stopping problem under the worst-case
subjective distribution Q∗.
Furthermore, we see
Vt ≥ V Q∗∗t .
Hence, compared to the multiple priors approach, expected reward from vari-
ational preferences is at least as high due to non-triviality of the penalty if
we assume Q = M. In other words, sophistication of αmin increases min-
imal expected utility. Intuitively: The agent has more information on the
likelihood of distributions available under variational preferences than under
multiple priors and hence values the problem more. Stated in other terms
more important to application in risk management: Convex risk measures
assess risk in a more liberal manner than coherent risk measures given the
sets of considered distributions coincide.
3.4.2 Infinite Horizon
Let T = ∞. Since the variational Snell envelope is only defined for T < ∞,
the appropriate theorem for the infinite time-horizon case shows the value
function to satisfy the Bellman principle.
Theorem 3.4.6 (Infinite Problem & Approximation). (a) The value process
(Vt)t∈N as defined in equation (3.6) is the smallest variational supermartingale
with respect to (αmint )t∈N that dominates the payoff process (Xt)t∈N.
(b) The value process (Vt)t∈N satisfies the Bellman principle, i.e.
Vt = max
{
Xt, ess infQ∈M
(
EQ[Vt+1|Ft] + αmint (Q)
)}
for all t ≥ 0.
(c) τ ∗ := inf{t ≥ 0|Vt = Xt} is the smallest optimal stopping time.
(d) Let (UTt )t≤T denote the variational Snell envelope with respect to (α
min
t )t≤T
for the optimal stopping problem of (Xt)t≤T truncated to finite horizon T <
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∞. Let (Vt)t∈N denote the value process of the infinite problem as given in
Theorem 3.4.6. Then we have limT→∞ UTt = Vt for all t ≥ 0.
Proof. ad (b): “≥”: By Lemma 3.4.7 below, there exists a sequence (τk)k of
stopping times, such that
ess inf
Q∈M
(
EQ[Xτk |Ft+1] + αmint+1(Q)
)↗k Vt+1.
Hence, making use of time-consistency16 and continuity from below, we have
ess inf
Q∈M
(
EQ[Vt+1|Ft] + αmint (Q)
)
= lim
k→∞
ess inf
Q∈M
(
EQ
[
ess inf
P∈M
(
EP[Xτk |Ft+1] + αmint+1(P)
)∣∣∣∣Ft]
+αmint (Q)
)
= lim
k→∞
ess inf
Q∈M
(
EQ[Xτk |Ft] + αmint (Q)
) ≤ Vt.
Furthermore, by definition of (Vt)t∈N, we have Vt ≥ Xt and hence
Vt ≥ max
{
Xt, ess infQ∈M
(
EQ[Vt+1|Ft] + αmint (Q)
)}
for all t ≥ 0.
“≤”: Given τ, t and set σ := max{τ, t + 1}. Then, by conditional cash
16Here, we use time-consistency directly in terms of preferences, i.e., for τ, t, we have
pit(Xτ ) = pit(pit+1(Xτ )), or, more elaborately,
ess inf
Q∈M
(
EQ[Xτ |Ft] + αmint (Q)
)
= ess inf
Q∈M
(
EQ
[
ess inf
Q∈M
(
EQ[Xτ |Ft+1] + αmint+1(Q)
)∣∣∣∣Ft]+ αmint (Q)) .
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invariance,
ess inf
Q∈M
(
EQ[Xτ |Ft] + αmint (Q)
)
= XtI{τ≤t} + ess infQ∈M
(
EQ[Xσ|Ft] + αmint (Q)
)
I{τ≥t+1}
= XtI{τ≤t}
+ ess inf
Q∈M
(
EQ
[
ess inf
P∈M
(
EP[Xσ|Ft+1] + αmint+1(Q)
)∣∣∣∣Ft]
+αmint (Q)
)
I{τ≥t+1}
≤ max
{
Xt, ess infQ∈M
(
EQ[Vt+1|Ft] + αmint (Q)
)}
,
as ess infP∈M
(
EP[Xσ|Ft+1] + αmint+1(Q)
) ≤ Vt+1.
This shows “≤” since the above inequality holds for all τ ≥ t and hence
for the ess supτ≥t. Hence (b) is achieved.
ad (a): By (b) we have for all t
Vt ≥ ess infQ∈M
(
EQ[Vt+1|Ft] + αmint (Q)
)
and Vt ≥ Xt.
Hence, (Vt)t∈N is a variational supermartingale with respect to (αmint )t∈N and
Vt ≥ Xt. Let (Wt)t∈N be another variational supermartingale with respect to
(αmint )t∈N exceeding (Xt)t∈N. By Proposition 3.3.9 we have for all τ ≥ t ∈ N
Wt ≥ ess infQ∈M
(
EQ[Wτ |Ft] + αmint (Q)
)
≥ ess inf
Q∈M
(
EQ[Xτ |Ft] + αmint (Q)
)
,
as Wτ ≥ Xτ and, hence,
Wt ≥ ess sup
τ≥t
ess inf
Q∈M
(
EQ[Xτ |Ft] + αmint (Q)
)
= Vt.
This shows (a).
ad (c): As in the proof of Theorem 3.4.1, we can show (Vs∧τ∗)s∈N to be a
variational martingale. By our continuity assumption, we hence achieve
ess inf
Q∈M
(
EQ[Vτ∗|F0] + αmin0 (Q)
)
= lim
s→∞
ess inf
Q∈M
(
EQ[Vs∧τ∗|F0] + αmin0 (Q)
)
= V0,
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which shows the assertion in (c).
ad (d): Since (Xt)t∈N is assumed to be bounded, (UTt )t≤T is bounded,
too. Furthermore, enlarging the set of stopping times when considering the
process up to T + 1 instead of T , we have UTt ≤ UT+1t . Hence, the limit
U∞t := limT→∞ U
T
t is well-defined for all t. We thus have by continuity from
below
U∞t = lim
T→∞
UTt︷ ︸︸ ︷
max
{
Xt, ess infQ∈M
(
EQ[UTt+1|Ft] + αmint (Q)
)}
= max
{
Xt, ess infQ∈M
(
EQ[U∞t+1|Ft] + αmint (Q)
)}
.
In particular, (U∞t )t∈N is a variational supermartingale with respect to (α
min
t )t∈N
exceeding (Xt)t∈N. We now show (Vt)t∈N = (U∞t )t∈N, where (Vt)t∈N is the infi-
nite horizon problem’s value function: By (a) and (Ut)t∈N being a variational
supermartingale exceeding (Xt)t∈N, we have (U∞t )t∈N ≥ (Vt)t∈N. From the
finite horizon problem, we have for all T and t
UTt = ess sup
t≤τ≤T
ess inf
Q∈M
(
EQ[Xτ |Ft] + αmint (Q)
)
≤ ess sup
t≤τ≤∞
ess inf
Q∈M
(
EQ[Xτ |Ft] + αmint (Q)
)
= Vt.
Hence for all t it holds
U∞t = lim
T→∞
UTt ≤ Vt.
This shows (Vt)t∈N = (U∞t )t∈N and completes the proof.
The last part of the foregoing theorem is particularly valuable for achiev-
ing constructive solutions for infinite models in terms of limiting solutions of
truncated ones.
Lemma 3.4.7. Let (αmint )t∈N be a time-consistent dynamic minimal penalty.
For t ∈ N, the set{
ess inf
Q∈M
(
EQ[Xτ |Ft] + αmint (Q)
)∣∣∣∣ τ ≥ t}
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is upward directed, i.e. for any two stopping times τ1, τ2, there exists a stop-
ping time, say, τ3 ≥ t such that
ess inf
Q∈M
(
EQ[Xτ3|Ft] + αmint (Q)
)
= max
{
ess inf
Q∈M
(
EQ[Xτ1|Ft] + αmint (Q)
)
;
ess inf
Q∈M
(
EQ[Xτ2|Ft] + αmint (Q)
)}
.
Proof. Set
A :=
{
ess inf
Q∈M
(
EQ[Xτ1|Ft] + αmint (Q)
)
> ess inf
Q∈M
(
EQ[Xτ2|Ft] + αmint (Q)
)}
and define the stopping time
τ3 := τ1IA + τ2IAC .
Note that A ∈ Ft.
“≥”: By Lemma 3.3.4, there exists Q3 ∈M such that
ess inf
Q∈M
(
EQ[Xτ3|Ft] + αmint (Q)
)
= EQ3 [Xτ3 |Ft] + αmint (Q3)I{τ3>t}
= EQ3 [Xτ1 |Ft]IA + EQ3 [Xτ2|Ft]IAC
+αmint (Q3)I{τ3>t}∩A + αmint (Q3)I{τ3>t}∩Ac
=
(
EQ3 [Xτ1|Ft] + αmint (Q3)I{τ1>t}
)
IA
+
(
EQ3 [Xτ2|Ft] + αmint (Q3)I{τ2>t}
)
IAC
≥ ess inf
Q∈M
{
EQ[Xτ1|Ft] + αmint (Q)
}
IA
+ ess inf
Q∈M
(
EQ[Xτ2|Ft] + αmint (Q)
}
IAC
= max
{
ess inf
Q∈M
(
EQ[Xτ1|Ft] + αmint (Q)
)
;
ess inf
Q∈M
(
EQ[Xτ2|Ft] + αmint (Q)
)}
,
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where the indicator function again drops as αmint is assumed to be grounded.
The last equality follows from the definition of A.
“≤”: Since
EQ[Xτ3|Ft] + αmint (Q)
=
(
EQ[Xτ1 |Ft] + αmint (Q)
)
IA +
(
EQ[Xτ2|Ft] + αmint (Q)
)
IAC ,
we have
ess inf
Q∈M
(
EQ[Xτ3|Ft] + αmint (Q)
)
=
[
ess inf
Q∈M
(
EQ[Xτ1|Ft] + αmint (Q)
)]
IA
+
[
ess inf
Q∈M
(
EQ[Xτ2|Ft] + αmint (Q)
)]
IAC
≤ max
{
ess inf
Q∈M
(
EQ[Xτ1|Ft] + αmint (Q)
)
;
ess inf
Q∈M
(
EQ[Xτ2 |Ft] + αmint (Q)
)}
,
as A ∩ AC = ∅ and each factor in front of the indicator function is of course
smaller than or equal to the maximum of both factors.
3.5 Examples
In this section, we consider optimal stopping problems for prominent exam-
ples of dynamic variational preferences. First, we consider stopping with
dynamic multiplier preferences or, equivalently, dynamic entropic risk mea-
sures. Secondly, we apply our theory to a generalized version of average value
at risk particularly paying attention to time-consistency issues.
In [Riedel, 09], several examples of optimal stopping problems with multi-
ple priors are considered; in particular for monotone payoff processes, as e.g.
American calls or puts. For those, a worst-case distribution is achieved by
virtue of stochastic dominance. Then the optimal stopping rule for multiple
112
3.5. EXAMPLES
priors is the optimal stopping rule for the expected utility problem under this
worst-case distribution aligning with the intuition of an uncertainty averse
agent with multiple priors behaving as an expected utility maximizer under
the worst-case distribution.
However, simplicity of these examples is owed to the penalty being trivial
for multiple priors. As the penalty is not trivial in case of variational prefer-
ences, we might have a trade off between stochastic dominance on the payoff
process and the penalty that might increase as nature moves towards stochas-
tically dominated distributions of the payoff process. Hence, the worst-case
distribution cannot be attained any longer by stochastic dominance for the
payoff process even in the monotone case but by stochastic dominance of the
entire expression, the sum of expected payoff and penalty. Furthermore, we
observe that correlation is introduced even in quite simple contexts.
3.5.1 Dynamic Entropic Risk Measures
As first fundamental example we consider dynamic entropic risk measures
or, equivalently, dynamic multiplier preferences. Its robust representation is
intuitive: the agent expects a reference distribution Q ∈ M most likely and
distributions further away seem to be more and more unlikely. Hence, nature
shall be punished more severely the further “away” the chosen distribution
from that specific Q. Relative entropy turns out to be the measure of dis-
tance in the robust representation. We introduce multiplier preferences as
in [Maccheroni et al., 06b]. [Cheridito et al, 06] and [Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06]
equivalently consider this example as dynamic entropic risk measures. Let
again (Ω,F , (Ft)t≤T ,P0), T ∈ N∪{∞}, be the underlying space and τ denote
a stopping time.
Definition 3.5.1. For P Q, locally,17 we define the relative entropy of P
17By definition of M this is satisfied for all distributions under consideration.
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with respect to Q at time t ≥ 0 as
Ht(P|Q) := EP [ln(Zt)] ,
where Zt :=
dP
dQ |Ft. Furthermore, we define the conditional relative entropy
of P with respect to Q at time t ≥ 0 as
Hˆt(P|Q) := EP
[
ln
(
ZT
Zt
)∣∣∣∣Ft] = EQ [ZTZt ln
(
ZT
Zt
)∣∣∣∣Ft] I{Zt>0}.
Basic properties of relative entropy are stated in [Csiszar, 75]: Ht(P|Q) =
0 if and only if P = Q on Ft, i.e. Zt = 1, and non-negative else. As we assume
the distributions under consideration to be locally equivalent, the indicator
function in the last equation vanishes.
We now formally introduce dynamic multiplier preferences:
Definition 3.5.2. Let θ > 0. We say that dynamic variational expected
reward piet (Xτ ), t, τ ≤ T , is obtained by dynamic multiplier preferences given
reference model Q or, equivalently by dynamic entropic risk measures, if its
robust representation is of the form18
piet (Xτ ) = ess infP∈M
(
EP[Xτ |Ft] + θHˆt(P|Q)
)
. (3.10)
Remark 3.5.3. The variational formula for relative entropy implies
piet (Xτ ) = −θ ln(EQ[e−
1
θ
Xτ |Ft]).
Proposition 3.5.4. Dynamic multiplier preferences with reference distri-
bution Q ∈ M are time-consistent: Its robust representation has minimal
penalty αmint (P) = θHˆt(P|Q) for t ≤ T , P ∈M, satisfying the no-gain condi-
tion. Hence, we have
piet (Xτ ) = XtI{τ=t}
+ ess inf
µ∈M|Ft+1
(∫
piet+1(Xτ )dµ+ θHˆt+1(µ|Q(·|Ft))
)
I{τ≥t+1},
18This is the generalized version of the respective definition in [Maccheroni et al., 06b].
By conditional cash invariance, for τ ≤ t both sides of the equation equal Xτ .
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where we set Hˆt+1(µ|Q(·|Ft)) := Eµ[ln( dµdQ(·|Ft)|Ft+1 )] which, by abuse of nota-
tion, we write as Eµ[ln( dµ
dQ(·|Ft)
∣∣∣
Ft+1
)], µ ∈M|Ft+1.
Proof. The specific form of the penalty is shown in [Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06],
Lemma 6.2, in terms of dynamic entropic risk measures: Robust representa-
tion of these are equal to those of multiplier preferences up to a minus sign.
Time-consistency is shown in [Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06], p.92.
We now show the specific form of piet : By Corollary 3.2.16, we have
to show γt(µ) = θHˆt+1(µ|Q(·|Ft)). For µ ∈ M|Ft+1 we recall γt(µ) :=
ess infP∈M αmint (µ ⊗t+1 P). As αmint only depends on the conditional dis-
tributions given Ft, we may write αmint (µ ⊗t+1 P) := αmint (Q ⊗t µ ⊗t+1 P)
∀Q ∈M. Hence,
1
θ
γt(µ) = ess infP∈M
αmint (Q⊗t µ⊗t+1 P)
= ess inf
P∈M
EQ⊗tµ⊗t+1P
[
ln
(
d(Q⊗tµ⊗t+1P)
dQ |FT
d(Q⊗tµ⊗t+1P)
dQ |Ft
)∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
.
First, note that we have by dµ = d(Q⊗t µ)(·|Ft)
Eµ
[
ln
(
dµ
dQ(·|Ft)
∣∣∣∣
Ft+1
)]
= EQ⊗tµ
[
ln
(
d(Q⊗t µ)
dQ
∣∣∣∣
Ft+1
)∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
.
As the integrand is Ft+1-measurable and d(Q⊗tµ)dQ
∣∣∣
Ft+1
= d(Q⊗tµ⊗t+1P)
dQ
∣∣∣
Ft+1
, the
following equation holds for all P ∈M:
Eµ
[
ln
(
dµ
dQ(·|Ft)
∣∣∣∣
Ft+1
)]
= EQ⊗tµ⊗t+1P
[
ln
(
d(Q⊗t µ⊗t+1 P)
dQ
∣∣∣∣
Ft+1
)∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
.
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Hence, it leaves to show for all R ∈M that
EQ⊗tµ⊗t+1R
[
ln
(
d(Q⊗t µ⊗t+1 R)
dQ
∣∣∣∣
Ft+1
)∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
= ess inf
P∈M
EQ⊗tµ⊗t+1P
[
ln
(
d(Q⊗tµ⊗t+1P)
dQ |FT
d(Q⊗tµ⊗t+1P)
dQ |Ft
)∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
= ess inf
P∈M
EQ⊗tµ⊗t+1P
[
ln
(
d(Q⊗t µ⊗t+1 P)
dQ
∣∣∣∣
FT
)∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
,
where the last equation follows as d(Q⊗tµ⊗t+1P)
dQ |Ft = 1.
We know from the properties of the entropy, that Hˆt(P|Q) ≥ 0 and = 0
if and only if P = Q on Ft. In the same way, we have that
Q ∈ arg ess inf
P∈M
EQ⊗tµ⊗t+1P
[
ln
(
d(Q⊗t µ⊗t+1 P)
dQ
∣∣∣∣
FT
)∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
.
More precisely,
arg ess inf
P∈M
EQ⊗tµ⊗t+1P
[
ln
(
d(Q⊗t µ⊗t+1 P)
dQ
∣∣∣∣
FT
)∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
= {V ∈M|V = R⊗t µ⊗t+1 Q for some R ∈M}.
Hence, we have
ess inf
P∈M
EQ⊗tµ⊗t+1P
[
ln
(
d(Q⊗t µ⊗t+1 P)
dQ
∣∣∣∣
FT
)∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
= EQ⊗tµ⊗t+1Q
[
ln
(
d(Q⊗t µ⊗t+1 Q)
dQ
∣∣∣∣
FT
)∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
= EQ⊗tµ⊗t+1Q
[
ln
(
d(Q⊗t µ⊗t+1 Q)
dQ
∣∣∣∣
Ft+1
)∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
,
where the second equality follows since qt :=
dQ
dQ |Ft = 1 for all t ≤ T and
hence d(Q⊗tµ⊗t+1Q)
dQ
∣∣∣
Ft+1
= d(Q⊗tµ⊗t+1Q)
dQ
∣∣∣
Fη
for all η ≥ t + 1. This completes
the proof.
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For the value function, we thus have
Vt = ess sup
t≤τ≤T
piet (Xτ )
= ess sup
t≤τ≤T
{
XtI{τ=t}
+ ess inf
µ∈M|Ft+1
(∫
piet+1(Xτ )dµ+ θHˆt+1(µ|Q(·|Ft))
)
I{τ≥t+1}
}
= max
{
Xt;
ess sup
t+1≤τ≤T
ess inf
µ∈M|Ft+1
(∫
piet+1(Xτ )dµ+ θHˆt+1(µ|Q(·|Ft))
)}
= max
{
Xt;
ess inf
µ∈M|Ft+1
(∫
ess sup
t+1≤τ≤T
piet+1(Xτ )dµ+ θHˆt+1(µ|Q(·|Ft))
)}
= max
{
Xt; ess infQ∈M
(
EQ[Vt+1|Ft] + αmint (Q)
)}
again showing the Bellman principle to hold but having applied our mini-
max theorem. As we want to achieve explicit solutions, we further confine
ourselves:
Assumption 3.5.5. Let the underlying probability space (Ω,F , (Ft)t≤T ,P0)
be given as the independent product of the time-t state space, (S,S, ν0), S ⊂
R. Then P0 = ⊗Tt=1νo and Fs is generated by the projection mappings t :
Ω 7→ S, t ≤ s. In particular, the ts are i.i.d. with ν0 under P0.
As in [Riedel, 09], we confine ourselves to the set
M[a,b] :=
{
Pβ ≈ P0 : dP
β
dP0
∣∣∣∣
Ft
= Dβt ∀t, (βt)t ⊂ [a, b], predictable
}
,
Dβt := exp(
∑t
s=1 βss −
∑t
s=1 L(βs)) for some predictable process (βt)t≤T ⊂
[a, b] ⊂ R and L(βt) := ln
∫
S
eβtxν0(dx).
Remark 3.5.6. As we have now constrained the set of possible probability
distributions, we note that we are not in context of general dynamic entropic
risk measures any longer.
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Notation 3.5.7. The reference distribution of the entropic penalty write as
Q := Pβ1, i.e. (β1t )t≤T denotes the process defining the penalty’s reference
distribution. Note that Q is in general not equal to P0. Other distributions
in M write as P := Pβ2.
Then
dP
dQ
∣∣∣∣
Ft
=
Dβ
2
t
Dβ
1
t
dP0
dP0
∣∣∣∣
Ft
= exp
(
t∑
s=1
(β2s − β1s )s −
t∑
s=1
[L(β2s )− L(β1s )]
)
.
and the entropic penalty with reference distribution Q is given by
αmint (P) = θHˆt(P|Q)
= θEP
[
T∑
s=t+1
(β2s − β1s )s −
T∑
s=t+1
[L(β2s )− L(β1s )]
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
.
We write Eβ := EPβ and Hˆt(β2|β1) := Hˆt(Pβ2|Pβ1) as well as αmint (β2). Note,
in case Q = P0, we have (β1t )t≤T = 0 and hence for P = Pβ
2
: αmint (P) =
θEP
[∑T
s=t+1 β
2
s s −
∑T
s=t+1 L(β
2
s )
∣∣∣Ft].
To make the value function (Vt)t≤T more explicit, note for µ ∈ M|Ft+1
given by previsible (β2t )t≤T and penalty’s reference distribution Q ∈ M by
previsible (β1t )t≤T , we have
Hˆt+1(µ|Q(·|Ft)) = Eµ
[
ln
(
dµ
dQ(·|Ft)|Ft+1
)]
= Eβ2t+1
[
(β2t+1 − β1t+1)t+1 − (L(β2t+1)− L(β1t+1))
]
.
Hence, as above the value is given by
Vt = ess sup
t≤τ≤T
ess inf
β2⊂[a,b]
(
Eβ2 [Xτ |Ft] + θHˆt(β2|β1)
)
(3.11)
= ess sup
t≤τ≤T
ess inf
β2⊂[a,b]
Eβ2
[
Xτ + θ
(
T∑
s=t+1
(β2s − β1s )s
−
T∑
s=t+1
[L(β2s )− L(β1s )]
)∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
= max
{
Xt;
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ess sup
t+1≤τ≤T
ess inf
β2t+1∈[a,b]
Eβ2t+1
[
pit+1(Xτ ) + θ
(
(β2t+1 − β1t+1)t+1
−(L(β2t+1)− L(β1t+1))
)] }
= max
{
Xt ; ess inf
β2t+1∈[a,b]
Eβ2t+1
[
Vt+1 + θ
(
(β2t+1 − β1t+1)t+1
−(L(β2t+1)− L(β1t+1))
)] }
,
where the last equality follows from the Minimax result. In particular, we
see that the value of the problem – and hence the worst case distribution –
depends on the reference distribution Q = Pβ1 of the penalty. In case T <∞,
the same recursion has to hold for the Snell envelope (Ut)t≤N by Theorem
3.4.1:
Ut = max {Xt; pit(Ut+1)}
= max
{
Xt; ess inf
µ∈M|Ft+1
(∫
pit+1(Ut+1)dµ+ θHt+1(µ|Q(·|Ft))
)}
= max
{
Xt; ess inf
µ∈M|Ft+1
(∫
Ut+1dµ+ θHt+1(µ|Q(·|Ft))
)}
= max
{
Xt; ess inf
β2t+1∈[a,b]
Eβ2t+1
[
Ut+1 + θ
(
(β2t+1 − β1t+1)t+1
−(L(β2t+1)− L(β1t+1))
)] }
.
To further solve problems under entropic risk, we have to make specific
properties of the payoff process explicit. We constraint ourselves to monotone
problems:
Assumption 3.5.8. Xt := f(t, t), where f is a bounded measurable function
that is strictly monotone in the state variable t.
For monotone payoff processes in the ambiguous, i.e. multiple priors, case
it is shown in [Riedel, 09] that Ut is increasing in t. However, having a look
at the proof therein (Appendix F), we see that this crucially depends on t
being independent of Ft−1 (cf. equation (12) in [Riedel, 09]) as the process
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(β2t )t yielding the worst case distribution under multiple priors is constant,
and the worst case distribution being the one that is stochastically dominated
for the payoff process (Lemma 13). We will see that these arguments do not
have to hold in case of variational preferences. Furthermore, in [Riedel, 09]’s
multiple priors case, the calculation of a worst case measure is done by virtue
of stochastic dominance on the payoff process. It is intuitive that this cannot
work as elegant under variational preferences: The penalty is not trivial, i.e.
not zero on some set of priors and infinite else. In particular, in the entropic
case, the worst-case measure depends on the reference distribution Q: there
might be a trade off between stochastic dominance on (Xt)t and the penalty:
The penalty increases the further nature moves away from Q and in direction
of a distribution minimizing the expectation of the payoff process.
To gain insights, we have a look at a special case for the reference distri-
bution of the penalty:
Example 3.5.9. Let f be increasing and the reference distribution be Q =
Pa, the distribution given by β1t = a for all t ≤ T . We encounter for the
first term in the value function, Eβ2 [f(τ, τ )|Ft]: Pa is stochastically domi-
nated, i.e. minimizes that term on M[a,b]. Pa also minimizes the penalty:
Hˆt(β
2|a) := Hˆt(Pβ2|Pa) is increasing in β2 on [a, b], Hˆt ≥ 0 and zero if and
only if Pβ2 = Pa. Hence we have equivalence of the problem under dynamic
multiplier preferences and the optimality problem under the worst case dis-
tribution Pa as in Theorem 5 in [Riedel, 09].
Proposition 3.5.10. Let f be increasing, T < ∞, and τa denote the opti-
mal stopping time for the classical optimal stopping problem of (Xt)t≤T under
subjective distribution Pa, i.e. τa solves max0≤τ≤T Ea[Xτ ]. Let Q = Pa be
the reference measure for the penalty, i.e. β1t = a, t ≤ T , in equation (3.11).
Then, τa is the solution to the robust problem with dynamic multiplier pref-
erences (piet )t≤T as given in equation (3.11).
Proof. Intuitively, in Appendix F in [Riedel, 09], it is shown that Pa is the
worst case distribution for the first term in the value function (3.11). As
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Hˆt(a|a) = 0 ≤ Hˆt(β2|a) for all β2, Pa also minimizes the penalty and hence
is the worst case distribution in the multiplier case when Q = Pa.
Formally: For all increasing bounded measurable functions h : Ω → R
and all t ≥ 1, we have by Lemma 13 in [Riedel, 09]
Ea[h(t)|Ft−1] = ess inf
β2∈[a,b]
Eβ2 [h(t)|Ft−1]
= ess inf
β2[a,b]
Eβ2 [h(t)|Ft−1] + min
β2∈[a,b]
θHˆt−1(β2|a)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=Hˆt(a|a)=0
= ess inf
β2∈[a,b]
(
Eβ2 [h(t)|Ft−1] + θHˆt−1(β2|a)
)
,
where the last equation follows as the joint minimizer of both summands is Pa.
Given this result, we can mimic the proof of Theorem 5 in [Riedel, 09]: Let
(Ut)t≤T denote the variational Snell envelope of the problem under multiplier
preferences and (Uat )t≤T the classical Snell envelope with respect to subjective
prior Pa. For t = T , we have UT = XT = f(T, T ) = UaT and hence increasing
in T . As by induction hypothesis Ut+1 is an increasing function of t+1, say
Ut+1 = u(t+1) for some bounded measurable increasing u, we have for all
t < T
Ut = max
{
f(t, t), ess inf
β2∈M[a,b]
(
Eβ2 [Ut+1|Ft] + θHˆt(β2|a)
)}
= max
f(t, t), Ea[Ut+1|Ft] + θHˆt(a|a)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0

= max {f(t, t), Ea[Ut+1|Ft]} =: Uat .
This shows the assertion by equality of the recursion formulas: (Ut)t≤T =
(Uat )t≤T and hence the optimal stopping times coincide.
Remark 3.5.11. The foregoing proof particularly shows that Ut is increasing
in t in case Q = Pa: t+1 is independent of Ft under Pa and hence
Ut = max{f(t, t),Ea[u(t+1)|Ft]}
= max{f(t, t),Ea[u(t+1)]}.
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The argument in the foregoing proof for the case Q = Pa is that Pa mini-
mizes EP[f(t, t)] as well as Hˆt(P|a). Of course, this does not hold true if the
reference measure Q = Pβ1 is such that β1t is not identical a. Then, we have
a trade off between a decrease in the first term, EP[f(t, t)], which is inde-
pendent of Pβ1 , and an increase of the penalty in the second term, Hˆt(P|β1),
the further nature deviates from the reference distribution Pβ1 “downwards”
to the distribution Pa. More elaborately, considering a distribution Pβ2 with
β2t ∈ [a, β1t ], t ≤ T : When nature moves towards Pa, decreasing the first
term, the second term increases; when nature moves towards the reference
distribuiton Pβ1 , minimizing the second term, the first term increases. How-
ever, moving from Pβ1 in direction of the upper extremal distribution Pb,
both terms increase:
Proposition 3.5.12. Let Q = Pβ1 ∈ M[a,b] be the reference distribution of
the entropic penalty, and f be increasing. Then, the worst case distribution
Pβ¯2 satisfies β¯2t ∈ [a, β1t ].
Proof. For h as above, we have
ess inf
β∈[a,b]
{
Eβ[h(t)|Ft−1] + Hˆt−1(β|β1)
}
≤ Eβ2 [h(t)|Ft−1] + Hˆt−1(β2|β1)
for all β2t ∈ [β1t , b] for all t as Hˆt−1(β1|β1) = 0 and ≥ 0 else and further-
more Eβ2 [h(t)|Ft−1] is increasing in β2 as seen in the proof of Lemma 13
in [Riedel, 09]. As Hˆt(·|β1) is strictly increasing on [β1t , b], we have strict
inequality on ]β1t , b].
We see, that the approaches e.g. in [Karatzas & Zamfirescu, 08], with
nature maximizing over the set of priors, are easier to handle in this context
as there is no tradeoff.
Example 3.5.13. The second extreme case for monotone increasing prob-
lems to be considered is the penalty’s reference distribution set to Q = Pb:
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Here, the smaller (β2t )t is chosen and hence the smaller the first term, the
more increases the penalty as nature deviates further from the reference dis-
tribution. In particular, we see that the worst case distribution depends on
the specific form of f , not just on f being increasing: Due to tradeoff, it
depends on the slope of f at a particular state of the world. This has severe
consequences for the complexity of calculations: Let us for example take the
case of an American call as considered in [Riedel, 09]. As long as it is in the
money, the slope of f is one, whereas it is zero when out of the money. I.e.,
when out of the money, nature cannot just apply a distribution low enough
to likely staying out of the money but also has to take care of it being close
enough to Q not to increase the penalty too much. In this sense, the penalty
comes relatively more severely into account when the call is out of the money
and, hence, the one step ahead worst case distribution depends on the current
state:
Remark 3.5.14. In case of variational preferences, correlation is already
introduced for the call that has independent rewards under multiple priors as
shown in [Riedel, 09].
In general, we see that an increase in penalty by deviating further from
Pβ1 to Pa is less severe the steeper f , i.e. the tradeoff effect is in favor of
minimizing the first part of the value function, the expectation. In extreme
cases we might even still have Pa to be the worst case distribution if f is“steep
enough”, i.e. the increase in penalty might be outweighed by the decrease in
expected f , and Pβ1 “is not too far away” from Pa. To sum up:
Proposition 3.5.15. As we have already seen, the worst case distribution
depends on the reference distribution Q of the penalty, i.e. on (β1t )t≤T . Fur-
thermore, as we have argued, it is a function of the current state of the world
and the specific form of the function f at that state and particularly of the
whole history.
It is hence immediate that not even a constant reference process (β1t )t≤T
induces a constant worst case (β¯2t )t≤T . This insight can be seen in the follow-
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ing calculations: Let Ut = h(1, . . . , t), bounded and Ft-measurable. Then,
the right hand side of the Snell envelope becomes
Eβ2t [h(1, . . . , t)|Ft−1] + θHˆt(β21 |Pβ
1
(·|Ft−1)|Ft)
= Eβ2t [h(1, . . . , t) + θ
(
(β2t − β1t )t − (L(β2t )− L(β1t ))
) |Ft−1].
In order to recursively obtain a worst-case distribution, we have to min-
imize this expression with respect to β2t ∈ [a, b] and obtain some β¯2t =
β¯2t (1, . . . , t−1, β
1
t ). In particular, we can see that the process achieving the
worst-case distribution is again previsible, i.e. β¯2t is Ft−1-measurable. Hence,
given a specific structure of (Xt)t≤T and a reference Pβ
1
for the penalty, we
receive a worst case measure Pβ¯2 where (β¯2t )t is achieved as above. Having
achieved this worst case distribution, we can calculate the optimal stopping
time τ ∗. However, as in general Hˆt(β¯2t |β1t ) 6= 0, we obtain a negation of
Theorem 5 in [Riedel, 09] for our approach:
Proposition 3.5.16. Let (β¯2t )t denote the process inducing the worst-case
distribution for the monotone problem under dynamic multiplier preferences
(piet )t≤T . Then,
Ut = max
{
Xt; ess inf
β2t+1∈[a,b]
(
Eβ2t+1 [Ut+1|Ft] + θHt+1(β2t+1|Pβ
1
(·|Ft))
)}
= max
{
Xt;Eβ¯
2
t+1 [Ut+1|Ft] + θHt+1(β¯2t+1|Pβ
1
(·|Ft))
}
≥ max
{
Xt;Eβ¯
2
t+1 [Ut+1|Ft]
}
= U β¯
2
t ,
where U β¯
2
t denotes the classical Snell envelope of the optimal stopping problem
under subjective prior given by β¯2. In particular, we see that
τ ∗ = inf
t
{Xt = Ut} ≥ inf
t
{Xt = U β¯2t } = τ β¯
2∗.
As the recursion formulas for the Snell Envelopes and hence the optimal stop-
ping times of the problem under dynamic multiplier preferences and the one
for an expected utility maximizer under the respective worst case distribution
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differ, we see that the intuition in [Riedel, 09] is not valid anymore: The
agent does not behave as the expected utility maximizer under the worst
case distribution.
As a tangible example, we apply the problem of an American put to vari-
ational preferences. We assume the agent to consider the market as “emerg-
ing”, i.e. she considers distributions more favorable under which the value of
the underlying is likely to go up. We hence set the reference distribution of
the entropic penalty to Pb. We will formally show the following result: As
the value of the American put is decreasing in the value of the underlying
and the penalty is minimal for Pb, the worst case distribution is given by Pb.
Moreover, as Hˆt(Pb|Pb) = 0 for all t, the agent behaves as expected utility
maximizer under the subjective prior Pb. Formally:
Example 3.5.17 (American Options in CRR-Model). Let the agent assess
utility in terms of dynamic multiplier preferences with entropic penalty given
by parameter θ = 1 and reference distribution Pb. We consider American
options for the Cox-Ross-Rubinstein (CRR) model: Let Ω := {0, 1}T , T <
∞.19 Let t : Ω → {0, 1}, t ≤ T , be the projection mappings and P0 such
that t’s are i.i.d. under P0 with P0[t = 1] = P0[t = 0] = 12 . Let M[a,b]
be given as in Assumption 3.5.5. As in [Riedel, 09], we then have for all
β := (βt)t that Pβ[t = 1|Ft−1] ∈ [p; p¯], where p := ea1+ea and p¯ := e
b
1+eb
. Let
Pa be again the distribution induced by the constant process with βt = a for
all t and equivalently for Pb. Then, under Pa, t’s are i.i.d. with Pa[t] = p
and equivalently for Pb with Pb[t] = p¯.
The “ingredients” of the CRR-model are given by a risk-less asset with
value process Bt = (1 + r)
t for some fixed interest rate r > −1 and a risky
asset with value process St at t such that S0 = 1 and
St+1 = St ·
{
(1 + d) if t+1 = 1,
(1 + c) if t+1 = 0,
19The infinite case can be achieved by virtue of Theorem 3.4.6.
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where we assume the constants to satisfy −1 < c < r < d for the model not
to allow for arbitrage opportunities.
Now, consider an American option with payoff A(t, St) from exercising at
t. The agent has to solve the problem20
ess sup
τ
ess inf
P∈M[a,b]
{
EP [A(τ, Sτ )] +H0(P|Pb)
}
.
To further elaborate the example: Assume Ap(t, St) being an American put
and, hence, decreasing in St for all t.
21 Let (U bt )t≤T denote the classical Snell
envelope of Ap(t, St) under subjective probability Pb, i.e.
U bt (t, St) = max
{
Ap(t, St); p¯U
b
t (t+ 1, St(1 + d))
+(1− p¯)U bt (t+ 1, St(1 + c))
}
.
The following assertion holds: The variational Snell envelope (Ut)t≤T of the
American put problem with dynamic multiplier preferences and reference
distribution Pb satisfies (Ut)t≤T = (U bt )t≤T . In particular, the worst case
distribution is given by Pb and, as the penalty vanishes for this distribution,
the optimal stopping time is given by τ ∗ = inf{t ≥ 0|Ap(t, St) = U bt } = τ b∗,
i.e. the optimal stopping time τ b∗ of the problem under subjective prior Pb.
The proof of this assertion is immediate by virtue of stochastic dominance:
As in Appendix H in [Riedel, 09], we show for the variational Snell envelope
(Ut)t≤T that Ut = u(t, St) = U bt , t ≤ T , for a function u that is decreasing
in the second variable: First, we have UT = A
p(T, ST ) = U
b
T by definition.
For an inductive proof, we write with a slight but intuitively understandable
misuse of notation Hˆt(pt+1 ⊗ pt+2 ⊗ . . . |Pb)22 for pi ∈ [p; p¯] and note that
Hˆt(p¯ ⊗ p¯ ⊗ . . . |Pb) = 0 and ≥ 0 else, i.e. p¯ at any t minimizes the penalty.
From the induction hypothesis, we have u(t+1, St(1+d)) ≤ u(t+1, St(1+c)).
20[Riedel, 09] achieves a general theory for American options under multiple priors.
21Equivalent results hold for an American call with Pa as reference distribution.
22Formally: Hˆt(pt+1 ⊗ pt+2 ⊗ . . . |Pb) := Hˆt(Pβ |Pb) with (βt)t≤T such that Pβ [t =
1|Ft−1] = pt for t ≤ T ; well defined as p1, . . . , pt drops by general definition of Hˆt.
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We hence have
Ut = max
{
Ap(t, St) ; min
pt+1∈[p;p¯]
{
pt+1u(t+ 1, St(1 + d))
+(1− pt+1)u(t+ 1, St(1 + c))
+Ht(pt+1 ⊗ p¯⊗ . . . |Pb)
}}
= max
{
Ap(t, St) ; p¯u(t+ 1, St(1 + d))
+(1− p¯)u(t+ 1, St(1 + c))
+Ht(p¯⊗ p¯⊗ . . . |Pb)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
}
= U bt .
Thus, we have the equality of the variational Snell envelope and the classical
Snell envelope under the worst case measure, i.e. (Ut)t≤T = (U bt )t≤T , and the
coincidence of the respective optimal stopping times, i.e. τ ∗ = τ b∗.
To conclude: The problem of optimally exercising an American put under
dynamic entropic risk with reference distribution Pb for the entropic penalty
coincides with the problem for the American put for an expected utility max-
imizer with respect to subjective prior Pb.
In a way, the result in the example is more like a self fulfilling prophecy
as the agent assumes the worst-case distribution to be the most likely one.
The same holds true for an American call with reference distribution Pa: In
that case, the reference distribution is also the worst-case one. However, due
to the tradeoff effects, Pa is not the worst-case distribution for the American
call when Pb is the reference distribution; as Pb is not worst-case distribution
for the American put when Pa is the reference one.
[Fo¨llmer & Schied, 02] introduce convex risk measures based on expected
loss or shortfall risk in a static framework. Entropic risk measures are just a
special case when loss is exponential. Carrying over these risk measures to a
dynamic framework, a fruitful further application could be achieved as risk
measures based on shortfall risk have a quite intuitive appeal.
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3.5.2 Dynamic Generalized AVaR
In the financial industry value at risk (V aR) still is a standard method for
risk quantification and risk management. Given a confidence level λ ∈]0, 1[,
V aR of a risky project X is “commonly” defined as
V aRλ(X) := inf {l ∈ R|P(X + l < 0) < λ} ,
i.e. the negative of the upper quantile, a definition that might inter alia be
found in [Cheridito & Stadje, 09]. Prominence of VaR might be due to its
simplicity in applications and its intuitive appeal. Though widely used, V aR
is neither convex nor coherent as it is not sub-additive: Applying V aR, a risk
officer runs the danger or accumulating a highly risky portfolio. A standard
example is inter alia given in [McNeil et al., 05]. Moreover, VaR does not
account for the actual magnitude of losses but just loss events. Being aware
of VaR’s shortcomings, average value at risk (AV aR) is introduced taking
into account not only loss probabilities in terms of quantiles, as V aR does,
but also the amount of possible loss. Nevertheless, AV aR is still intuitive
and easily implemented by virtue of
AV aRλ(X) :=
1
λ
∫ λ
0
V aRm(X)dm
for some level λ ∈]0, 1[. It can be shown that AVaR satisfies the robust
representation
AV aRλ(X) = sup
Q∈M
{
EQ[−X]− α(Q)}
for
αmin(Q) =
{
0 if dQ
dP0 ≤ 1λ ,∞ else.
Hence AV aR is a coherent risk measure giving raise for multiple prior prefer-
ences as considered in [Riedel, 09]. Elaborate discussions on AVaR and fur-
ther representations can be found in [McNeil et al., 05]. [Fo¨llmer et al., 09]
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introduce a generalization of AVaR, called utility based shortfall risk measure.
[Cheridito & Li, 09] use a convenient representation for AV aR which has an
immediate generalization to a convex risk measure, called generalized AV aR
(gAV aR) here. This convex risk measure gives then raise to a variational
preference by multiplying the robust representation with −1.
As shown in [Cheridito & Stadje, 09] as well as [Artzner et al., 07] the
natural dynamic extension of AV aR, and hence of gAV aR, just in terms
of conditional expectations is not time-consistent, cp. [Artzner et al., 99]’s
Definition 5.5. We thus define a time-consistent dynamic version of gAV aR,
called dyn gAV aR: In a first approach as in [Cheridito & Stadje, 09] recur-
sively in terms of the definition of time-consistency. Thereafter, recursively
in terms of the penalty function as in [Maccheroni et al., 06b] by compos-
ing one period ahead penalties directly achieving the robust representation.
By Corollary 4.8 in [Cheridito et al, 06], both approaches induce the same
time-consistent dynamic convex risk measure or, equivalently, the same time-
consistent dynamic variational preference.
Consider again the underlying filtered reference space (Ω, (Ft)t≤T ,P0).
Set Lit := L
i(Ω,Ft,P0|Ft) for i ∈ {0} ∪ N ∪ {∞}, t ≤ T . To start with,
we first consider the static convex risk measure gAV aR for some end pe-
riod payoff XT ∈ L∞T as in [Cheridito & Li, 09], T < ∞. Later this static
risk measure will serve as dyn gAV aR0 in the definition of the dynamic con-
vex risk measure (dyn gAV aRt)t≤T . We obtain robust representations for
gAV aR in terms of a penalty αmin, serving as αmin0 in the penalty function
(αmint )t≤T for (dyn gAV aRt)t≤T .
Definition 3.5.18. For (θ, β, p) ∈]0,∞[×]1,∞[×[1,∞[, define the risk mea-
sure gAVaR for XT ∈ L∞T , called generalized Average Value at Risk (gAVaR),
by virtue of
gAV aRβ,pθ (XT ) := min
s∈R
{
1
θ
∥∥(s−XT )+∥∥βp − s} ,
where ‖ · ‖p := (EP0|FT [| · |p])
1
p denotes the usual p-norm.
129
3. STOPPING WITH VARIATIONAL PREFERENCES
For ease of notation, we do not explicitly state the parameters but just
write gAV aR instead of gAV aRβ,pθ when these are obvious. We have:
Proposition 3.5.19. (a) For (θ, β, p) ∈ ]0, 1[×{1} × [1,∞[, gAV aRβ,pθ is
a coherent risk measure for XT ∈ L∞T with robust representation in terms of
minimal penalty αmin by virtue of
αmin(Q) =
{
0 if ‖ dQ|FT
dP0|FT
‖q ≤ 1θ ,
∞ else,
for Q ∈M, where q := p
p−1 and ‖
dQ|FT
dP0|FT
‖q =
(
EP0|FT [| dQ|FT
dP0|FT
|q]
) 1
q
.
(b) For θ ∈]0, 1[, β = p = 1, we have ‖ dQ|FT
dP0|FT
‖∞ = ess sup | dQ|FTdP0|FT | and hence
the robust representation becomes
gAV aR1,1θ (XT ) = sup
Q∈M
{
EQ|FT [−XT ]
∣∣ 0 ≤ dQ|FT
dP0|FT
≤ 1
θ
}
= AV aRθ(XT ),
which again shows AV aR to be a coherent risk measure.
(c) For (θ, β, p) ∈ ]0,∞[×]1,∞[×[1,∞[, gAV aRβ,pθ is a convex risk mea-
sure for XT ∈ L∞T with minimal penalty αgAV aR(Q) := c‖ dQ|FTdP0|FT ‖
d
q, where
q := p
p−1 , d :=
β
β−1 and c = θ
d−1β1−dd−1. Hence
gAV aRβ,pθ (XT ) = sup
Q∈M
{
EQ|FT [−XT ]− c
∥∥∥∥ dQ|FTdP0|FT
∥∥∥∥d
q
}
.
Proof. cp. [Cheridito & Li, 09].
[Cheridito & Stadje, 09] recursively achieve a time-consistent dynamic
version of AV aR for end period payoff XT . Mimicking this approach by
virtue of the definition of time-consistency for dynamic convex risk measures,
i.e. ρt = ρt(−ρt+1) or ,equivalently, pit = pit(pit+1) for dynamic variational
preferences,23 we obtain a time-consistent dynamic version of gAV aRβ,pθ .
23As we assume T being finite, time-consistency of dynamic risk measures is by Propo-
sition 4.5 in [Cheridito et al, 06] equivalent to “one-step time consistency” as applied in
this article.
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As in [Cheridito & Stadje, 09], we now define a time-consistent version
for the more general risk measure gAV aR in terms of the definition of time-
consistency:
Definition 3.5.20. We recursively define the dynamic convex risk measure
called dynamic generalized average value at risk, (dyn gAV aRt)t≤T , as fol-
lows: Let Xi ∈ Fi, i ≤ T , then we set for all t
dyn gAV aRt(Xj) := −Xj,
dyn gAV aRt(Xt+1) := ess inf
s∈L∞t
{
1
θ
(
E
[∣∣(s−Xt+1)+∣∣p∣∣Ft])βp − s} ,
dyn gAV aRt(Xz) := dyn gAV aRt(−dyn gAV aRt+1(Xz))
for j ≤ t, t+ 1 < z ≤ T .24
Remark 3.5.21. In terms of Definition 3.5.20, for an adapted payoff process
(Xt)t≤T and a stopping time τ ≤ T , the term dyn gAV aRt(Xτ ) is well defined
for t ≤ T .
Remark 3.5.22. From [Cheridito & Stadje, 09], we see that the natural dy-
namic generalization
gAV aRt(XT ) := ess inf
s∈L∞t
{
1
θ
(
E
[∣∣(s−XT )+∣∣p∣∣Ft])βp − s}
is not time-consistent. But in these terms our definition becomes
dyn gAV aRt(Xz) = gAV aRt(−dyn gAV aRt+1(Xz)).
Proposition 3.5.23. (dyn gAV aRt)t≤T is a time-consistent dynamic convex
risk measure, i.e. satisfies for t < T
dyn gAV aRt = dyn gAV aRt(−dyn gAV aRt+1).
24The last term is well-defined as dyn gAV aRt+1(Xz) is Ft+1-measurable. A special
case is of course z = T, in which case we are back in the setting of [Cheridito & Stadje, 09]
but for gAVaR instead of AVar.
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In our optimal stopping approach time-consistency can be written as: For
(Xt)t≤T , and a stopping time τ ≤ T we obtain for t < T
dyn gAV aRt(Xτ ) = dyn gAV aRt
(
Xτ I{τ≤t}
−dyn gAV aRt+1(Xτ )I{τ≥t+1}
)
= −Xτ I{τ≤t}
+dyn gAV aRt(−dyn gAV aRt+1(Xτ )I{τ≥t+1}).
Proof. Being a dynamic time-consistent convex risk measure is immediate by
Definition 3.5.20 in terms of the static convex risk measure gAV aR as the
recursion formula is just the definition of time-consistency.
Our special form of time-consistency follows immediately as we have al-
ready seen in the theoretical section. Nevertheless, we make it explicit here:
As τ ≤ T , Xτ is FT -measurable, i.e. at time T we know when we have
stopped the process. Writing Xτ = Xτ I{τ≤t} + Xτ I{τ≥t+1} we obtain with
conditional cash invariance
dyn gAV aRt(−dyn gAV aRt+1(Xτ ))
= dyn gAV aRt(−dyn gAV aRt+1(Xτ I{τ≤t} +Xτ I{τ≥t+1}))
= dyn gAV aRt(− dyn gAV aRt+1(Xτ I{τ≤t})︸ ︷︷ ︸
=−Xτ I{τ=t}
−dyn gAV aRt+1(Xτ )I{τ≥t+1})
= dyn gAV aRt(Xτ I{τ≤t} − dyn gAV aRt+1(Xτ )I{τ≥t+1})
= −Xτ I{τ≤t} + dyn gAV aRt(−dyn gAV aRt+1(Xτ )I{τ≥t+1}).
By [Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06], Theorem 4.5, (dyn gAV aRt)t≤T then of course
possesses a robust representation in terms of a minimal penalty satisfying the
no-gain condition by Proposition 3.2.15.
Definition 3.5.24. We say that the dynamic variational preference (piaRt )t≤T
is obtained by dynamic generalized average value at risk (dyn gAV aRt)t≤T if
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it is of the form
piaRt := −dyn gAV aRt.
Remark 3.5.25. By Proposition 3.5.23, (piaRt )t≤T is time-consistent, i.e. for
t < T , z ≤ T , we have
piaRt (Xz) = pi
aR
t (pi
aR
t+1(Xz)),
more elaborately for a stopping time τ ≤ T
piaRt (Xτ ) = Xτ I{τ≤t} + piaRt
(
piaRt+1(Xτ )I{τ≥t+1}
)
which shows time-consistency in terms of Proposition 3.2.16.
As the assertion in Theorem 3.4.1 can be reformulated not to make use of
the robust representation of dynamic variational preferences, we can directly
apply the variational Snell envelope approach25 and achieve for t < T
Ut = max
{
Xt; pi
aR
t (Ut+1)
}
= max {Xt;−dyn gAV aRt(Ut+1)}
= max
{
Xt; ess sup
s∈L∞t
{
s− 1
θ
(
E
[∣∣(s− Ut+1)+∣∣p∣∣Ft])βp}}
as Ut+1 is Ft+1-measurable. In order to achieve explicit solutions in terms
of worst-case distributions as done in the theoretical section, we rather want
to have the robust representation of (dyn gAV aRt)t≤T . Hence, we end this
section by establishing an alternative way to introduce a time-consistent dy-
namic version of gAV aR in terms of a robust representation, i.e. we ap-
propriately define a penalty (αgAVaRt )t≤T : Hereto, we will use the minimal
penalty αgAV aR of the static gAV aR as defined in Proposition 3.5.19. We
apply the recursive procedure from [Maccheroni et al., 06b] in terms of one
25In [Cheridito et al, 06], Section 5.3, optimal stopping problems with general monetary
risk measures are considered. In that case, the Snell envelope can only be given in this
form as the risk measure does not necessarily possess a robust representation.
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period ahead penalties (γt)t≤T to achieve a time-consistent dynamic mini-
mal penalty (αgAVaRt )t≤T . We then show that the dynamic time-consistent
variational preferences obtained by virtue of both procedures coincide.
To ease notation, we do not state this example in terms of one-period
ahead penalties γt but in terms of s-period ahead penalties α
min
t,t+s, s ≥ 0,
as defined in [Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06], p. 76. s-period ahead penalties con-
stitute a direct generalization of our one-period ahead penalties by virtue
of γt(Q|Ft+1(·|Ft)) = αmint,t+1(Q). We do not rigorously introduce the theory
in terms of these more general s-period ahead penalties: All assertions, in
particular the no-gain condition, can be analogously stated in terms of αmint,t+1.
The respective results are given in [Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06], Theorem 4.5.
Making use of αgAV aR in Proposition 3.5.19(c), define the s-period ahead
penalty at t by
αgAV aRt,t+s (Q) := αgAV aR(Q|Ft+s(·|Ft)) = c
(
EP0
[(
dQ
dP0
∣∣∣∣
Ft+s
)q∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]) d
q
for s ≥ 0, t+ s ≤ T , Q ∈M, and the parameters as in Proposition 3.5.19(c).
Note, that we then have αgAV aR0,0+T (Q) = αgAV aR(Q) = c
∥∥∥∥ dQdP0 ∣∣∣FT
∥∥∥∥d
q
. Then, the
one period ahead penalty γgAV aRt on M|Ft+1 is defined by
γgAV aRt (Q|Ft+1(·|Ft)) := αgAV aRt,t+1 (Q) = c
(
EP0
[(
dQ
dP0
∣∣∣∣
Ft+1
)q∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]) d
q
.
Given this one-step ahead penalty, we recursively define a dynamic penalty
(αgAV aRt )t≤T as in Theorem 2 in [Maccheroni et al., 06b]:
Definition 3.5.26. Let Ft ∈ Ft.We define the dynamic penalty (αgAV aRt )t≤T
by virtue of
αgAV aRT (Q)(ω) :=
{
0 if Q = I{ω},
∞ else for ω ∈ Ω,
αgAV aRt (Q)(Ft) :=
∫
αgAV aRt+1 (Q(·|Ft+1))dQ(·|Ft) + γgAV aRt (Q(·|Ft)|Ft+1)
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if Q(Ft) > 0,
αgAV aRt (Q)(Ft) := ∞ if Q(Ft) = 0,
for t < T .26
Applying (αgAV aRt )t≤T to a robust representation, we define dynamic vari-
ational preferences (piα
gAV aR
t )t≤T by
piα
gAV aR
t (XT ) := ess infQ∈M
{
EQ[XT |Ft] + αgAV aRt (Q)
}
for XT ∈ L∞T .
Remark 3.5.27. (piα
gAV aR
t )t≤T is a time-consistent dynamic variational pref-
erence. Indeed: It is a dynamic variational preference by virtue of its defi-
nition in terms of a robust representation. Time-consistency of (piα
gAV aR
t )t≤T
follows by Proposition 3.2.15 as the penalty (αgAV aRt )t≤T is defined recursively
in terms of the no-gain condition.
We have achieved two distinct time-consistent variational preferences gen-
eralizing gAV aR: (piaRt )t≤T = (−dyn gAV aRt)t≤T and (piαgAV aRt )t≤T . We
now show that these preferences coincide, i.e.
(piaRt )t≤T = (pi
αgAV aR
t )t≤T ,
given equality of the respective model parameters not explicitly stated here.
By Corollary 4.8 in [Cheridito et al, 06], it suffices to check that piaR0 (XT ) =
piα
gAV aR
0 (XT ) for FT -measurable random variables XT . However, for both piaR0
as well as piα
gAV aR
0 we have a robust representation:
piα
gAV aR
0 (XT ) = ess infQ∈M
{
EQ [XT ] + αgAV aR0 (Q)
}
,
26Intuitively, αgAVaRT (Q)(ω) is the penalty that only allows for the observed path
(ω1, . . . , ωT ).
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and on the other hand we have
piaR0 (XT ) = −dyn gAV aR0(XT )
= − ess inf
s∈R
{
1
θ
(
EP0 [|s−XT |p]
)β
p − s
}
= −gAV aR(XT )
= ess inf
Q∈M
{
EQ|FT [XT ] + αgAV aR(Q)
}
,
where the second equality follows by Definition 3.5.20 and time-consistency,
and the last by Proposition 3.5.19. Hence, it suffices to show equality of the
minimal penalties at t = 0, i.e. for all Q ∈M, we have to show
αgAV aR(Q) = αgAV aR0 (Q).
Indeed: As we have seen that αgAV aR0,0+T (Q) = αgAV aR(Q), it leaves to show
αgAV aR0,0+T (Q) = α
gAV aR
0 (Q). By Theorem 4.5 in [Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06], we
have the no-gain condition for s-period ahead penalties reducing to
αgAV aR0 (Q) = α
gAV aR
0,0+T (Q) + E
Q
[
αgAV aRT (Q)
∣∣∣F0] .
The right hand side equals αgAV aR0,0+T (Q) as EQ
[
αgAV aRT (Q)
∣∣∣F0] = 0 by defini-
tion of αT and the assumption thatQ ∈M: Otherwise EQ
[
αgAV aRT (Q)
∣∣∣F0] =
∞ contradicting Q ∈M.
Hence, both time-consistent dynamic variational preferences, piaR and
piα
gAV aR
, coincide and we have
piaRt (Xτ ) = ess infQ∈M
{
EQ[Xτ |Ft] + αgAV aRt (Q)
}
= Xτ I{τ≤t}
+ min
µ∈M|Ft+1
(∫
piaRt+1(Xτ )dµ+ γ
gAV aR
t (µ)
)
I{τ≥t+1}.
We have the following recursive representation of the Snell envelope of time-
consistent dynamic variational preferences induced by dynamic generalized
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average value at risk, (dyn gAV aRt)t≤T :
Ut = max
{
Xt; pi
aR
t (Ut+1)
}
= max
{
Xt; ess inf
µ∈M|Ft+1
(∫
piaRt+1(Ut+1)dµ+ γ
gAV aR
t (µ)
)}
= max
{
Xt; ess inf
µ∈M|Ft+1
(∫
Ut+1dµ+ c
(
E
[∣∣∣∣ dµdP0|Ft+1(·|Ft)
∣∣∣∣q∣∣∣∣Ft]) dq
)}
.
This representation enables us, given an explicit structure of (Xt)t≤T , to solve
the problem for an optimal stopping time τ ∗ as in Theorem 3.4.1.
3.6 Conclusions
We have generalized the theory of optimal stopping under multiple priors
as set out in [Riedel, 09] to dynamic convex risk measures or, equivalently,
dynamic variational preferences introduced in [Maccheroni et al., 06b]. To
achieve our results, we have introduced the notion of variational supermartin-
gales as a generalization of the usual notion of supermartingales. For this
concept, we have obtained results including a Doob decomposition and op-
tional sampling. These enabled us to generalize the classical optimal stopping
approach for an expected utility maximizer in [Neveu, 75] (Section VI.1) in
terms of Snell envelopes to the case of dynamic variational preferences by
virtue of variational Snell envelopes. We have achieved general optimal stop-
ping times for this problem and have shown that the solution to the infi-
tite horizon problem can be approximated by a sequence of solutions for an
approximating sequence of finite horizon problems. A further insight is a
minimax theorem similar to a minimax result in [Schied, 07] but making use
of time-consistency.
Our results were then applied to prominent examples: dynamic entropic
risk measures and dynamic generalized average value at risk. For the latter,
we are not aware of any reference having obtained this notion to a dynamic
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context. We applied static generalized average value at risk to a dynamic
set up solving a severe time-consistency issue. We have achieved a recursive
representation directly applicable to the optimal stopping approach in terms
of variational Snell envelopes.
To conclude, the virtue of the present article is that optimal stopping
problems are now solved for convex risk measures. This is important for
applications on financial markets: coherent risk measures, as a robust ap-
proach reducing model risk, are quite conservative. Convex risk measures
are a comprehensive vehicle to more liberally assess risk while still being ro-
bust: No specific probabilistic model is assumed but a penalty representing
the likelihood of distinct models.
Of course, our approach leaves a realm for further generalizations. It
seems possible to achieve the results in this article for general time-consistent
(monotone) monetary risk measures, i.e. relaxing the convexity assumption.
Of course, in that case, the robust representation in terms of penalty α does
not hold anymore. Hence, proofs have to be adjusted accordingly. However,
as we have explicitly stated in one of the examples, the variational Snell
envelope does not need a robust representation and can hence be generalized
to more general risk measures.27 The next direction in which theory might be
generalized is to relax the assumption of the payoff process being bounded.
27In [Cheridito et al, 06], Chapter 5.3, the authors introduce a stopping problem for
more general dynamic risk measures relaxing the convexity assumption. It is assumed
that expected reward (pit)t≤T is induced by a dynamic time-consistent monetary risk
measure, i.e. a dynamic time-consistent monotone translation invariant risk measure.
As the convexity assumption is relaxed, (pit)t≤T does not convey the robust representation
crucial for our recursive solution. However, having the agent maximizing over her set of
stopping times, the usual Snell envelope approach as set out in [Neveu, 75] is still valid.
Hence, [Cheridito et al, 06] achieve equality of the Snell envelope and the value function as
well as the smallest optimal stopping time as in Theorem 3.4.1. Moreover, they show the
value function to be time-consistent and again a monetary utility function, i.e. the value
function again has all properties of expected reward (pit)t≤T . Due to a missing robust
representation, the solution is not explicit.
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Several of the cited references consider convex risk measures for Lp processes
or, as in [Cheridito & Li, 09], risk measures defined on Orlicz spaces.
Besides these theoretical considerations, further examples and concrete
applications might be elaborated. As mentioned in the text, the theory
should be applied to dynamic risk measures based on expected shortfall as
a generalization of dynamic entropic risk measures or dynamic variational
preferences. These can inter alia be found in [Fo¨llmer et al., 09].
At last, the problem might be considered in a time-continuous setting.
Several approaches to convex risk measures in a time-continuous framework
are available: In [Bion-Nadal, 08], dynamic convex risk measures are achieved
by virtue of BMO martingales. A special case of this approach is given
in [Rosazza Gianin, 04] and [Rosazza Gianin, 06] via BSDE resulting in g-
expectations as introduced in [Peng, 97].
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Chapter 4
Learning for Convex Risk
Measures with Increasing
Information
4.1 Introduction
Reaching decisions concerning risky projects in a dynamic system, an agent
faces new information consecutively influencing her assessment of risk instan-
taneously.
In this article, we answer the question how anticipation of risk evolves
over time when an agent gathers information. We show that, in the limit, all
uncertainty is revealed but risk remains if the agent perceives risk in terms
of time-consistent dynamic convex risk measures and, hence, generalize the
famous Blackwell-Dubins Theorem to convex risk measures. We then relax
the time-consistency assumption and show the result to still be valid. Hereto,
a fundamental assumption is existence of a reference distribution that fixes
impossible and sure events by virtue of equivalence of distributions under
consideration.
Coherent risk measures were introduced by virtue of an axiomatic ansatz
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in [Artzner et al., 99] in a static setting and have been generalized to a dy-
namic framework in [Riedel, 04]. Tangible problems in this setup are inter
alia discussed in [Riedel, 09]. The equivalent theory of multiple prior prefer-
ences in a static setup is introduced in [Gilboa & Schmeidler, 89]; a dynamic
generalization is given in [Epstein & Schneider, 03]. Applying coherent risk
measures substantially decreases model risk as they do not assume a spe-
cific probability distribution to hold but assume a whole set of equally likely
probability models. Moreover, they possess a simple robust representation.
However, as they assume homogeneity, coherent risk measures do not ac-
count for liquidity risk. Though in financial applications, the Basel II accord
requires a “margin of conservatism”, coherent risk measures are far too con-
servative when estimating risk of a project as they result in a worst case
approach. Furthermore, popular examples of risk measures, as e.g. entropic
risk, are not coherent.
Hence, it seems worthwhile to consider a more sophisticated axiomatic
system: [Fo¨llmer & Schied, 04] introduce convex risk measures as a gener-
alization of coherent ones relaxing the homogeneity assumption. Equiva-
lently, [Maccheroni et al., 06a] generalize multiple prior preferences to varia-
tional preferences. Convex risk measures are applied to a dynamic setup in
[Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06] for a stochastic payoff in the last period or, equiva-
lently, in [Maccheroni et al., 06b] in terms of dynamic variational preferences.
[Cheridito et al, 06] applies dynamic convex risk measures to stochastic pay-
off processes. Given a set of possible probabilistic models, convex risk mea-
sures are less conservative than coherent ones. Dynamic convex risk measures
as well as dynamic variational preferences possess a robust representation in
terms of minimal penalized expectation. The minimal penalty, serving as
a measure for uncertainty aversion, uniquely characterizes the risk measure
or, respectively, the preference. Conditions on the minimal dynamic penalty
characterize time-consistency of the dynamic convex risk measure.
A parametric learning model in an uncertain environment for dynamic co-
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herent risk measures or, equivalently, dynamic multiple priors as introduced
in [Epstein & Schneider, 03], is elaborated in [Epstein & Schneider, 07]. The
main virtue of this article is to introduce learning based on experience to
convex risk measures models. First, we try to introduce learning in a con-
structive approach: we design a minimal penalty function and plug it into
the robust representation: Since the penalty might be seen as some inverse
likelihood of a specific prior distribution, we first apply a quite simple and
intuitive learning mechanism to the penalty. We calculate the likelihood of
a distribution given past experience and use this as updated penalty. The
intuition behind this approach is quite simple: observing good events, dis-
tributions of a payoff process that are “stochastically more dominated”, i.e.
put more weight on bad events, become more unlikely, i.e. have a higher
penalty. However, besides its intuitive appeal, it turns out that this proce-
dure does not result in a penalty function as it is backwards oriented and a
penalty function, by definition, incorporates probability distributions of the
future movement of the payoff process. In a second, more sophisticated ap-
proach, we model a penalty incorporating projections of “past” likelihoods on
future distributions. Here, we make use of the conditional relative entropy
as penalty function: we achieve a proper penalty that penalizes distributions
according to “distance” from the “most likely” distribution serving as refer-
ence distribution. However, the convex risk measure in terms of this penalty
turns out not to be time-consistent in general as shown by a counterexample.
In [Epstein & Schneider, 07], time-consistency is not an issue as multiplicity
of priors is not introduced in terms of multiple equally likely distributions of
the payoff process as e.g. in [Riedel, 09] or [Maccheroni et al., 06a], but in
terms of multiple distributions on the parameter space.
Our further approach is not constructive but takes the robust representa-
tion of a risk measure in terms of minimal penalty for granted. As the main
result of this article we achieve a generalization of the famous Blackwell-
Dubins Theorem in [Blackwell & Dubins, 62] from conditional probabilities
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to time-consistent dynamic convex risk measures. We pose a condition on
the minimal penalty in the robust representation, always satisfied by coherent
risk measures, forcing the convex risk measure to converge to the conditional
expected value under the true underlying distribution. Intuitively, this re-
sult states that, eventually, the uncertain distribution is revealed or, in other
words, uncertainty diminishes as information is gathered but risk remains.
The agent, as she has learned about the underlying distribution, is again
in the framework of being an expected utility maximizer with respect to the
true underlying distribution. We have hence achieved learning as an intrinsic
property of dynamic convex risk measures.
Our generalization of the Blackwell-Dubins Theorem serves as an alterna-
tive approach to limit behavior of time-consistent dynamic convex risk mea-
sures as the one in [Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06]. The result particularly states the
existence of a limiting risk measure. As an example we consider dynamic
entropic risk measures or, equivalently, dynamic multiplier preferences. We,
however, show a Blackwell-Dubins type result to hold, even if we relax the
time-consistency assumption. Again, we obtain existence of a limiting risk
measure but in a more general manner than [Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06] for not
necessarily time-consistent convex and coherent risk measures.
[Schnyder, 02] discusses H.P. Minsky’s theory of financial instability, a
huge portion of which is caused by herding on financial markets. Besides,
herding is usually one of the major objections towards Basel II. Our result
however shows that, in the long run, there is hardly any chance to circumvent
herding behavior.
The article is considered in a parametric setting. However, the second part
can be restated in a non parametric setting. It is structured as follows: The
next section formally introduces the underlying probabilistic model. Section
3 elaborately discusses robust representation of dynamic (time-consistent)
convex risk measures. Constructive approaches to learning in terms of dy-
namic minimal penalty as well as their shortcomings are stated in Section
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4. Section 5 generalizes the Blackwell-Dubins Theorem to conditional expec-
tations. The following two sections then apply this result to coherent and
convex risk measures first in the time-consistent case and then in the case
without time-consistency. Section 8 states examples. Then we conclude.
4.2 Model
For our model we start with a discrete time set t ∈ {0, ..., T} where T is an
infinite time horizon. We will now construct an underlying filtered reference
space (Ω,F , (Ft)t,Pθ0) and define risky projects X:
We fix (S,A) as a measurable space where S describes the possible states
of the world at a fixed point in time t and define Ω to be all possible states
of the world, formally the set of sequences of elements of S. For this let
St = S for all t ∈ {0, ..., T} and then define Ω :=
⊗T
t=0 St. On this space
let F be the product σ-field generated by all projections pit : Ω → St and
let the elements of the filtration Ft be generated by the sequence pi1, ..., pit.
Additionally define all sequences up to time t by Ωt :=
⊗t
s=0 Ss. Denote
generic elements on these spaces by st ∈ St, s ∈ Ω, st ∈ Ωt and at ∈ A.
Let Θ be a set of parameters where every θ ∈ Θ uniquely defines a distri-
bution Pθ on (Ω,F) with filtration (Ft)t and fix Pθ0 as a reference distribution
which can be seen as the true distribution of the states. For all θ ∈ Θ, Pθ
is assumed to be equivalent to Pθ0 . Let Me(Pθ0) denote the set of all distri-
butions on (Ω,F) equivalent to Pθ0 . Assume that all these can be achieved
by parameters θ ∈ Θ, i.e. Me(Pθ0) = {Pθ|θ ∈ Θ}. For Pθ ∈ Me(Pθ0) let
Pθ(·|Ft) denote the distribution conditional on Ft. Due to our assumption
to only consider distributions equivalent to Pθ0 , the reference distribution
merely fixes the null-sets of the model, i.e. distinct agents at least agree on
impossible and sure events. This assumption has no influence on the stochas-
tic structure of the distributions it just tells the decision makers what sure
or impossible events are. An economic interpretation of this assumption was
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given by Epstein and Marinacci in [Epstein & Marinacci, 07]. They related
it to an axiom on preferences first postulated by Kreps in [Kreps, 79]. He
claimed that if an agent is ambivalent between an act x and x ∪ x′ then he
should also be ambivalent between x ∪ x′′ and x ∪ x′ ∪ x′′. Meaning if the
possiblity of choosing x′ in addition to x brings no extra utility compared to
just being able to choose x, then also no additional utility should arise from
being able to choose x′ supplementary to x ∪ x′′.
Furthermore we define X : Ω → R to be an F -measurable random vari-
able which can be interpreted as a payoff at final time T . Assume X being
essentially bounded with ess sup |X| = κ > 0. Having constructed the fil-
tered reference space (Ω,F , (Ft)t≥0,Pθ0) as above, the sets of almost surely
bounded F -measurable and Ft-measurable random variables are denoted by
L∞ := L∞(Ω,F ,Pθ0) and L∞t := L∞(Ω,Ft,Pθ0), respectively. All equations
have to be understood Pθ0-almost surely.
Remark 4.2.1. As we will see in course of the article, the parametric set-
ting is only needed in the first part on the constructive approach to learn-
ing. All statements in the second part, the generalization of the Blackwell-
Dubins theorem, can be posed in terms of an arbitrary underlying filtered
space (Ω,F , (Ft)t≥0,P0) with distributions in Me(P0), where P0 denotes the
reference distribution, i.e. in a non-parametric setting. Moreover, for these
results, we do not need the particular structure of Ω in terms of a product of
marginal spaces St. We however follow the parametric approach throughout
to obtain a unified appearance.
4.3 Dynamic Convex Risk Measures
In this article, we apply the theory of convex risk measures as set out in
[Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06] for end-period payoffs. For payoff processes, con-
vex risk measures are described in [Cheridito et al, 06]. We do not consider
the axiomatic approach to convex risk but take the robust representation of
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dynamic convex risk measures or, equivalently, of dynamic variational pref-
erences as given.
Definition 4.3.1 (Dynamic Convex Risk & Penalty Functions). (a) A family
(ρt)t of mappings ρt : L
∞ → L∞t is called a dynamic convex risk measure if
each component ρt is a conditional convex risk measure, i.e. for all X ∈ L∞,
ρt can be represented in terms of
ρt(X) = ess sup
Q∈Me(Pθ0 )
(
EQ [−X| Ft]− αt(Q)
)
,
where (αt)t denotes the dynamic penalty function, i.e. a family of mappings
αt : Me(Pθ0) → L∞t , αt(Q) ∈ R+ ∪ ∞, closed and grounded. For technical
details on the penalty see [Fo¨llmer & Schied, 04].
(b) Equivalently, we define the dynamic concave monetary utility function
(ut)t by virtue of ut := −ρt, i.e.
ut(X) := ess inf
Q∈Me(Pθ0 )
(
EQ [X| Ft] + αt(Q)
)
.
Remark 4.3.2. (a) By Theorem 4.5 in [Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06], the above
robust representation in terms of Me(Pθ0) is sufficient to capture all time-
consistent dynamic convex risk measures.
(b) Assuming risk neutrality but uncertainty aversion, no discounting, and no
intermediate payoff, (ut)t is the robust representation of dynamic variational
preferences as introduced in [Maccheroni et al., 06b]. In this sense, all our
results also hold equivalently for dynamic variational preferences. However,
we have chosen to concentrate on dynamic convex risk measures here.
Assumption 4.3.3. In the robust representation, we assume the penalty αt
to be given by the minimal penalty αmint . The minimal penalty is introduced
in terms of acceptance sets in [Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06], p.64: For every Q ∈
Me(Pθ0)
αmint (Q) := ess sup
X∈L∞:ρt(X)≤0
EQ [−X| Ft] .
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As stated in the respective references, every dynamic convex risk mea-
sure (ρt)t can be expressed in terms of the above robust representation,
uniquely by virtue of the minimal penalty and vice versa. The notion of
minimal penalty is justified by the fact that every other penalty represent-
ing the same convex risk measure a.s. dominates the minimal one, cp.
[Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06]’s Remark 2.7. Throughout, we assume a represen-
tation in terms of the minimal penalty (αmint )t.
Remark 4.3.4 (Equivalent Notation). In our parametric set-up, a distribu-
tion Pθ of the process is uniquely defined by a parameter θ ∈ Θ. Hence, we
write
ρt(X) = ess sup
θ∈Θ
(
EPθ [−X| Ft]− αmint (θ)
)
.
Further assumptions on the risk measure under consideration will be
posed when necessary.
Remark 4.3.5 (On Coherent Risk). As set out in the references, the robust
representation of coherent risk is a special case of the robust representation
of convex risk when the penalty is trivial, i.e. for all t it holds
αt(θ) =
{
0 if Pθ(·|Ft) ∈ Q˜(·|Ft),
∞ else
for Q˜ the set of prior distributions induced by all θ in some set Θ˜ ⊂ Θ.
Throughout, Q˜ is assumed to be convex and weakly compact or, equivalently,
Θ˜ is assumed to be such.
The following definition is a major assumption needed in order to solve
tangible economic problems under convex risk.
Definition 4.3.6 (Time-Consistency). A dynamic convex risk measure (ρt)t
is called time-consistent if, for all t, s ∈ N, it holds
ρt = ρt(−ρt+s)
or, equivalently, ut = ut(ut+s).
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Remark 4.3.7. For the special approach here, [Cheridito et al, 06] show that
it suffices to consider s = 1 in the above definition.
Remark 4.3.8. As inter alia shown in [Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06], Theorem
4.5, time-consistency of (ρt)t is equivalent to a condition on the minimal
penalty (αmint )t called no-gain condition in [Maccheroni et al., 06b].
We now introduce a special class of dynamic convex risk measures that
will be used in several examples later on: Dynamic entropic risk measures.
Therefore, we first have to introduce:
Definition 4.3.9 (Relative Conditional Entropy). For P Q, we define the
relative entropy of P with respect to Q at time t ≥ 0 as
Ht(P|Q) := EP [logZt] ,
where (Zt)t by virtue of Zt :=
dP
dQ |Ft denotes the density process of P with
respect to Q. Furthermore, we define the conditional relative entropy of P
with respect to Q at time t ≥ 0 as
Hˆt(P|Q) := EP
[
log
ZT
Zt
∣∣∣∣Ft] = EQ [ZTZt log ZTZt
∣∣∣∣Ft] I{Zt>0}.
Definition 4.3.10 (Entropic Risk Measures). Given reference model Q ∈
Me(P0). Let δ > 0. We say that dynamic convex risk ρet (X) of a random
variable X ∈ L∞, is obtained by a dynamic entropic risk measure given
reference model Q ∈Me(Pθ0) if it is of the form
ρet (X) = ess sup
P∈Me(Pθ0 )
(
EP[−X|Ft]− δHˆt(P|Q)
)
. (4.1)
Equivalently, dynamic multiplier preferences (uet )t are defined by virtue of
uet (X) = ess infP∈Me(Pθ0 )
(
EP[X|Ft] + δHˆt(P|Q)
)
. (4.2)
Remark 4.3.11. The variational formula for relative entropy implies
ρet (X) = δ log(EQ[e−
1
δ
X |Ft]).
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Intuitively, an entropic risk measure means that the agent in an uncertain
setting beliefs the reference model Q as most likely and distributions “further
away” as more unlikely. Again, we can write (ρet )t by virtue of
ρet (X) = ess sup
θ∈Θ
(
EPθ [−X|Ft]− δHˆt(θ|η)
)
,
where Pη defines the reference model.
4.4 A Constructive Approach to Learning
In this section, we try to explicitly develop a learning mechanism by virtue of
penalty functions that are then used for the robust representation of dynamic
convex risk measures. We will encounter, that this is not an eligible approach
to model learning as it is still not clear how to explicitly form a penalty. In
a later section, we will just take the robust representation as given and pose
the question what can be said about learning when distinct properties of the
penalty are assumed.
4.4.1 The Intuition of Learning via Penalties
In a first, intuitive approach, we explicitly introduce a learning mechanism
to the penalty (αt)t in terms of a likelihood function. The fundamental idea
is that the penalty might be viewed as a measure for the likelihood of a
distribution. In the extreme case of coherent risk, this means
• αt(θ) =∞: Pθ is not possible,
• αt(θ) = 0: Pθ is among the most likely.
In general, the larger αt, the less likely the respective distribution. Stated in
other terms, (αt)t is a measure for uncertainty aversion: given two penalties
(α1t )t and (α
2
t )t, the a.s. larger one corresponds to the less uncerteinty averse
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agent. In the entropic case, αt(θ) = Ht(Pθ|Pθ¯), the conditional relative en-
tropy of Pθ with respect to Pθ¯ at time t, the agent considers Pθ¯ most likely as
Ht(Pθ¯|Pθ¯) = 0 and distributions “further away” as more and more unlikely.
In the coherent case characterized by a trivial penalty, learning means
to alternate the sets Q˜t := {P ∈ Q˜ | P(·|Ft) ∈ Q˜(·|Ft)} , t = 0, ..., T of
conditional priors on which the penalty as value zero: when more information
is available and hence, more might be known about the distribution that rules
the world, Q˜t ⊃ ˜Qt+1, i.e. penalty is increasing in t. For some cut off value
β, an intuitive approach would be in terms of some likelihood function l:
αt(θ) =
{
0 if l(Pθ|θ,Ft) ≥ β,
∞ else.
As a direct generalization to convex risk measures, one might consider the
log-likelihood − log(l(Q|θ,Ft)) as penalty. It will turn out that this approach
is not eligible since a penalty defined in terms of likelihood functions is not
feasible. Hence, we come up with a distinct ansatz in which penalty is given
by relative conditional entropy. We then achieve a dynamic convex risk
measure but run into trouble regarding time-consistency. A model defined
as above serves as a measure theoretic fundament of H.P. Minsky’s theory
of financial instability: A sequence of “good” events causes the penalty to
be smaller for distributions that stochastically dominate for the payoff under
consideration. Upon observing favorable events, the agent thinks that nature
has become kinder. This might help to understand underestimation of risk
leading to bubbles and financial instability in times of growth and financial
success.
4.4.2 Special Case: Explicit Learning for Coherent Risk
[Epstein & Schneider, 07] introduce learning for coherent risk in terms of
likelihood ratio tests. As we will see later, they do not consider the sets of
priors (Qt)t as for example in [Riedel, 04] but the process Pt(Ft) of one-step
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ahead conditional beliefs, formally introduced below, as these immediately
represent the learning process. Moreover, [Epstein & Schneider, 07] distin-
guish between information that can be learned and information that cannot:
Information that can be learned is incorporated in a the set of priors not
being singleton, information that cannot be learned is incorporated in the
set of likelihood functions not being singleton.
Formally, let the state space be given by ST := ⊗Tt=1St, St = S, Θ as in the
general model. The space of parameters will be slightly modified, i.e. every
θ ∈ Θ uniquely characterizes a distribution on S and not on Ω; however,
this modification is restricted to the current subsection. Let Q0 ⊂M(Θ) be
the set of priors on Θ and L the set of likelihoods, i.e. every l ∈ L satisfies
l(·|θ) ∈ M(S) and l(st|·) is Ft-measurable for st ∈ St. Set st = (s1, . . . , st),
si ∈ Si. Every µ0 ∈ Q0 together with a family of likelihoods (l1, l2, . . .) ∈ L∞
induces a prior P ∈Me(P0) of the payoff process or, equivalently, the process
(pt)t of one-step-ahead conditionals
pt(·|st) =
∫
Θ
l(·|θ)dµt(θ|st) ∈M(St+1),
where µt is derived from µ0 as described below and µt(·|st) ∈ Qt(st), the set
of posterior beliefs on Θ given history st. Hence, multiplicity of beliefs is
described by
Pt(st) =
{
pt(·|st) =
∫
Θ
l(·|θ)dµt(θ)
∣∣∣∣ µt ∈ Qαt (st), l ∈ L}
:=
∫
Θ
L(·|θ)dQαt (θ).
To complete the model, it leaves to show how (µ0; l1, . . .) induce µt or, equiv-
alently, how Qt(st) is obtained. For (µ0; l1, . . .), the posteriors are obtained
by Bayesian updating:
dµt(·, st, µ0, lt)
=
lt(st|·)∫
Θ
lt(st|θ˜dµt−1(θ˜, st−1, µ0, lt−1)
dµt−1(·, st−1, µ0, lt−1).
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Then, the posteriors are achieved by virtue of a likelihood ratio test in terms
of the unconditional data density:
Qαt (st) :=
{
µt(s
t, µ0, l
t)
∣∣∣∣∣µ0 ∈ Q0, lt ∈ Lt,
∫ t∏
j=1
lj(sj|θ)dµ0(θ)
≥ β max
µ¯0∈Q0,l¯t∈Lt
∫ t∏
j=1
l¯j(sj|θ)dµ¯0(θ)
}
for some bound β ∈ R+.
Remark 4.4.1. Conceptually, there is a huge difference between the ap-
proach in [Epstein & Schneider, 07] and [Gilboa & Schmeidler, 89]: In the
latter, the term “multiple priors” means multiple distributions of the payoff
stream, all being equally likely, in the former, it means multiple distribu-
tions of the parameter, i.e. multiple distributions on the distributions of
the payoff stream. Hence, [Epstein & Schneider, 07] is a generalization of
[Gilboa & Schmeidler, 89] as the latter framework is achieved with Q0 = {µ0}
with µ0 the uniform distribution on some subset of Θ. In that case we have
a trivial α and hence a coherent risk measure. Intuitively, a uniform distri-
bution on a subset of Θ corresponds to the agent believing all distributions in
that subset being equally likely and the others impossible.
Nevertheless, fruitful insights from [Epstein & Schneider, 07] can be gained
for our approach in particular the incorporation of a likelihood ratio test. We
go a step closer to [Gilboa & Schmeidler, 89] and introduce a single distribu-
tion on Θ inducing a unique penalty for a dynamic convex risk measure.
4.4.3 A First, Particularly Intuitive Approach: Sim-
plistic Learning
As stated above, multiple prior preferences mean the agent has a uniform
distribution on a subset of Θ: She is sure about which parameters are possible
and which not, but has no tendency towards their likeliness. In a way, this
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corresponds to a non-informative weighting or a trivial penalty function α0.
We act on this non-informative approach and assume the following penalty
at time zero: Let Θ˜ ⊂ Θ. The penalty corresponding to this distribution is
given by:
αt(θ) =
{
0 if θ ∈ Θ˜,
∞ else.
Hence, initially the convex risk measure is actually coherent:
ρ0(X) := ess sup
θ∈Θ
{
EPθ [−X]− α0(θ)
}
= ess sup
θ∈Θ˜
EPθ [−X].
We now come up with a simple learning mechanism directly defining the
dynamic penalty function (αt)t in terms of likelihoods. At t = 0, we have
already characterized the penalty. Furthermore, we set
α1(θ) := − ln
(
l(s1|θ)
supθ¯ l(s1|θ¯)
)
= − ln
(
Qθ(s1)
supθ¯Qθ¯(s1)
)
,
where s1 = s
1 and
α2(θ) = − ln
(
l(s2|θ)
supθ¯ l(s
2|θ¯)
)
= − ln
(
Qθ(s1)Qθ(s2|θ, s1)
γ2
)
,
where γ2 := supθ∈ΘQθ(s1)Qθ(s2|θ, s1).
Definition 4.4.2. We say that the penalty (αt)t in the robust representation
of the convex dynamic risk measure (ρt)t is achieved by simplistic learning,
if it is of the form:
αt(θ) := − ln
(∏t
i=1Qθ(si|θ, si−1)
γt
)
,
where γt := supθ∈Θ
∏t
i=1Qθ(si|θ, si−1).
Remark 4.4.3 (On improperness of simplistic learning). (αt)t achieved by
simplistic leaning is not a feasible penalty function.
Proof. A penalty at t shall include the conditional distributions from t on-
wards as seen in the definition. In our likelihood approach αt only depends
on distributions up to time t, i.e. already realized entities of the density
process.
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4.4.4 A Second, More Sophisticated Approach: En-
tropic Learning
We now incorporate the likelihood function in the relative entropy in order
to achieve a risk measure based on the well known and elegant entropic risk
measures.
Here, we assume θ = (θt)t ∈ Θ; every entity θt characterizes a distribution
in M(St) possibly dependent on (θi)i<t. The family θ = (θt)t then defines a
prior Pθ ∈Me(Pθ0). Set θt := (θ1, . . . , θt) analogous to st.
In the foregoing section, we have seen the major problem to be that our
“penalty” was only contingent on the past evolution of the density process.
There is however a whole bunch of possibilities to estimate the future by use
of past information. A prominent route is by virtue of maximum likelihood
estimator.
Definition 4.4.4 (Experience Based Learning). (a) Given likelihood l. Being
at time t, learning is said to be naive if the estimator θˆt for θt is achieved
solely by taking into account maximum likelihood for the observation st at
time t.
(b) Learning is called intermediate or experience based at level m, if θˆt is
the maximum likelihood estimator of the last m observations (st−m, . . . , st)
MLE−m ∈ arg max
θt∈Θ
l(st−m, . . . , st|θt, θˆt−1, st−m−1).
(c) Learning is said to be of maximum likelihood type, if, at any t, θˆt is the
maximum likelihood estimator of the whole history.
Note that the naive estimator is just the intermediate one at level zero.
Furthermore, note that our definition of experience based maximum like-
lihood. In the next definition, we characterize how learning results in a
distribution for the payoff.
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Definition 4.4.5 (Learning Distributions). Being at time t, having obtained
θˆt and the foregoing estimators (θˆi)i<t, the reference family θˆ of parameters
is achieved by
θˆi =
{
θˆi i ≤ t,
θˆt i > t.
Having seen how agents learn about the best fitting distribution, we now
formally introduce entropic learning for wich dynamic entropic risk measures
in Definition 4.3.10 serve as a vehicle: We choose the best fitting distribution
as reference distribution in the conditional relative entropy.
The agent’s variational utility incorporating learning is in our setup given
by a convex risk measure with an entropic penalty function:
Definition 4.4.6 (Experience Based Entropic Risk). A penalty (αˆt)t is said
to be achieved by experience based entropic learning if given as
αˆt(η) := δHˆt(Pη|Pθˆ)
for δ > 0 and θˆ = (θˆt)t achieved as in Definition 4.4.5, η = (ηt)t ∈ Θ. The
resulting convex risk measure (ρˆt)t incorporating this very penalty function is
then called experience based entropic risk.
Remark 4.4.7. (αˆθt )t is well defined as penalty; this is inter alia shown in
[Fo¨llmer & Schied, 04]. Due to our construction, the penalty now incorpo-
rates conditional distributions of future movements.
Remark 4.4.8. When the parameter is also the realization of an entity in
the density process, e.g. in a tree (cp. the example below), relative entropy
can directly be written as
αˆt(θ) = EP
θ
[
ln
(
dPθ
dPθ0
/ dPθˆ
dPθ0
)∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
.
Remark 4.4.9. Naive entropic learning reflects the tendency of the agent to
forget (or ignore) about the distant past and just assume the present to be the
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best estimator of the underlying model. This learning mechanism is then of
course particularly adjuvant in explaining a bubble as it is harder to see that
the financial system moves away from the fundamentals.
Despite [Epstein & Schneider, 07] we do not consider multiplicity of likeli-
hoods here. Hence, we do not incorporate information that cannot be learned
upon in our model. Though real world applications with several true param-
eters, e.g. in incomplete financial markets with a multiplicity of equivalent
martingale measures, would be modeled in terms of multiple likelihoods.
However, our main result in this section on “time-inconsistency” of expe-
rience based entropic risk would not change when extending the model to
multiple likelihoods.
Proposition 4.4.10. The model is well defined, i.e. for every t, ρˆt is a
conditional convex risk measure.
Proof. As can easily be seen, the model satisfies the axioms of convex risk
measures: ρˆt : L
∞ → L∞t and
• ρˆt is monotone, i.e. ρˆt(X) ≤ ρˆt(Y ) for X ≥ Y a.s.
• ρˆt is cash-invariant, i.e. ρˆt(X +m) = ρˆt(X)−m ∀m ∈ Lt, X ∈ LT
• ρˆt is convex as a function on LT
As inter alia shown [Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06], Proposition 4.4, dynamic en-
tropic risk measures are time-consistent when the reference distribution is
not learned but fixed at the beginning. However, now that the reference
distribution is also stochastic, we achieve:
Proposition 4.4.11. Experience based entropic risk is in general not time-
consistent.
Proof. As proof we construct the following counterexample showing an ex-
perience based entropic risk measure which is not time-consistent.
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Example 4.4.12 (Entropic Risk in a Tree). Since our example is mainly for
demonstration purposes we restrict ourselves to a simple Cox-Ross-Rubinstein
model with 3 time periods. Each time period is independent of those before.
One could imagine that in every time period a different coin is thrown and
the result of the coin toss determines the realization in the tree, e.g. from
heads results up and from tails down. The payoffs of our random variable
X are limited to the last time-period and are as shown in the figure below.
For tractability reasons we also confine ourselves to a single likelihood func-
tion l(· | θ). For the same reason we will also use the extreme case of naive
updating which means our reference measure will merely depend on the last
observed event in our tree. The probability for going up in this tree will always
be assumed to lie in the interval [a, b] where 0 < a ≤ b < 1.
Time-period 2: Since we want to show a contradiction to time-consistency
we will show that the recursive formula
ρˆt(X) = ρˆt(−ρˆt+s(X)) for all t ∈ [0, T ] and s ∈ N
is violated. So we start with the calculation of ρ2(X) for the different sets in
F2
ρˆ2(X)(up, up)
= ess sup
p∈[a,b]
E [−X | F2] (up, up)− E
[
ln
(
θ2
θ∗2
)
| F2
]
(up, up)
= sup
p∈[a,b]
(
−3p− 1 + p− p ln p
b
− (1− p) ln
(
1− p
1− b
))
= ln
(
be−3 + (1− b)e−1) ,
where the reference distribution Pθ∗ induced by θ∗ is determined by the fol-
lowing maximization:
θ∗ = (θ∗0, θ
∗
1, θ
∗
2), θ
∗
2 ∈ arg max
θ2∈[a,b]
l(up | θ2)
giving us the maximum-likelihood estimator for what happened in the last
time-period which we also think is the right distribution for the next time-
period.
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The result of this computation can also be obtained by using a variational
form which can for example be found in [Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06] and takes
the following form
ρˆt(X) = lnEP
θ∗
[exp(−X) | Ft] ,
where Pθ∗ is again the reference distribution the decision maker establishes
by looking at the past, which, as we look at naive learning, will again only
be what happened in the last period. Since this gives way for an easier and
quicker computation we will use this form for the following calculations:
ρˆ2(X)(down, up) = lnEP
θ∗
[exp(−X) | F2] (down, up)
= ln
(
be−1 + (1− b)e1) ,
ρˆ2(X)(up, down) = lnEP
θ∗
[exp(−X) | F2] (up, down)
= ln
(
ae−1 + (1− a)e1) .
Here one can nicely observe the extremeness of the naive learning approach.
Even though the decision maker in these two calculations is located at the
same vertex in the tree he has very different beliefs about the probability of
going up or down which causes strong shifts in his risk conception.
In the case of going first down then up he clearly believes up will be more
probable in the next step. This is visible in his choice of reference measure
Pθ∗ in the penalty function which he sets b for going up and 1 − b for going
down.
In contrast to this the decision maker who has observed up and then down
will put more weight on the probability of going down in the next step and
therefore sets his reference measure a for up and 1− a for down.
For the last possible event in time 2 our risk-measure takes the following
value:
ρˆ2(X)(down, down) = lnEP
θ∗
[exp(−X) | F2] (down, down)
= ln
(
ae1 + (1− a)e3) .
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Time-period 1: If for the next time-period we maintain the assumption of
time-consistency and make use of the recursive formula, using the variational
form as we did above will yield
ρˆ1(X)(up) = ρˆ1(−ρˆ2(X))(up) = lnEPθ
∗
[exp(ρˆ2(X)) | F1](up)
= ln
(
b
(
be−3 + (1− b)e−1)+ (1− b) (ae−1 + (1− a)e1))
= ln
(
b2e−3 + (a+ b)(1− b)e−1 + (1− a)e1) .
Now if we calculate ρˆ1(X)(up) without the time-consistency assumption mean-
ing we cannot use the recursive formula we obtain the following equation:
ρˆ1(X)(up) = ess sup
p,q∈[a,b]
Ep,q [−X | F1] (up)− Ep,q
[
ln
(
θ1θ2
θ∗1θ
∗
2
)
| F1
]
(up)
= ln
(
b2e−3 + 2b(1− b)e−1 + (1− b)2e1) .
This clearly is not the same as we obtained under the assumption of time-
consistency. However if our dynamic experience based entropic risk measure
were time-consistent these calculations should give us the same results. Hence
this example clearly shows us that the assumption of our risk measure being
time-consistent only leads up to contradictions and can therefore not be true.
To emphasize the reason for these inconsistencies set Zt :=
dPθ1
dPθ2
∣∣∣
Ft
, where
Pθi is the reference distribution the agent obtains at time i when looking at
past realizations and then maximizing the respective likelihood function. Then
for instance for t = 1 and ω = up we obtain:
ρˆ1(−ρˆ2(X − ln ZT
Z2
))(up)
= ln
[
EPθ1
[
exp
(
ρ2
(
X3 − ln Z3
Z2
))]
| F1
]
(up)
= ln
[
bEPθ2
[
e−X
Z
Z2
| F2
]
(up, up)
+(1− b)EPθ2
[
e−X
Z
Z2
| F2
]
(up, down)
]
= ln
[
b
(
be−3
bbb
bbb
bb
bb
+ (1− b)e−1 bb(1− b)
bb(1− b)
bb
bb
)
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+ (1− b)
(
ae−1
b(1− b)b
b(1− b)a
b(1− b)
b(1− b)
+(1− a)e1 b(1− b)(1− b)
b(1− b)(1− a)
b(1− b)
b(1− b)
)]
= ln
[
b2e−3 + 2b(1− b)e−1 + (1− b)2e1] = ρ1(X)(up),
which, if ZT
Zi
6= 1 (generally true), clearly contradicts time-consistency.
In this special case for example the measure Pθ1 corresponds to the mea-
sure assigning the probability b to up in every time period, whereas Pθ2 is the
measure assigning b to up in the first 2 time periods and a in the last. That
is why e.g. Z3(up, down, up) =
b(1−b)b
b(1−b)a and
Z3
Z2
(up, down, up) = b
a
.
4.4.5 Lack of Time Consistency
As we have seen in the foregoing paragraph our definition of experience based
entropic risk does not result in a time-consistent dynamic convex risk mea-
sure. This insight is somewhat disappointing as time consistency is a pros-
perous vehicle to solve tangible problems. On the other hand, [Schied, 07]
shows that a meaningful theory of convex risk can even be achieved in a not
generally time-consistent setting.
We have to pose the following question: Does there exist any learning
model for the reference distribution such that dynamic entropic risk becomes
time-consistent?
Remark 4.4.13. The major issue that might come into mind is the inde-
pendence of the reference distribution of future histories. As we will see,
this is basically the reason for the general impossibility result below. Fur-
thermore, the worst-case distribution chosen by nature is heavily dependent
on the reference distribution. As the latter one may change in a broad va-
riety of manners, there is no good reason to expect nature to choose in a
time-consistent way.
Next, we pose the most general definition of learning in entropic set-ups.
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Definition 4.4.14. A reference distribution Pθ˜ for experience based entropic
risk is said to be obtained by general learning if the family (θ˜t)t is a family
of random variables, i.e. not deterministically fixed from scratch. We call
the resulting dynamic convex risk measure (ρ˜gt )t defined by virtue of α˜
g
t :=
Hˆt(·|(θ˜t)t) in the robust representation general experience based entropic risk.
We see that our definition of experience based entropic risk satisfies the
above definition as in that context learning takes place in terms of maximum
likelihood.
Using this general definition of learning, we can show an impossibility
result for time-consistency of general experience based entropic risk.
Proposition 4.4.15. General experience based entropic risk (ρ˜gt )t is in gen-
eral not time-consistent.
Proof. Let θ˜ = (θ˜1, . . .) be obtained by general learning and
tθ˜ such that
Ptθ˜ = Pθ˜(·|Ft). Let Zt+1 := dQ
tθ˜
dQt+1θ˜
∣∣∣
Ft+1
. Then, we have
ρ˜gt (X) = lnEQ
tθ˜ [
e−X
∣∣Ft]
= lnEQ
tθ˜
[
elnE
Q
tθ˜
[e−X|Ft+1]
∣∣∣∣Ft]
= lnEQ
tθ˜
[
e
lnEQ
t+1θ˜
h
ZT
Zt+1
e−X
˛˛˛
Ft+1
i∣∣∣∣Ft]
= lnEQ
tθ˜
[
e
−(−ρt+1(X−ln( ZTZt+1 )))
∣∣∣∣Ft]
= ρ˜gt (−ρ˜gt+1(X − ln(
ZT
Zt+1
)))
6= ρ˜gt (−ρ˜gt+1(X)),
if ZT
Zt+1
6= 1 a.s., i.e. if, intuitively speaking, learning actually takes place and,
hence, the reference distributions at distinct time periods differ.
The foregoing result immediately implies our main intuition for expe-
rience based entropic risk not being time-consistent though quite puzzling
as entropic risk measures are broadly used as standard example for time-
consistent convex risk.
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Remark 4.4.16 (Main Intuition). The minimal penalty function uniquely
defines a risk measure. Changing the reference distribution due to learning
results in a different minimal penalty and hence, a distinct risk measure.
Hence, an experience based entropic risk measure is actually a family of dy-
namic entropic risk measures and our definition of time-consistency is not
even applicable.
4.4.6 A Retrospective – In Between
In this section, we have stated a constructive approach to learning for convex
risk measures. We have encountered several problems in doing that:
• In our first intuitive approach, we ran into problems in defining a
penalty function not entirely contingent on the past evolution of the
density process.
• In our second one, we ran into time-consistency problems.
In a way, in the next section, we put the cart before the horse: We
just take the robust representation in terms of minimal penalty of time-
consistent dynamic convex risk measures as given and ask ourselves what can
be said about “learning” in that respect. We will show an equivalent to the
fundamental Blackwell-Dubins Theorem for convex risk measures. As will be
seen, this result will be equivalently satisfied whenever the true parameter
is eventually learned upon as defined in the subsequent subsection. Our
result states some kind of herding behavior as every market participant will
eventually perceive risk in the same manner.
4.4.7 Learning for a given Time-Consistent Convex Risk
Measure
We now want to encounter, whether we actually have to construct a learning
mechanism or if learning is not already incorporated in some sense in the
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concept of a time-consistent convex risk measure.
Remark 4.4.17. We have stated that the time-consistency problem encoun-
tered so far in learning models is due to the fact that penalties are not just
random variables but random itself, i.e. also the functional form depends on
the observations. This assumption in general contradicts time-consistency as
we actually may achieve distinct risk measures at a particular point in time.
However, the basis for learning is already incorporated in convex risk as the
domain of penalty consists of bayesian updated distributions of the process.
Let us hence assume a true underlying parameter θ0 ∈ Θ and the agent
evaluates risk in terms of robust representation of time-consistent dynamic
convex risk (ρt)t with minimal penalty (α
min
t )t. We then state the following
definition:
Definition 4.4.18. We say that θ0 is eventually learned upon if∣∣∣ρt(X)− EPθ0 [−X|Ft]∣∣∣→ 0 Pθ0 − a.e.
for t→∞.
Proposition 4.4.19. The above definition is satisfied if and only if
lim
t→∞
∣∣∣∣ρt(X)− ∫
St+1
−ρt+1(X)Pθ0(dst+1|Ft)
∣∣∣∣ = 0 Pθ0 − a.e.
Proof. cp. [Klibanoff et al., 09], Proposition 5.
In the time-consistent case, the following assertion is equivalent to Defi-
nition 4.4.18:
Proposition 4.4.20. Given a time-consistent dynamic convex risk measure
(ρt)t, then θ0 is eventually learned upon if and only if
αmint (θ)
t→∞−→ 0 Pθ0 − a.e
for all θ such that αmin0 (θ) < 0.
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Proof. As (ρt)t is assumed to be time-consistent, it holds for all t
ρt = ρt(−ρt+1)
or, more elaborately, for all X
ρt(X)
= sup
θ∈Θ
{
EPθ [−X| Ft]− αmint (θ)
}
= sup
θ∈Θ
{
EPθ [−ρt+1(X)| Ft]− αmint (θ)
}
.
As further for all X ∫
St+1
−ρt+1(X)Pθ0(dst+1|Ft)
= EPθ0 [−ρt+1(X)| Ft]
= sup
θ∈Θ
{
EPθ [−ρt+1(X)| Ft]− α¯mint (θ)
}
,
where (α¯mint )t is defined as
α¯mint (θ) :=
{
0 if θ = θ0
∞ else,
the proof follows readily: αmint (θ)
t→∞−→ α¯mint (θ) by Proposition 4.4.19. Theo-
rem 5.4.(4) in [Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06] then shows equivalence to a vanishing
limit given time-consistency.
In the subsequent sections, we show the notion of being eventually learned
upon to be satisfied by convex risk measures in case of time-consistency and
under less stringent assumptions in terms of Blackwell & Dubins.
4.5 Adaption of Blackwell-Dubins Theorem
As a cornerstone for our main result on convergence of dynamic convex
risk measures, we first generalize the famous Blackwell-Dubins theorem, cp.
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[Blackwell & Dubins, 62], from conditional probabilities to conditional expec-
tations of risky projects. As set out in the model section, we assume existence
of a reference distribution Pθ0 , θ ∈ Θ, as in [Blackwell & Dubins, 62]. This
reference has to be interpersonally being agreed upon.
Proposition 4.5.1. Let Pθ be absolutely continuous with respect to Pθ0 for
some θ ∈ Θ,1 X as in the definition of the model, then∣∣EPθ [X |Ft]− EPθ0 [X |Ft]∣∣→ 0 Pθ0-almost surely for t→∞.
Proof. For improving readability denote Pθ0 by P and Pθ by Q.
Given P and Q, Q being assumed absolutely continuous with respect to
P, i.e. dQ
dP = q, and for every n,
dQ(·|Ft)
dP(·|Ft) = q(·|Ft). Then, the following line of
equations holds:
EQ[X|Ft] = EQ(·|Ft)[X]
= EP(·|Ft)[q(·|Ft)X]
and hence∣∣EQ[X|Ft]− EP[X|Ft]∣∣ = ∣∣EP(·|Ft) [(q(·|Ft)− 1)X]∣∣
≤ κ ∣∣EP(·|Ft) [(q(·|Ft)− 1)]∣∣
= κ
∣∣∣∣∫ (q(·|Ft)− 1)P(d · |Ft)∣∣∣∣ ,
which converges to zero P-a.s. by Blackwell-Dubins theorem as (Ft)t is as-
sumed to be a filtration and, hence, an increasing family of σ-fields.
Remark 4.5.2. As we see in the proof, the parametric setting is not needed.
The assertion can be shown in the same fashion in a non-parametric setting.
The same holds true for subsequent results.
1Note that we have assumed all distributions induced by parameters θ ∈ Θ to be
equivalent. In particular, all those are absolutely continuous with respect to each other
and this assumption is no restriction within our setup. Also note that the respective θ
does not have to be θ0.
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4.6 Time-Consistent Risk Measures
We will now show a Blackwell-Dubins type result for coherent as well as
convex risk measures in case time-consistency is assumed. We see that the
risk measure eventually equals the expected value under the true parameter;
in this sense, uncertainty vanishes but risk remains.
4.6.1 Time-Consistent Coherent Risk
Let (ρt)t be a time-consistent coherent risk measure possessing robust repre-
sentation
ρt(X) = sup
θ∈Θ˜
EPθ [−X |Ft],
with Θ˜ ⊂ Θ assumed to be a convex and compact set of parameters inducing
a weakly compact and convex set of priors Q˜ ⊂ Me(Pθ0).
Proposition 4.6.1. For every essentially bounded F-measurable random
variable X and time-consistent coherent risk measure (ρt)t we have∣∣ρt(X)− EPθ0 [−X |Ft]∣∣→ 0 Pθ0-almost surely for t→∞.
Proof. Thanks to the assumption of time-consistency and compactness there
exists a parameter θ∗ ∈ Θ˜ such that ρt(X) = EPθ
∗
[−X |Ft] for all t ∈
{0, ..., T} resulting in the following equation∣∣ρt(X)− EPθ0 [−X |Ft]∣∣ = ∣∣EPθ∗ [−X |Ft]− EPθ0 [−X |Ft]∣∣
and this converges to zero as t increases and Pθ∗ ∼ Pθ0 by Proposition 4.5.1.
Remark 4.6.2. Note that we have not assumed θ0 ∈ Θ˜.
Remark 4.6.3. The assumption that Θ˜ is weakly compact is a very crucial
assumption, as it assures that the supremum is actually attained. Addition-
ally it is a necessary property for our result to hold, which is shown in the
Proposition 4.6.4.
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Proposition 4.6.4. Weak compactness of the set {Pθ|θ ∈ Θ˜} of priors is a
necessary condition for our result in Proposition 4.6.1 to hold.
Proof. For the proof, see the counterexample in Section 4.8.2.
4.6.2 Time-Consistent Convex Risk
Let (ρt)t be a time-consistent dynamic convex risk measure, hence, possessing
the following robust representation:
ρt(X) = ess sup
θ∈Θ
{
EPθ [−X|Ft]− αmint (θ)
}
with dynamic minimal penalty (αmint )t.
Assumption 4.6.5. We assume (ρt)t to be continuous from below for all t,
i.e. for every sequence of random variables (Xj)j, Xj ∈ L∞ for all j, with
Xj ↗ X ∈ L∞ we have limj→∞ ρt(Xj) = ρt(X).
Remark 4.6.6. In the coherent case, continuity from below is equivalent to
weak compactness of the set {Pθ|(αt(θ))t = 0} = {Pθ|θ ∈ Θ˜} of priors as
inter alia shown in [Riedel, 09].
This assumption has technical advantages as it ensures the supremum to
be achieved in the robust representation of ρt. A proof is given in Theorem
1.2 of [Fo¨llmer et al., 09]. It is also shown that continuity from below implies
continuity from above. To sum up: continuity from above is equivalent to the
existence of a robust representation. Continuity from below (which general-
izes the compactness assumption in the coherent case) is equivalent to the
existence of a robust representation in terms of a distinct prior distribution,
the so called worst case distribution.
From an economic point of view, continuity from below results from a
feature of preferences already claimed in [Arrow, 71] and related to this as-
sumption by [Chateauneuf et al., 05]. The condition on preferences we need
to ask for in order to obtain this feature is called Monotone Continuity: If
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an act f is preferred over an act g then a consequence x is never that bad
that there is no small p such that x with probability p and f with probability
(1−p) is still preferred over g. The same is true for good consequences mixed
with g.
Formally this means, for acts f  g, a consequence x and a sequence of
events {En}n∈N with E1 ⊇ E2 ⊇ ... and ∩n∈NEn = ∅ there exists an n¯ ∈ N
such that [
x if s ∈ En¯
f(s) if s /∈ En¯
]
 g and f 
[
x if s ∈ En¯
g(s) if s /∈ En¯
]
.
Now with the help of this assumption we can show the Blackwell-Dubins
result for time-consistent convex risk measures:
Proposition 4.6.7. For every essentially bounded F-measurable random
variable X and time-consistent convex risk measure (ρt)t, continuous from
below, it holds∣∣ρt(X)− EPθ0 [−X |Ft]∣∣→ 0 Pθ0-almost surely for t→∞
if there exists θ ∈ Θ such that αmint (θ) → 0 Pθ0-almost surely and αmin0 (θ) <
∞.
Remark 4.6.8 (On the Assumption). By the main assumption in Proposi-
tion 4.6.7 there ought to be some θ such that the penalty vanishes in the long
run. This intuitively means that, eventually, nature at least has to pretend
some distribution to be the correct one. We see that this is satisfied e.g. in
the coherent or in the entropic case.
The assertion then states that it does not matter which risk measure was
chosen as long as the penalty is finite in the beginning. In the time-consistent
case, the penalty then vanishes for all those parameters and the convex risk
eventually will be coherent.
As we will see later, in the non-time-consistent case, nature has to pay a
price for not choosing a distribution time-consistently as in that case penalty
has to vanish for the true underlying parameter. To conclude: when nature
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chooses the worst case distribution time-consistently, she merely has to pre-
tend some distribution to be the underlying one. If she does not choose the
worst case measures at any stage time-consistently, she has to reveal the true
underlying distribution in the long run.
Remark 4.6.9. By Theorem 5.4 in [Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06] due to time-
consistency the assumption αmint (θ)→ 0 Pθ0-almost surely for some θ ∈ Θ is
equivalent to αmint (θ)→ 0 Pθ0-almost surely for all θ ∈ Θ with α0(θ) <∞.
Proof of the proposition. By our assumptions on (ρt)t there exists θ
∗ ∈ Θ
such that the assertion becomes∣∣∣EPθ∗ [−X|Ft]− αmint (θ∗)− EPθ0 [−X|Ft]∣∣∣→ 0 Pθ0-a.s.
By the foregoing proposition on coherent risk, we know that this assertion
holds if and only if ∣∣αmint (θ∗)∣∣→ 0 Pθ0-a.s.
Theorem 5.4 in [Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06] implies this convergence being equiv-
alent to ∣∣αmint (θ)∣∣→ 0 Pθ0-a.s.
for some θ ∈ Θ such that α0(θ) <∞ as assumed to hold in the assertion.
Corollary 4.6.10. By Proposition 4.4.20 under the conditions of Proposition
4.6.7, θ0 is eventually learned upon.
Again, note that we have not assumed θ0 such that α0(θ0) <∞.
Corollary 4.6.11. Every dynamic time-consistent convex risk measure (ρt)t
satisfying the assumptions of the Proposition 4.6.7 is asymptotically precise
as in the sense of [Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06], i.e. ρt(X)→ ρ∞(X) = −X, and
vice versa. In particular, this holds for the coherent case as t→∞.
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Proof. By the assumption of continuity from below, we know that a worst
case measure in the robust representation of (ρt)t is actually achieved. By
Theorem 5.4 (5) in [Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06] we have that ρt(X)→ ρ∞(X) ≥
−X as we have assumed αmint (θ0) → 0. Then the assertion is shown by
Proposition 5.11 in [Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06].
Remark 4.6.12. In [Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06] time-consistency is directly used
to show the existence of the limit ρ∞ := limt→∞ρt. As, by assumptions on X
in the model, limt→∞(EP
θ0 [−X |Ft]) exists we achieve existence of ρ∞ from
our result not directly from time-consistency. In our propostion the con-
vergence of the α corresponds to asymptotic precision, however starting at a
different point of view. The question now is if time-consistency is a necessary
condition for our result to hold. If so, we have gained nothing, if not, we have
a more general existence result for ρ∞ than [Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06]. We will
tackle the problem of necessity of time-consistency for our result within the
next section.
Proposition 4.6.13. (ρt)t being continuous from below is a necessary con-
dition for the result in Theorem 4.6.7 to hold.
Proof. In Proposition 4.6.4 we show necessity of weak compactness of the set
of priors for coherent risk measures. However, weak compactness is equivalent
to continuity from below and coherent risk measures are particular examples
for convex ones. This proofs the assertion.
Remark 4.6.14. In Proposition 4.6.7, if there does not exist θ such that
αmint (θ)→ 0 but αmint (θ∗) ≤ c ∈ R+ for all t ≥ n0 for some n0 ∈ N then there
is at least an upper bound on the remaining uncertainty:
|ρt(X)− EPθ0 [−X|Ft]| ≤ c
as t→∞.
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4.7 Not Necessarily Time-Consistent Risk Mea-
sures
We will now achieve a Blackwell-Dubins type result for dynamic coherent and
convex risk measures for which we do not pose the time-consistency assump-
tion. However, we still assume the dynamic risk measure to be continuous
from below, i.e. in the coherent case the set of priors to be weakly compact.
We can still show that anticipation of risk converges to the expected value
of a risky project X as defined in the model with respect to the underlying
parameter θ0.
4.7.1 Non Time-Consistent Coherent Risk
We will now restate the result in a manner that time-consistency is not
needed. We however need to assume that learning takes place; which is a
more liberal assumption than time-consistency as seen in Section 4.8.3.
Definition 4.7.1. (a) Given a dynamic convex risk measure (ρt)t, continu-
ous from below but not necessarily time-consistent, we call a distribution Pθ∗t
instantaneous worst case distribution at t if it satisfies2
ρt(X) = EP
θ∗t [−X| Ft]− αmint (θ∗t ).
(b) We say learning takes place if there exists a θ ∈ Θ, Pθ ∼ Pθ0, such that
the instantaneous worst case measures Pθ∗t → Pθ weakly for t → ∞. In the
coherent case we need θ ∈ Θ˜ as the penalty is infinite otherwise.
In this very definition, we see however, that the agent does not have to
learn the true underlying parameter θ0. In this sense, nature might mislead
her to a wrong parameter.
2Note, that existence is locally guaranteed by continuity from below. As we however
have not assumed time-consistency, the instantaneous worst case distributions at each time
period may differ, hence global existence is not necessarily fulfilled.
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We can now relax the time-consistency assumption in the main result of
this article. Note that time-consistency is a special case of Definition 4.7.1
given continuity from below as in that case the sequence of instantaneous
worst case parameters is constant. Hence, we achieve the more general result:
Proposition 4.7.2. Let (ρt)t be a not necessarily time-consistent dynamic
coherent risk measure for which learning takes place. Then∣∣ρt(X)− EPθ0 [−X |Ft]∣∣→ 0 Pθ0-almost surely for t→∞.
Proof. To make things clearer we will write the proof in terms of penalty
functions and not in terms of priors. We know that a coherent risk measure
has a robust representation of a convex risk measure with a penalty
αmint (θ) =
{
0 if Pθ(·|Ft) ∈ Q˜(·|Ft),
∞ else
where Q˜ is the set of priors, i.e. Q˜ = {Pθ|(αmint (θ))t = 0} uniquely defining
the coherent risk measure. As we are in the case of a coherent risk measure,
we particularly have αmint (θ
∗
t ) = 0.
First, note that in case αmint (θ) → ∞ for all θ ∈ Θ˜3, our convergence
result cannot hold, as limt→∞ EP
θ0 [−X|Ft] exists and is finite by assumption.
Secondly, in the time-consistent (coherent as well as convex) case, it suf-
fices to assume αmint (θ¯) → 0 for some θ¯ ∈ Θ. This assumption in the time-
consistent case is equivalent to αmint (θ)→ 0 for all θ for which αmin0 (θ) <∞
by Theorem 5.4 in [Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06].
Let us now turn to the proof itself: As Q˜ is assumed to be weakly compact
and non-empty, i.e. there exists a distribution that has penalty zero, we
achieve an instantaneous worst case distribution at each time step, i.e. at
any t, there exists θ∗t ∈ Θ s.t.
ρt(X) = EP
θ∗t [−X| Ft]− αmint (θ∗t ) = EP
θ∗t [−X|Ft].
Of course, due to “time-inconsistency”, we might have θ∗i 6= θ∗j for i 6= j.
3Of course, convergence is trivial in this case due to triviality of the penalty function.
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The proof is completed by showing the following convergence4
EPθ
∗
n [−X|Ft]→ EPθ0 [−X|F∞] for n, t→∞.
In order to do this we look at the following equation for n ≥ t which uses the
projectivity of the density, i.e. of the Radon-Nikodym derivative:
EPθ
∗
n [−X|Ft] = EPθ0 [−XdP
θ∗n
dPθ0
∣∣∣
Fn
|Ft].
Define the following sequence of random variables Yn := −X dPθ
∗
n
dPθ0
∣∣∣
Fn
. These
have finite expectation and thanks to our assumption that learning takes
place and the original Blackwell-Dubins result we have
Pθ0 [ lim
n→∞
Yn = −X] = Pθ0 [−XdP
θ∗∞
dPθ0
∣∣∣
F∞
= −X] = 1.
Then, by Lemma 4.7.4, the assertion follows.
Remark 4.7.3. Again, note that we have not assumed θ0 ∈ Θ˜.
In the foregoing proof, we need a general martingale convergence result
as stated in [Blackwell & Dubins, 62], Theorem 2. We know from Doob’s
famous martingale convergence result that
EPθ [X|Ft] = lim
t→∞
EPθ [X|F∞] a.s.
under suitable assumptions. The question is: If Xn ↗n X in some sense, is
it true that
EPθ [Xn|Ft] = lim
n,t→∞
EPθ [X|F ] a.s.?
A positive answer is given in the following lemma.
4By our assumptions we know:
• EPθ∗n [−X|Ft]→ EPθ [−X|Ft] for n→∞ as θ∗n → θ by Portemonteau’s Theorem.
• EPθ∗n [−X|Ft]→ EPθ
∗
n [−X|F∞] for t→∞ by Proposition 4.5.1.
The question now is, whether the result also holds when letting n, t→∞ at once.
In the time-consistent case, where θ∗i = θ
∗
j for all i, j, this is immediate by Proposition
4.5.1.
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Lemma 4.7.4. Fix θ. Let (Yn)n be a sequence of F-measurable random
variables such that EPθ [supn |Yn|] < ∞. Assume Yn →n→∞ Y almost surely
for some F-measurable random variable Y . Then, it holds5
lim
n,t→∞
EPθ [Yn| Ft] = EPθ [Y | F ] .
Proof. We re-sample the proof in [Blackwell & Dubins, 62]: For k ∈ N, set
Gk := sup{Yn|n ≥ k}. If n ≥ k, we hence have Yn ≤ Gk and thus
EPθ [Yn| Ft] ≤ EPθ [Gk| Ft] (4.3)
for all t. Together with Doob’s martingale convergence result and Lebesgue’s
theorem, we achieve
z := lim
j→∞
sup
n,t≥j
EPθ [Yn| Ft]
(4.3)
≤ lim
j→∞
sup
t≥j
EPθ [Gk| Ft]
= lim
t→∞
EPθ [Gk| Ft]
Doob
= EPθ [Gk| F ]
and
z ≤ lim
k→∞
EPθ [Gk | F ] Lebesgue= EPθ [Y | F ] .
In the same token,
x := lim
j→∞
inf
t,n≥j
EPθ [Yn| Ft] ≥ EPθ [Y | F ] ,
which completes the proof since
x = lim
j→∞
inf
t,n≥j
EPθ [Yn| Ft] ≤ lim
j→∞
sup
n,t≥j
EPθ [Yn| Ft] = z.
5The convergence in the assertion of the lemma can also be shown in L1.
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Remark 4.7.5 (On Blackwell-Dubins Type Learning). Blackwell-Dubins ap-
plies for learning models but does not necessarily result in time-consistency
as this notion is now motivated as a special case of our notion of θ0 to be
eventually learned upon.
We have built a bridge between the first and the second part of this article:
in the first part we have achieved dynamic convex risk measures by virtue of
learning that did not turn out to be time-consistent. Hence, we have shown,
that our result even holds for those models, e.g. entropic learning.
Remark 4.7.6. Note, that the above new version of the fundamental result
particularly holds for time-consistent dynamic coherent risk measures as then
such a limiting θ as in the Definition 4.7.1(b) always exists, the worst case
one. However, we particularly have an existence result for the limit ρ∞ :=
limt→∞ ρt in the non time-consistent case and thus a more general existence
result than in [Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06].
4.7.2 Non Time-Consistent Convex Risk
As in the case of coherent risk measures, we now state our generalization
of the Blackwell-Dubins theorem when the dynamic convex risk measure is
not assumed to be time-consistent. As in the coherent case, we assume that
learning takes place, i.e. there exists θ ∈ Θ such that the instantaneous worst
case θ∗t → θ as t → ∞. Furthermore, we have to assume αmint (θ∗t ) → 0 as
n→∞:6 As in the foregoing proof, we achieve convergence of the conditional
expectations under the family of instantaneous worst case distributions to the
conditional expectation under θ0.
Proposition 4.7.7. For every risky project X as set out in the model and
dynamic convex risk measure (ρt)t, continuous from below but not necessarily
time-consistent, we have∣∣ρt(X)− EPθ0 [−X |Ft]∣∣→ 0 Pθ0-almost surely for t→∞
6Note, again, we do not have to assume αmint (θ0)→ 0.
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if learning takes place for an instantaneous worst case sequence (θ∗t )t toward
some θ ∈ Θ and we have
αmint (θ
∗
t )→ 0.
Proof. Applying the procedure used in the proof of Proposition 4.7.2 to the
proof of Proposition 4.6.7 shows the assertion.
4.8 Examples
In this section, we first consider dynamic entropic risk measures as a promi-
nent economic example of time-consistent dynamic convex risk measures. In
the second part we state a counterexample serving as proof for Proposition
4.6.4 and 4.6.13. Lastly, we consider a dynamic risk measure that is not
time-consistent.
4.8.1 Entropic Risk
Here, we will have a look at time-consistent dynamic entropic risk measure
(ρet )t. Recall its Definition 4.3.10 in terms of
ρet(X) := δ logE
[
e−γX
∣∣Ft]
for some model parameter δ > 0. A fundamental result shows that the
robust representation of dynamic entropic risk is given in terms of conditional
relative entropy as penalty function, i.e. for all n, we have
αmint (θ) =
1
γ
Hˆt(Pθ|Pη) := 1
γ
EPθ
[
ln
ZT
Zt
∣∣∣∣Ft] ,
where Zt :=
dPθ
dPη
∣∣∣
Ft
, the Radon-Nikodym derivative of Pθ with respect to Pη
conditional on Ft.
The fundamental Blackwell-Dubins Theorem immediately shows that∣∣Pθ(·|Ft)− Pη(·|Ft)∣∣→ 0
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for every θ, η. Hence, we have that ZT
Zt
→ 1 Pθ0-a.s. for t→∞and hence
αmint (θ)→ 0
showing Proposition 4.6.7 to hold. This is an alternative way to show the
last assertion in Theorem 6.3 in [Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06] directly.
4.8.2 Counterexample
To show necessity of continuity from below in Proposition 4.6.7 we consider
the following example introduced in [Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06]:
The underlying probability space consists of the state space Ω = (0, 1]
endowed with the Lebesgue measure Pθ0 and a filtration (Ft)t generated by
the dyadic partitions of Ω. This means Ft is generated by the sets Jt,k :=
(k2−t, (k + 1)2−t] for k = 0, ..., 2t−1. In this setting [Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06]
construct a time-consistent coherent and therefore convex risk measures with
αmint (θ0)→ 0 Pθ0-a.s. of the following form:
ρt(X) = − ess sup{m ∈ L∞t |m ≤ X}.
That this sequence from all properties assumed in Proposition 4.6.7 is only
missing continuity from below (here equivalent to weak compactness of priors)
can be seen in the following way: Let t be arbitrary but fixed and X defined
by virtue of
X(ω) =
{
0 for ω ∈ (0, (2t − 1)2−t],
1 else.
Then we can construct a sequence (Xn)n, Xn ↗ X, such that ρt(Xn) = 0
for all n but ρt(X) = −X 6= 0. This shows (ρt)t not being continuous from
below.
Now we still have to show that for this construction the statement of our
proposition is not fulfilled. To verify this look at a set A assumed to be
F := σ(⋃t≥0Ft)-measurable such that Pθ0 [A] > 0 and Pθ0 [Ac ∩ Jt,k] 6= 0 for
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all t and k. For this set, it holds
lim
t→∞
∣∣∣ρt(1A)− EPθ0 [−1A |Ft]∣∣∣ = lim
t→∞
∣∣0 + Pθ0 [A |Ft]∣∣ = Pθ0 [A] > 0
and hence necessity of the continuity assumption is shown.
The skeptical reader might now object that such a set A might not exist.
For sake of completeness we briefly quote a set A from [Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06]
that satisfies our assumptions: Let A be defined by virtue of its complement
A :=
( ∞⋃
t=1
2t−1⋃
k=1
Ut(k2
−t)
)c
,
where Ut denotes the t-neighborhood and t ∈]0, 2−2t].
4.8.3 A Non Time-Consistent Example
Here, we consider the entropic learning model introduced in Definition 4.4.6
explicitly in terms of Ω = ⊗tSt. Let Pθ denote the distribution induced by
θ = (θt)t, θt inducing a marginal distribution in M(St). Though the model
looks quite similar to dynamic entropic risk measures, we briefly recall it: Let
the robust representation of a dynamic convex risk measure (ρˆt)t be given by
virtue of the penalty
αˆmint (θ) := δHˆt(Pθ|Pθˆ),
δ > 0 and θˆ = (θˆt)t be achieved as in Definition 4.4.5: for t ∈ N, θˆt is the
maximum likelihood estimator of the foregoing observations and θˆi := θˆt for
i > t. Restricting ourselves to the iid case, we know that we achieve θˆt → θ¯0,
Pθ0-a.ss, where θ0 = (θ¯0)t for some θ¯0 inducing a marginal distribution in
M(St). By definition, (ρˆt)t is a dynamic convex risk measure. As shown
in Proposition 4.4.15, (ρˆt)t is not time-consistent. By standard results on
conditional entropic risk measures, (ρˆt)t is continuous from below.
Furthermore, Proposition 4.7.7 is applicable and hence, our generaliza-
tion of Blackwell-Dubins’ theorem holds for experience based entropic risk.
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Indeed: By definition of the penalty and our considerations in Section 4.8.1,
αˆmint (θ) → 0 as t → ∞ for all θ ∈ Θ. Secondly, as the maximum likelihood
estimator is asymptotically stable, i.e. θˆt → θ¯0, the conditional reference
distributions Pθˆ(·|Ft) converge. Thus, the worst case instantaneous distribu-
tions Pθ∗t converge as in Definition 4.7.1 due to continuity of the entropy and
as the effective domain of the penalty is given by conditional distributions, a
fact that is made particularly precise in [Maccheroni et al., 06b].7
4.9 Conclusions
The major contribution of our results is to carry over the famous Blackwell-
Dubins theorem from probability distributions to convex risk measures. It is
particularly striking that the results still hold when time-consistency is not
posed as an assumption.
Hereto, the present article is twofold: In the first part, we show that
explicitly constructing dynamic convex risk measures by virtue of a penalty
emerging from a learning mechanism and inserted in the robust represen-
tation of convex risk measures leads to time-consistency problems. In the
second part, we have then assumed a time-consistent dynamic convex risk
measure for granted and asked the question of limit behavior; more elabo-
rately its convergence to the expected value under the true underlying dis-
tribution.
We therefore introduced a generalization of the famous Blackwell-Dubins
theorem on “Merging of Opinions” to conditional expected values. Existence
of a worst case distribution due to continuity from below and time-consistency
then allowed for a further generalization to coherent and convex risk mea-
sures. In particular, we have obtained the existence of the limiting risk
7The notation is quite misleading at this point: the worst case instantaneous distribu-
tions Pθ∗t ∈ Me(Pθ0) as in Definition 4.7.1 is a distribution on (Ω,F) as θ∗t is an element
of Θ and not a “marginal” parameter as the above θts.
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measure ρ∞ in that case.
By virtue of a counterexample, we have shown necessity of continuity
from below for our result. However, we have shown that time-consistency
is not necessary for the result to hold. In particular, we have obtained
a more general existence result for the limiting risk measure ρ∞ than in
[Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06]. Our generalization of the Blackwell-Dubins theorem
was shown to be equivalent to the notion of the parameter being eventually
learned upon and the notion of asymptotic precision in [Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06]
in the time-consistent case.
Further research should be conducted in the direction of our results.
First, of course, the riddle of explicitly constructing convex risk measures
by virtue of the penalty function is still to solve; in particular, how a learn-
ing mechanism might be introduced without destroying the assumption of
time-consistency. Weaker notions of time-consistency that are satisfied in
a “learning” environment should be introduced along with a comprehensive
theory allowing for solutions of tangible economic and social problems.
In the article at hand, we have considered risky projects with final payoffs,
i.e. random variables of the form X ∈ F . We have shown convergence of con-
vex risk measures to the conditional expected value with respect to the true
underlying distribution: a generalization of the Blackwell-Dubins theorem to
(not necessarily time-consistent) convex risk measures for final payoffs. To
us it seems being an interesting, yet challenging, task to generalize our result
to the case of convex risk measures for stochastic payoff processes (Xt)t with
respect to some filtration (Ft)t, where each Xt denotes the stochastic payoff
in period t. [Cheridito et al, 06] introduce dynamic convex risk measures for
these stochastic processes and elaborately discuss time-consistency issues but
do not inspect limiting behavior. A major difficulty in the case of stochastic
processes is that the assumption of equivalent distributions should be re-
placed by local equivalence, cp. [Riedel, 09]. Hence, the main question turns
out to be if the result still holds assuming local instead of global equivalence
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as done here.
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Chapter 5
Closing Remarks
Within the three essays of this thesis we have tackled several problems arising
in case of dynamic coherent as well as convex risk measures or, equivalently,
dynamic variational preferences. Each essay is elaborately given in one chap-
ter and finalized by a conclusion stating achievements of that essay’s results
as well as limitations and ideas for further research. Nevertheless, we briefly
summarize our results here at the very end:
First, we have generalized the Best-Choice or Secretary problem to the
case of an ambiguous number of applicants. For this problem we have
achieved a result on the number of stopping islands generalizing the main
theorem in [Presman & Sonin, 72]. In order to achieve this, we have encoun-
tered several problems in directly generalizing the risky to the ambiguous
problem and hence have built a model in terms of assessments.
Thereafter, we have build a general theory for optimal stopping of pay-
off processes in context of time-consistent dynamic variational preferences.
In order to achieve our results on optimal stopping times by virtue of so
called variational Snell envelopes extending [Riedel, 09], we have introduced
the notion of variational supermartingales and have built an accompanying
martingale theory. We have applied our insights to dynamic entropic risk
measures and average value at risk.
5. CLOSING REMARKS
In the third article, we have considered dynamic convex risk measures
when information is gathered in course of time. We have generalized the
fundamental Blackwell-Dubins theorem from [Blackwell & Dubins, 62] to not
necessarily time-consistent dynamic convex risk measures and have thus shown
their convergence to conditional expected values with respect to the true un-
derlying distribution: Intuitively the result shows that uncertainty vanishes
but risk endures.
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